Military internal security operations in Plateau State, North Central Nigeria : Ameliorating or exacerbating insecurity? by Musa, Sallek Yaks
Military internal security operations in Plateau State, North Central 
Nigeria: Ameliorating or exacerbating insecurity? 
by 
Sallek Yaks Musa 
Supervisor: Prof L.P.T. Heinecken 
December 2018
Dissertation presented for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at 
Stellenbosch University 
i 
DECLARATION 
By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein 
is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise 
stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third 
party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any 
qualification. 
December 2018 
Copyright © 2018 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The primary responsibility of a state is the protection of its citizens against external aggression and 
internal violence and disturbances. Conventionally, the latter is normally the duty of the police. 
However, in Nigeria as in many African states, as violence erupts and the security situation worsens, 
government often relies on deploying the military to enforce orderliness and the return of peace. This 
action is largely due to the inability of the police to contain violent conflicts, especially where the 
security of the citizenry is threatened by armed groups. This is the situation in Plateau State, Nigeria 
where the military is used for military internal security operations since violence broke out between 
Christians and Muslims in Jos, on 7 September 2001. 
Several studies have indicated support for the use of the military as a ‘necessary evil’ to enforce 
ceasefires and ensure the return to peace. However, this study finds that using the military evokes 
several challenges which undermine both the legitimacy of the military mission and its professional 
image. Along with this is the concern that the conduct of soldiers adds to worsen the security situation 
of the citizenry, which in turn strains civil-military relations (CMR). Two factors were identified as 
responsible for the problems: a lack of military professionalism, and the cultural disposition of soldiers 
in terms of the unsuitability of military habitus with civilian values. Whereas the problems could be 
addressed with effective civil control of the military, the study argues that civil control is weak in 
Nigeria, despite the existence of a legal framework that could ensure this. 
To understand the problem, the study reviewed the separation, integration, agency, and concordance 
theories, and it argues that they are limited in scope and application. As such, they are unable to fully 
explain CMR in Nigeria. In this regard, a quadrumvirate interaction theory which upholds aspects of 
concordance theory explanation of CMR was proposed to fill the void. The theory contends that CMR 
is a tripartite relationship, with interactions among the partners occurring as a quadrumvirate along a 
major intersecting level and three different subunits. The theory introduced a typology indicating that 
the citizenry can exert agency in CMR in four different ways: compliance, contestation, collaboration, 
and confrontation against demands, policies, actions or inactions of the other partners. 
The aim of the study was to understand whether the Nigerian State is exercising adequate civil control 
of the military to ensure that it does not become a threat to the citizenry and exacerbate insecurity. 
55 one-on-one interviews with civilians across different social categories were conducted in six local 
government areas in Plateau State to understand this. The study found that the military acts 
unprofessionally and soldiers abuse of civilians is a recurring phenomenon, hence civilians are 
dissatisfied with the military. This has affected CMR, and civilians are exerting their agency including 
using confrontation that has resulted to the killing of some personnel, because they see the military as 
exacerbating insecurity.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die primêre verantwoordelikheid van ’n staat is die beskerming van sy burgers teen eksterne aggressie, 
asook interne geweld en oproeringe. Laasgenoemde is volgens konvensie normaalweg die plig van die 
polisie, maar in Nigerië – soos in baie ander Afrika-state – maak die regering dikwels staat op die 
ontplooiing van die weermag om orde en vrede te herstel wanneer geweld uitbreek en die 
veiligheidsituasie versleg. Hierdie optrede kan grootliks toegeskryf word aan die onvermoë van die 
polisie om gewelddadige konflikte te beheer, veral wanneer die veiligheid van inwoners bedreig word 
deur gewapende groepe. Dit is die geval in die Plateau-Staat in Nigerië, waar die weermag gebruik 
word vir interne millitêre veiligheidsoperasies sedert geweld op 7 September 2001 uitgebreek het 
tussen Christene en Moslems in Jos. 
Verskeie studies ondersteun die gebruik van die weermag as ’n ‘noodsaaklike euwel’ om ’n 
wapenstilstand af te dwing en om vrede te herstel. Hierdie studie bevind egter dat die gebruik van die 
weermag aanleiding gee tot verskeie uitdagings, ten opsigte van die legitimiteit van die millitêre 
operasie as die professionele beeld van die weermag. Tesame hiermee, is daar die bekommernis dat 
die optrede van soldate die veiligheid van burgers verder in gevaar stel, wat weer aanleiding gee tot 
gespanne siviel-militêre betrekkinge (SMB). Twee oorsake vir hierdie probleme is geïdentifiseer: ’n 
gebrek aan millitêre professionaliteit, en die onversoenbaarheid van millitêre gewoontes met siviele 
waardes weens die kulturele disposisie van soldate. Hierdie studie voer aan dat hoewel dit moontlik 
sou wees om dié probleme suksesvol aan te spreek met effektiewe siviele beheer oor die weermag, 
siviele beheer in Nigerië swak is, ten spyte van die bestaan van ’n regstelsel wat dit sou kon verseker. 
Die studie het die probleem ondersoek aan die hand van verskeie SMB teorieë, naamlik die skeidings-
integrasie-, agentskap-, en ooreenkomsteorieë, en argumenteer dat hierdie teorieë beperk is ten 
opsigte van omvang en toepassing, en kan daarom nie die situasie in Nigerië ten volle verduidelik nie. 
’n Viermanskapmodel, ’n aanpassing van ooreenkoms-teorie en die oorvleuelende sfere in ’n 
staatsbewind, is voorgestel om die gaping te vul. Dié model voer aan dat SMB ’n drieparty-vennootskap 
is, waar interaksies tussen die vennote geskied as ’n viermanskap by ’n belangrike snyvlak en drie 
verskillende sub-eenhede. As ’n selfstandige vennoot kan die inwoners die SMB beïnvloed wanneer 
burgers hulle agentskap uitoefen deur gehoorsaamheid aan instruksies, samewerking met die weermag, 
en teenstand teen gewelddadige en vyandige millitêre optrede. 
Die studie het gepoog om te bepaal of die Nigeriese staat genoegsame siviele beheer oor die weermag 
uitoefen om te verseker dat dit nie ’n bedreiging word vir inwoners wat hul veiligheid verder in gedrang 
kan bring nie. Vyf-en-vyftig individuele onderhoude is gevoer met burgers uit verskillende sosiale 
kategorieë in ses plaaslike regeringsgebiede van die Plateau-staat. Resultate dui daarop dat burgers 
ontevrede is met die weermag en dat hulle voel dat magsmisbruik en hardhandige optrede deur soldate 
hul veiligheidsituasie versleg. In geval van millitêre magsmisbruik gee baie burgers gehoor aan millitêre 
instruksies en strafmaatreëls. Sommige werk saam met gekompromitteerde soldate om onwettige 
doelwitte na te streef, terwyl ander hul agentskap uitoefen en weerstand bied teen magsmisbruik. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
One primary responsibility of a state is the protection of its citizens against external aggression, and 
internal violence and disturbances. The latter is normally the duty of the police in liberal democracies 
(Bigo, 2000; Lioe, 2011).1 However, in Nigeria, as in many African States, as violence erupts and the 
security situation worsens, governments often rely on deploying the military to enforce orderliness 
and the return of peace (Enloe, 1977; Collier, 1999; Howe, 2001). This is largely because the police 
are unable to contain violent conflicts, especially where the security of the citizenry is threatened by 
armed groups2 (Nwolise, 2007; Omede, 2012). As a consequence, Herbst (2004) and Baker (2010) 
argue that most African police forces are generally not well equipped or trained to deal with the 
challenges that armed groups and internal armed conflicts evoke. Consequently, the government is 
often compelled to use the military in an internal role as it is the only state organ with the requisite 
coercive capacity to suppress violence, disorderliness or insurgency (Peterside, 2014b). The ability to 
contain such violence is a challenge facing many African states in the 21st century. This is especially 
true where the conflicts escalate, and plunge the country into a state of internal warfare (Okumu & 
Ikelegbe, 2010b). 
The causes of these violent conflicts in Africa can be ascribed to numerous factors (see for example 
Gurr, Marshall & Khosla, 2000; Sarkees, Wayman & Singer, 2003). These include high income 
inequality, manipulation and exploitation of ethnic and religious differences, greed, and lack of judicial 
remedies to address these grievances (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Other factors include 
government failure to deliver basic public goods, grievances arising from the marginalisation of minority 
ethnic groups, and the inability of the citizenry to gain access to economic, political, or social privileges 
in society. Typically, these situations are exploited by armed groups, a majority of which are driven by 
political motives, economic intent, and extremist religious ideologies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 75; Vreӱ, 
2010: 59). The proliferation of these armed groups in their various forms is currently occupying a 
critical position in international politics and security sector reforms in the 21st century (Vinci, 2008). 
In this regard, one cannot help but agree with Thompson (2014: 60) that their mere existence poses 
                                               
1 The study approaches state security from the conventional viewpoint which sees state security as broadly divided into two 
realms: the internal and external realm (see Bigo, 2000, 2006; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009; Lioe, 2011; Weiss, 2011).  
Conventionally, the internal realm focuses on public safety, public order, and law enforcement, while the external realm 
focuses on fighting wars and defence (Bigo, 2006; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009; Weiss, 2011). In this regard, the police and other 
civil security agencies are in charge of internal security services, while the military defends the state against external aggression 
(Lutterbeck, 2004). 
2 Unless stated otherwise, the concept of ‘armed groups’ is used in this study to refer to non-state armed actors. See 
Thompson (2014: 54) for a detailed distinction between armed groups and state militaries. 
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a major security threat, “whether or not they are active in the country or only just using it as a safe 
haven.”3 This is essentially because to accomplish their goals, they intimidate and harass the citizenry 
and use coercive violence and crime to achieve their goals (Shultz, Farah & Lochard, 2004; Thompson, 
2014). 
Typically, armed groups are “classical spoilers or trouble-makers for state-building and peace-building 
efforts” (Schneckener, 2006: 35). They threaten the security of the citizenry and the delivery of public 
goods by exploiting existing grievances and disrupting the core functions of states, thereby 
undermining state legitimacy (Stewart, 2002, 2004). This is especially true when they launch 
coordinated attacks on civilian groups, critical infrastructures, or state forces and are able to gain 
territorial control of parts of a state (Thompson, 2014: 61–62). To this end, it is argued that dealing 
with or curtailing armed groups is immensely difficult, and requires high levels of force to contain the 
threats they pose to society (Ogah, 2011; Peterside, 2014b). The result is that states turn to the 
military to assist the police in maintaining internal security and to contain the threats armed groups 
evoke.4 
Using the military for internal security operations (ISOPs), otherwise known as military aid to civil 
authority (MACA), comes with its own challenges. One relates to the training of military personnel, 
which is not suited for use in an internal role in society. The orientation of the military is focused on 
defence, war and the infliction of collective violence, unlike the police whose main function is law 
enforcement (Harris, 2003; Weiss, 2012). Where they work in collaborative units, or as a hybrid 
security forces with the police and other civilian agencies, the military tends to dominate. Typically, 
this occurs in states that have no constabulary forces or gendarmeries. Hybrid forces consisting of 
joint police and military units create several problems in terms of command and control, the nature 
of operations, and organisational culture. Several scholars have pointed out that numerous difficulties 
emerge when personnel of different combat orientation strategies, tactics, training and instructions 
have to work together as a team (Clausewitz, 1976; Crelinsten, 1998; O’Hanlon, 2000; Weiss, 2012). 
There are several other concerns pertaining to the internal use of the military in society. Key among 
these are the military’s excessive use of force, militarism and the militarisation of society, as well as 
the restriction of civil liberties (Nwolise, 2007; Odoemene, 2012). Often, the problems arise because 
military training and the combat orientation of soldiers are not suited for crowd control and law 
                                               
3 A recent instance of this is the case of the Boko Haram group which started its operations in the border town of Maiduguri 
in Nigeria (Azumah, 2015). As pressure mounted on the groups from Nigeria’s security forces, the group sought refuge in 
the poorly-controlled border territories between Cameroon and Nigeria. Today, the group has not only used Cameroon as 
a safe haven but also as an operational base, and has carried out numerous attacks which have claimed a number of lives, 
including Cameroonian soldiers (Blair, 2015). 
4 For contextual clarity, the concept ‘armed forces’ refers to one or all the units of state-owned militaries – army, navy 
(marine), and the air force. It also denotes the military, and these are used interchangeably in this study. 
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enforcement purposes (Weiss, 2012). In fact, Weiss (2012: 462) argues that while it is “capable of 
controlling crowds, the military still remains a force to fight wars, which is very distinct from the 
police.” Typically, this is because, “the most core competency of soldiers is skill in inflicting pain, killing 
people, and breaking things” (Gray, 2007: 37). Given the incompatibility of this with internal security 
duties in society, it accounts for numerous challenges when the military is deployed in an internal role, 
especially when this entails the use of force. Nonetheless, as Enloe (1977), Dasuki (2013) and Okoli & 
Orinya (2013) argue, the state often has no choice but to use the military in this way to protect its 
citizens against external and internal ‘enemies’ where they threaten social and political stability. 
Given the capacity of the military to suppress violence and insurgence, military sociologists and other 
security strategists see the military as an essential tool for “conflict de-escalation in order to reinstall 
peace and order” (Von Bredow, 2006: 97). In several African states, the use of the military in an 
internal role in society has become the norm because “when violence breaks out policy-makers and 
society-at-large assume that the military should be brought in” (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5). This is 
the situation in Nigeria, where the military is constantly deployed to combat the threat posed by civil 
violence and armed groups that destabilise the country (Omede, 2012; Dambazau, 2014). While this 
is typically sanctioned by the legislature, a problem often arises where there is not sufficient control 
over the armed forces’ excessive use of force, or where they abuse their power when interacting with 
the general population. A consequence can be that instead of increasing the security of citizens, it has 
the opposite effect as citizens become the victims of both the state security forces and the armed 
groups. In Nigeria, some have even described the military as a “group of monsters… maltreating the 
populace” (Ojo-Ade, 2004: 293), and requiring taming because of their abuse of power (Ojo, 2006). 
Citizens who are faced by this may even be compelled into joining or seeking protection from 
opposition groups, thereby creating a further security dilemma (Collier, 1999: 10). 
In this regard, Buzan points out that “for perhaps a majority of the world’s people, threats from the 
state are among the major sources of insecurity in their lives” (1991: 45). Peterside reaffirmed this 
argument when she noted that “an average Nigerian encountering soldiers on the road is likely to be 
subjected to unnecessary and unwarranted fear” (2014b: 1306). Although her argument presents an 
account of the experiences of Nigerians with the military, the study does not explain how citizens 
experience the internal use of the armed forces in society. A recent study on the Plateau incident by 
Abdullahi, Wika & Abdul-Qadir (2016) examines public perception of internal security management. 
They established that the citizenry lacks confidence in the military, and the military’s ability to address 
insecurity in the State (Abdullahi et al., 2016: 23–24). Other studies, such as those conducted by Ogah 
(2011), Dode (2012), Omede (2012), Okoli & Orinya (2013) and Dambazau (2014), highlight the level 
of military abuse, but do not evaluate whether the military decreases or exacerbates insecurity.  
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To fill this void, this study examines the internal use of the military in Plateau State, Nigeria, which has 
been experiencing intermittent violence since 7 September 2001, when conflict broke out between 
aggrieved Christians and Muslims in Jos. 
Figure 1. 1 Map of Plateau State, Nigeria 
 
Source: Ekong, Ducheyne, Carpenter, Owolodun, Oladokun, et al., (2012: 171) and Adese, Saiki, Okonkwo & 
Vassa (2016). 
In Plateau State, military ISOPs and heavy military presence has failed to end attacks on civilians by 
numerous criminal and ethnic militias, and particularly attacks by rampaging Fulani herdsmen. On the 
contrary, accusations of complicity, bias, unprofessional conduct, and abuse of human rights of citizens 
are associated with the presence of the military.5 Research examining why the use of the military in 
an internal role in Nigeria has become problematic is largely lacking. For example, Azinge has argued 
that one of the explanations may be that “soldiers do not mingle with the day to day life of the people 
unlike the police” (2013: 29). This argument supports the critique of Huntington’s theory of separation 
as detaching and isolating the military, and the integration theory of Janowitz for the military to reflect 
the values of society. However, over 29 years of military praetorianism and numerous military ISOPs 
in Nigeria have seen the military assuming an active role in society and politics (Omede, 2012: 296). 
As such, there is very little substantive evidence to explain why the military appears to be exacerbating 
tensions in Plateau State. 
This study attempts to fill this gap by investigating the experiences of civilians with the military ISOPs 
in Plateau State to understand whether the Nigerian state exercises adequate civil control over the 
use of coercive force by the military, and how this affects the security of citizens. Thus, the study aims 
to uncover whether the Nigerian military is in fact contributing to the insecurity in Plateau State. Lange 
& Balian (2008) argue that the use of coercive force by states perpetuates insecurity by inciting 
violence, especially where there is regular abuse of power and where the liberties of citizens are 
                                               
5 The armed conflict in Plateau State and the military ISOPs to suppress the conflict are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of 
this study. 
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eroded. Clearly, it undermines civil-military relations (CMR) when the government fails to curb the 
military when they act unprofessionally or beyond their legal mandate. When effective civil control of 
the military is lacking, it results in a civil-military problematique (Feaver, 1996),6 and hence the need 
to interrogate this. 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Using the military in an internal role to suppress violence and enforce law and order has been the 
subject of much debate among scholars, given the consequences it holds for the state and its citizens 
(José & Rasmussen, 1999; Lutterbeck, 2004, 2013; Nwolise, 2007; Ojo, 2009a; Weiss, 2012). While 
the literature shows that the problems often recur, few studies have examined how civilians 
experience the use of coercive force by the military. This study aims to provide a deeper understanding 
of the use of the military in ISOPs, the effect on civil-military relations, and the security of citizens, 
with a focus on Plateau State, an ethnically heterogeneous society in Nigeria.  
Few studies have examined the interaction of the military and civilians in military ISOPs from a CMR 
perspective, and this study argues that it presents a shortcoming in the CMR literature. The field 
suffers theoretical weaknesses and inadequacies on several fronts, especially in the ‘civil’ (social) 
sphere. Studies in the field have focused extensively on preventing the military from intervening in 
politics while important aspects, such as how the ‘civilian’ (social) sphere affects the relationship, have 
received little attention. In fact, scholars have made little attempt to integrate the citizenry and civil 
society as actors in CMR whose agency influences the relationship.7 This also means that it is difficult 
to know if the internal use of the military for security enforcement is productive or counter-effective, 
potentially worsening the security situation after a ceasefire. Hence, this study tries to bridge the gap 
by advancing the theoretical debate beyond the traditional focus on preventing domestic military 
intervention in politics. This can increase our understanding of the interaction between the military 
institution and citizens, especially when it acts in an internal role for which it neither trained nor 
specialises in. This is important because it provide a means to examine how the interaction affects the 
professional stature of the military. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study seeks to investigate (1) the experiences of civilians during military ISOPs to understand 
whether the state exercises adequate control over the military; and (2) whether using the military 
improves or exacerbates the security situation of the citizenry. Accordingly, the research question of 
                                               
6 ‘Civil-military problematique’ refers to a situation in which the military becomes a threat to its society, or when it disobeys 
instructions from legitimate civilian authority, and when it intervenes in the domestic politics of its nation (Feaver, 1996: 150–
153). 
7 A notable exception, as discussed in Chapter Three of this study, is Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory, which argues for 
the integration of the citizenry as a third partner with agency in CMR (Schiff, 1995, 2009). 
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the study is: Does the Nigerian state exercise adequate civil control of the armed forces, to ensure 
that it does not become a threat to the citizenry, and exacerbate insecurity? 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
1. Understand the nature and type of threats armed groups pose to states, how these impact on 
the ability of the state to protect its citizens, and the subsequent use of the military in an 
internal role. 
2. Explore the current threats posed by armed groups in Nigeria and the conditions that have 
necessitated the use of the military in an internal role, with specific reference to Plateau State. 
3. Examine the nature of civil control of the armed forces and how Nigeria regulates and controls 
the military. 
4. Explore the perception and experiences of civilians in Plateau State to determine whether 
they believe the military is improving or undermining their security. 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This study examines the lived experiences of Nigerians who interact with military personnel 
conducting ISOPs in a society that has been subject to violent conflict. As this study examines the 
perceptions, attitudes, and experiences of people, it uses a qualitative approach. This is because 
understanding how the citizenry experiences the internal use of the military requires an approach that 
allows the participants to narrate their individual accounts of incidences. Several scholars have 
indicated that a qualitative approach is most suitable when one is seeking to understand and discover 
how people make sense of their circumstances (see for example, Berg, 2007; Creswell, 2007; Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Bryman, 2012). A quantitative research design would have 
been limited to quantification and generalisation, rather than exploring the issues in-depth. As there is 
little research on the interaction of the military with civilians, this was the best approach for this study.  
Interviews were conducted with a total of 55 participants. The interviews were conducted with 
persons from diverse walks of life until saturation was reached. The interviews were audio recorded 
and subsequently transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis, with the help of Atlas.ti computer 
aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). In line with the precepts of inductive studies of 
Braun & Clarke (2006: 87), themes emerged from the fieldwork data following the phases of thematic 
analysis. The methodology is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES 
1.6.1 Civil-Military Relations 
CMR is typically, the interrelationship between the political elite/institutions, the military, and society. 
As a field of study, CMR focusses on the complex interaction “between the military and the state, 
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societal structures, and institutions” (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). Feaver (2003a: 58) considers 
CMR as simply, “a game of strategic interaction” between military players and pollical leaders, each 
acting based on preference and the expected reaction from the other player. This study approaches 
CMR from this lens of rationality of interaction between the military, political elites, and the citizenry, 
where each player exercises some level of agency that can influence the relationship. 
1.6.2 Civil/Civilian Control of the Military 
The concept ‘civilian control’ of the military is widely used in the civil-military relations literature to 
mean the loyalty of the military to the state through obedience to legitimate or recognised civilian 
representatives/elites. In other words, ‘civilian’ denotes “the pre-eminence of civilian institutions, 
based on popular sovereignty, in the decision-making process… The control of the instruments of 
violence must be firmly in the hands of legitimate civilian authorities” (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 
134). However, some have critiqued the use of the concept ‘civilian’ as inappropriate, misleading, 
confusing, and a clear case of “an accident of language” (Chuter, 2000: 27). They argue that whereas 
scholars and theorist have severally used the concept ‘civilian’ in the right context, in numerous 
instances, it is wrongly applied. For instance,  
[I]n practice, it is likely that the agencies of the state which the military obeys will be 
staffed wholly or mainly by civilians. But this duty is owed, for example, by an attaché to 
an ambassador, not because the latter is a civilian, but because he or she represents the 
state in its entirety for this purpose. In the event of a defence minister being a serving 
officer (which is quite common in certain parts of the world), the military would, of 
course, owe obedience to him or her, but in his or her capacity as a minister, not as a 
serving officer (Chuter, 2000: 28). 
The implication of using ‘civilian’ is that it places the authority to certain individuals rather than the 
official position they occupy which capacitates them to act as the representatives of the state. Given 
this, critiques argue that the concept ‘civil’ rather than ‘civilian’ which does not necessarily depict 
obedience to the civis (state) is more appropriate (Chuter, 2000: 23–34). This study adopts the concept 
‘civil’ control rather than ‘civilian’, where the latter is used, it only signifies the original usage by 
scholars/theorist cited. 
1.6.3 Quadrumvirate Interaction 
Quadrumvirate interaction as used in this study refers to the four levels of interaction (major 
intersection level and the three subunit levels of interaction) in CMR between the three partners 
(political elites, military, and the citizenry). As the concept quadrumvirate signifies, four distinct levels 
or units of interaction occurs in CMR. These are interaction at: the major level of intersection among 
the three partners; the subunit of interaction between the political elites and the military; the subunit 
of interaction between the political elites and the citizenry; and the subunit of interaction between the 
military and the citizenry. As consequently discussed in Section 3.6, although the levels of interaction 
are distinct, the degree of distinctness does not preclude the possibility of an overlap in the interaction. 
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Reasons for this includes factors such as the domestic deployment status of the military and the level 
of political involvement of the military in the state. As the concept is a novel contribution of this study 
to the CMR debate, it is later used in this study as a theory which advances beyond the extant theories 
of CMR. 
1.6.4 Armed Groups 
Armed groups are groups of individuals or organisations who use threats and violence to achieve their 
goals which could be political, economic, ideological, or religious in nature (Shultz et al., 2004). They 
are mostly outlawed and non-state actors. However, it is possible to have some state-sponsored, 
state-backed or state-owned armed groups that are established to carry out extra-legal missions they 
do not want to be accountable for (Vinci, 2009: 4; Thompson, 2014: 5). 
1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The study contains seven chapters presented in the following structure: 
Chapter One introduced the background of the study, and it has explained the rationale for the study, 
the research question, and objectives. The chapter provides a brief overview of the design and 
methodology, which is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Two discusses armed groups using the frame of new wars vis-à-vis conflict theory. The 
chapter examined four types of armed groups, focusing on their goals, actors and membership, pattern 
of warfare, and sources of finance. The chapter uses the new wars paradigm to describe the nature 
and effect that armed groups have on society. 
Chapter Three reviews the debates on civil control of the armed forces, using the classical CMR 
theories of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, and other contemporary theories such as agency 
theory (Peter Feaver) and concordance theory (Rebecca Schiff). The discussion illuminates the 
contributions and the major shortcomings of these theories in relation to this study. It also presents 
the quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation of CMR as an alternative which fills the void 
identified with the extant theories. 
Chapter Four focuses on Nigeria and the use of the military in an internal role. The chapter explores 
in detail the numerous security threats troubling Nigeria, and the various armed groups responsible 
for this. It examines the state’s response to the threats, and why the Nigerian government often relies 
on the military for ISOPs to counter hostilities, force orderliness and restore peace. The impact of 
such internal deployment of the military on the professional posture of the military, CMR and civil 
control of the armed forces in Nigeria are evaluated. 
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Chapter Five discusses the methodology of this research study. It addresses the philosophical 
assumptions of the study, research design and strategy, as well as the ethical concerns. Also included 
in the Chapter are the limitations of the study and a reflection on the research process. 
Chapter Six presents the findings of the study in terms of the perception, reactions and experiences 
of civilians of the internal use of the military in society and how it affects their security situation. 
Chapter Seven is the discussion and conclusion of the dissertation. It discusses the research findings 
in relation to extant CMR literatures. The discussion follows the indicators of military professionalism 
to understand the reasons for the strained relationship between civilians and the military, and why 
peace and security is elusive in Plateau State.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
NEW WARS, ARMED GROUPS, AND THE THREATS THEY POSE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War saw a surge in internal armed violence in several countries, especially in 
Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe (Snyder & Jervis, 1999; Earl, 2004). Numerous factors contributed to 
this, key among which was access to a stock-pile of arms and weapons by aggrieved groups who had 
become dissatisfied with their authoritarian regimes (Kaldor, 1999: 4). Other factors included the 
withdrawal of ‘super-powers’ from their former colonies, the independence struggles and political 
turmoil in several African States, declining state economies, high unemployment, increasing criminality, 
widespread corruption, and the loss of political legitimacy of these states (Kaldor, 1999: 4–5, 101; 
Thoms & Ron, 2007: 675). Failure to address these by respective governments contributed to a rising 
security gap, as low-intensity conflicts, civil wars, and organised collective violence escalated (Fearon 
& Laitin, 2003; Mueller, 2009). In several African states, an increased cycle of internal violence emerged 
creating renewed internal security and political instability (Münkler, 2005; Spears, 2010). This chapter 
aims to explore and understand these contemporary security challenges, the different types of armed 
groups that pose a threat to states, and how these affect the ability of states to protect the populace. 
2.2 AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT 
In every society, there are structures of authority which set the rules for exerting power and authority, 
with the expectation that the populace will comply and obey these rules, regulations, and commands. 
However, over the course of history, the structures of authority and control have altered, due to the 
changing pattern of human association and relationships. Max Weber, arguably the most influential 
sociological theorist and one of the founding fathers of sociology, identified three such structures of 
authority (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008: 874; Ritzer, 2011: 112). In a typical traditional society, 
authority rests on the established and existing traditions of a people, and this serves as the basis for 
exercising social power, authority, and control over people. In other societies, authority rests on the 
exceptional and charismatic attributes of a leader, and in modern industrial society, the enacted laws 
of a state serve as the basis for the legitimacy of power and authority, or their legal-rational authority 
(Weber, 1978: 215). 
While the structures of authority legitimise the power of leaders to make decisions and expect 
obedience, compliance is determined by diverse motives, and this has certain sociological implications. 
In some instances, obedience is a product of routine habituation, while in others it could be based on 
the consideration of “interest (based on ulterior or genuine acceptance)” and benefits (Weber, 1978: 
212). In terms of the latter, irrespective of the legitimacy of authority, political decisions (be they laws, 
rules, or the norms guiding the conduct of human relationships and association) do not necessarily 
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favour every individual or group. Where legitimate authority marginalises or deprives a section of the 
population, it can create conflict. Aggrieved individuals or groups could choose to simply conform and 
comply, or to challenge this authority through several means, including the use of violence. While 
Weber recognises the centrality of authority in power relations, he is critiqued for not developing a 
theory to explain how this works, or bring about a constructive change in society (Turner, 1981, 1996; 
Ritzer, 2011: 155). 
To fully understand the relationship between authority and conflict, it is useful to draw on conflict 
theory, which was developed to explain the tensions and incompatibilities in the structures and 
institutions of society, particularly with respect to the role of authority relations within society 
(Dahrendorf, 1958). Ralf Dahrendorf is considered one of the most influential conflict theorists (Ritzer, 
2011: 216), and he argues that the social structures of society make conflict ubiquitous in social life 
(Dahrendorf, 1958: 126). For him, the authority attached to positions and how it is exercised leads to 
the development of different interests, which results in conflict in organisations and society. Often, 
the conflict of interest is about “the maintenance or modification of a status quo” (Dahrendorf, 1959: 
176). Those in positions of authority (dominant or superordinate) desire to maintain existing social 
structures which convey their authority, while subordinates are interested in disrupting and changing 
the existing order. In other words, as subordinates become dissatisfied with the position and influence 
of authority, particularly how policy decisions affect them, they feel compelled to seek social change. 
Dahrendorf contends that conflict ensues when ‘incompatible’ or aggrieved subjects form groups to 
actively pursue their interest and concerns and come to challenge existing authority. The first group 
to emerge is a quasi-group, which he describes as “the aggregates of incumbents of positions with 
identical role interests” (Dahrendorf, 1959: 180). The Ogoni people of the Niger Delta oil-producing 
region in Nigeria, who are dissatisfied with the failure of government to provide basic public goods 
and services, are a typical instance of a quasi-group. Dahrendorf notes that two other groups emerge 
from this group: the first are interest groups, which are the “real agents of group conflict ... have a 
structure, a form of organisation, a program or goal, and a personnel of members” (Dahrendorf, 1959: 
180). In the case of the Ogoni people, farmers, fishermen, and aggrieved youths whose sources of 
livelihoods were affected by oil spillage, environmental degradation, and lack of alternatives formed 
numerous interest groups to influence policy and development. However, this failed as peaceful 
protests and activism were suppressed and treated as dissent by the government, and many activists 
were sentenced to death for treason. 
The interest group coordinates and makes known the concern of the quasi-group. However, if the 
group feels its concerns are not being addressed, it creates the third group, the conflict group, which 
uses violence as a means to achieve the aims and concerns of the parent group. The conflict group 
serves as the primary agent of social change it uses conflict to impel changes. Where it uses intense 
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and violent conflict, it causes radical disruptions that facilitate rapid change. In the case of the Ogoni 
people of the Niger Delta, numerous armed groups emerged, disrupting oil production and threatening 
political stability and the ability of the government to function effectively. Typical examples are the 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). The example of the 
Ogoni people supports the position of conflict theory that incompatible groups form groups to pursue 
their interests, and challenge existing authority over unaddressed grievances. However, although the 
theory notes that conflict is not always violent, “the first task of conflict analysis, is to identify various 
authority roles within society” and examine how they evoke conflict (Ritzer, 2011: 267). 
Conflict theory is relevant to our understanding of the widespread upsurge of conflicts, and particularly 
armed conflicts, in society. The structural and institutional view of the theory focuses on the position 
of authority and its exercise, especially in contemporary societies, and is incisive to our understanding 
of contemporary armed conflicts and insurrections. It shows why some sections of the citizenry resort 
to armed conflict when they feel marginalised, or where government is seen to abuse their authority 
by imposing unfavourable policies, legislation, or other forms of suppression. While this theory is 
relevant to our understanding of why conflict erupts, it fails to explain social order and is critiqued for 
being macroscopic and ignoring individual thoughts and actions (Ritzer, 2011: 269). The theory has 
several other shortcomings, including its inability to explain why some will defer to authority, strike 
and protest, while others do not (Weingart, 1969; Craib, 1984). By implication, the theory is not 
adequate to explain the complexity of conflicts in relation to actors, their motivation, finances, and 
methods of warfare, especially concerning contemporary security challenges in Africa. In this regard, 
it is necessary to examine conflict from a perspective that allows deeper understanding of these 
dynamics. One way to do this is through the new war paradigm. 
2.3 NEW WARS AND THE INCIDENCE OF ARMED GROUPS 
Since the end of the 20th century, scholars studying armed conflict and war have observed that 
interstate conflicts were decreasing, while a new wave of intrastate violence was emerging (Duffield, 
1998, 2001; Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 2005). Several concepts have been used to describe the new wave 
of violence, and how this is affecting state authority and their monopoly over collective violence, given 
the asymmetric nature of these conflicts. Some call it hybrid wars (Hoffman, 2007), degenerate warfare 
(Shaw, 2003), or remnants of war (Mueller, 2004), while others simply define it as new wars (Kaldor, 
1999, 2012; Münkler, 2005). Among the scholars, some political sociologists and social theorists 
approached the study of this emerging wave of violence from a macro-level sociological perspective 
(Kaldor, 1999, 2012, Bauman, 2001, 2002, Shaw, 2002, 2003). They attribute the violence to the 
“transformative power of economic globalisation” (Malešević, 2010: 315), a situation which 
undermines the ability of a state to “provide welfare, to defend its borders, or to represent a people” 
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(Vinci, 2009: 11). When this occurs, it threatens the power, autonomy, and legitimacy of the state to 
govern its people. The consequence, which is also a typical cause of armed conflict, is the loss of 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force, a situation which gives rise to the spread and proliferation of 
armed groups who wreak violence in society (Kaldor, 2013: 2). 
Mary Kaldor, one of the influential advocates of the new war thesis, argues that the new wars bear 
elements that are distinct from conventional warfare in terms of the actors, goals, methods, and 
sources of finance (Kaldor, 1999: 6, 2013: 2). Unlike conventional interstate warfare, which has clarity 
in terms of actors, motive, type of warfare, and sources of finances, the new wars blur these 
distinctions. Typically, the “new wars are a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations,” and 
these factors distinguish it from the conventional sense of wars between states (Kaldor, 1999: 11). 
The literature identifies two forms of new war. One is a highly-technologically advanced Western-
style warfare which minimises both civilian and personnel casualties, and the second is a predatory 
warfare which is “concentrated in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia” (Kaldor, 1999, 2012: 13, Bauman, 
2001, 2002; Shaw, 2003). The latter forms the primary focus of Kaldor’s work and is more relevant 
to this study given that it is widespread in several African states and it influences governance and 
political instability. Studies show that marginalisation from exclusionary politics, judicial weakness, 
growing economic greed of illegitimate profit seeking groups, and grievances influence the spread of 
the new wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Kaldor, 2012: 12). 
Notwithstanding the contribution of the new wars thesis, it is heavily criticised on several aspects. 
One is that the new wars are not necessarily ‘new’, as many features of the new wars are found in 
conventional (old) warfare (Henderson & Singer, 2002; Mundy, 2011). Malešević (2010: 319–324) 
engaged in a critical review of the new war thesis, faulting several assumptions of the paradigm. He 
contends that, contrary to the central claim, economic globalisation does not undermine the autonomy 
of nation states. He notes further that war has not changed, and neither has the privatisation of 
violence and the involvement of non-state actors, both of which are not a new phenomenon. Kaldor 
(2012: 202–221, 2013) defended her claim by clarifying the ‘newness’ of the new wars, whether new 
wars qualify as ‘wars,’ whether data supports the claim of new wars, and whether new wars are post-
Clausewitzian. As the broader literature has already addressed these concerns, this study will not 
restate the debate. 
In terms of this study, the new war thesis provides a useful lens through which to examine the causes 
and consequences of internal armed conflicts. As Malešević (2010: 312) states, “the new-wars paradigm 
has proved highly beneficial in highlighting some distinctive features of civil wars” and internal conflicts 
more generally. The indication that new actors, particularly non-state armed groups, are the key 
perpetrators of violence and criminality in new wars is relevant for our understanding of internal 
conflicts. Studying these actors from the perspective of the new wars paradigm provides us with 
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important insights through which to understand the nature, goals/motivations, modes of warfare and 
sources of their finances. Given this, it is important to examine the actors whom the literature 
describes as armed groups. The following discussion provides an overview of armed groups and their 
distinct characteristics. 
There is no universal definition of armed groups, but in general it is non-state actors who use violence 
or the threat of violence as the means to achieve their goals (Vinci, 2009: 4; Thompson, 2014: 5).8 In 
part, the lack of concrete definition is because armed groups are clandestine, and they transform, 
hybridise, or evolve from one form to another. Another reason is that the concept embodies a myriad 
of arms-wielding groups whose aims are fluid and whose motives change between economic, political, 
or ideological objectives. For this reason, scholars, analysts, and policy makers use various working 
definitions to operationalise the concept. The International Review of the Red Cross defines armed 
groups as “organisations that are party to an armed conflict, but do not answer to, and are not 
commanded by, one or more states” (Bernard, 2011: 262). This is similar to that of Thompson (2014: 
4), who defines armed groups as “coherent, autonomous, non-state actors that rely on the threat of 
or use of force to achieve their objectives.” Similarly, the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs 
considers armed groups as having: 
[T]he potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or 
economic objectives; are not within the formal military structures of states, state-
alliances or intergovernmental organisations; and are not under the control of the 
state(s) in which they operate (Mc Hugh & Bessler, 2006: 6). 
Although these definitions appear different, they share similar characteristics. Firstly, armed groups 
consist of groups of individuals who have the capacity and the determination to use the threat of 
violence to achieve set aims. Secondly, they are rational actors with definite goals, which could change 
or increase as they pursue their initial or earlier goals. Thirdly, they do not have legal backing and are 
often outlawed as non-state entities. Fourth, they can set up international links that help them gain 
support from the international community, particularly foreign diaspora, and sympathetic donors. A 
fifth feature is that armed groups are capable of eroding public support for government by creating 
situations of distrust and a legitimacy crisis through security threats and use of violence (Shultz et al., 
2004). 
Armed groups present an existential security threat to both the citizenry and the state they operate 
in (Vreӱ, 2010). Some are well organised with defined chains of command and authority, while others 
operate as bands of loose groups with no specific structure or command system (Holsti, 1996: 19–
20). Examples of such groups include mercenaries, rebel groups, self-help ethnic militias, criminal gangs, 
                                               
8 It is possible to also have state-owned, state-sponsored, or state-backed armed groups, who have no legal qualification as 
legitimate state armed forces. 
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warlords and several other small-scale belligerents (Porto, 2002: 19). They threaten the monopoly of 
organised violence of the state through their use of sustained violence through direct combat, guerrilla 
or irregular warfare against state security forces (Vinci, 2008: 295). They can transform, evolve, or 
hybridise from one type to another, while adopting different operational structures as they wage 
protracted armed conflict. This hinders the ability of the state to define or categorise the groups to 
figure out their goals and develop the right strategy to suppress or counter the threats they pose. This 
has compelled several state to rely on the military to deal with the threats posed by these groups (José 
& Rasmussen, 1999: 5). 
There are several reasons why armed groups resort to violence. The common causes include poor 
economic conditions; unequal access to scarce resources; weak, failed or oppressive government; 
environmental or ecological degradation; a weak justice system; easy access to arms and weapons; and 
identity cleavages (Gurr et al., 2000; Smith, 2004; Maclean, 2008). By implication, high income 
inequality, the manipulation and exploitation of ethnic and religious differences by political elites, 
environmental depletion, greed, and lack of judicial remedy to address these grievances triggers the 
use of violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Other factors include grievances arising from 
marginalisation by the state, and the denial or failure to resolve legitimate concerns of marginalised 
ethnic and religious minority groups. These concerns could include the inability to gain access to 
economic and political benefits, such as government contracts to provide services (roads, potable 
water, electricity) and the political appointment of members of ethnic minority groups in society. This 
makes individuals and groups more prone to take up arms to forcefully pursue their goals or resolve 
these problems. 
A myriad of armed groups exists, ranging from small loose bands, to complex and highly structured 
groups. These include rebel movements, militias, marauders, mafias, criminal organisations, religious 
armed groups, ethnic warlords, pirates, insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, mercenaries and fraternities 
(Schneckener, 2006: 25–28; Shultz & Dew, 2006: 10–11; Vinci, 2006: 49). Several analysts and scholars 
have tried to classify these groups into archetypes or typologies to understand the operational drive, 
motivation, and the action plans of each group. However, because armed groups are flexible and easily 
change when faced with coercion from state forces, the archetypes present a fluid category. Some 
have also cautioned that making a typology could be misleading as armed groups easily transform 
(Petrasek, 2005: 8). Despite this critique, it is possible to categorise armed groups based on their aim 
and organisational structure. For example, Shultz et al. (2004: 16), Shultz & Dew (2006: 10) and 
Thompson (2014: 10) developed a comprehensive typology that categorised armed groups into 
insurgents, terrorists, militias and criminal organisations. Following the new wars theory, I discuss the 
goals, method of warfare, and sources of finances of these non-state actors to understand the groups 
and the threats they pose to the state. 
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 Insurgents 
Insurgents are non-ruling groups who consciously seek to undermine, “destroy, reformulate, or sustain 
the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” through violent insurgency (O’Neill, 1990: 
13). Typically, insurgent armed groups are politically motivated groups who aim to influence policy, to 
disintegrate, weaken, or overthrow and replace a government. They aim to exert political control or 
to seize control of territorial boundaries of a state, and to form an alternative government in its place 
(Shultz et al., 2004; Thompson, 2014). One possible reason is the desire to redress existing political 
inequalities and structural imbalances that the state seems unwilling or unable to address. Another 
reason is the desire to compel the government not to retract or change certain policies that are 
beneficial to a section of the population.  
Currently, several armed groups are classified as insurgents. The People’s Liberation Movement and 
the People’s Liberation Army in Sudan, and the Patriotic Union and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan 
are some examples (Shultz et al., 2004: 19). Others include the Islamic State of Iraq, Syria, and the 
Levant, which have seized territories and been engaged in prolonged warfare with state and 
multinational forces. Most insurgent armed groups attract membership, followers, and their support 
base from the population group that the insurgents represent. This is because the interest groups 
(ethnic, religious, etc.) stand to benefit from the political changes that the insurgents advocate. This 
makes it easier for charismatic leaders to exploit religious, racial or ethnic differences to mobilise 
followers and the foot soldiers of the group (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
To achieve their objectives, insurgents make their support base the groups whose interest they 
represent, and therefore do not use violence against these groups (Thompson, 2014: 78). They win 
the trust of their interest groups to ensure that they do not denounce or alienate them from society. 
They focus their violent attacks on state forces and other population groups who oppose their goals, 
or on those who reveal the identity of their members to state security forces. This makes the ability 
to counter the activities of insurgent groups difficult, as people are unlikely to report such information 
to the state security forces out of fear that they themselves might become the targets of the insurgents. 
Members of the community are also less inclined to denounce the insurgents where they are seen to 
advance and protect their interests or address their grievances. 
Given the motivation of insurgent groups, they often challenge the legitimacy of the government and 
their actions can destabilize a country if the military is unable to suppress insurgents. Their use of hit-
and-run tactics, terrorist attacks, guerrilla warfare, and their clandestine nature makes it difficult for 
state forces to counter them, despite their being outnumbered by state forces (Smith, 2006). 
Ultimately, their aim is to gradually weaken the state forces’ ability to counteract their attacks (Joes, 
1992: 5), as this presents the state as weak and unable to provide one of the most important public 
goods, that of security and the ability to protect the population.  
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To sustain the group and prolong its warfare, insurgents are mostly self-financing, heavily reliant on 
external support from foreign diaspora and other illicit income-generating activities. The financial 
support insurgents attract from external sources could be from “foreign states, diasporas, other armed 
groups, international organisations, and corrupt individuals”9 (Thompson, 2014: 79). Insurgents also 
often engage in one or more forms of illegal extraction, such as mining and the sales of natural 
resources, high-profile bank robberies, and other economically predatory activities on civilian groups 
who do not support their cause. This makes some argue that “insurgency is both an act of war and a 
criminal activity” (Baker & O’Neill, 2010: 5). When insurgents engage in predatory activities, 
particularly bank robberies, it often blurs the line between criminal organisations and insurgent groups, 
making it difficult to distinguish between the two. However, as we shall see, criminal armed groups 
differ from insurgents because of their motivation. Criminal armed groups seek economic or profit 
gains, while insurgents only become predatory in an attempt to sustain the needs of the group and its 
demands for weapons and ammunitions in pursuit of political goals. 
 Terrorists 
Much like armed groups, terrorism is difficult to define, given the many different forms of terrorist 
groups that exist (Fletcher, 2006: 907). These range from single/lone actors, to loose cells, and 
organised groups having defined chains of command and authority through which to further their cause 
(Best & Nocella, 2004: 9–14). The working definition by the United Nations International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999, which was adopted by the Security Council 
Resolution 1566 (2004), defines terrorism as follows: 
Terrorism is any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to 
abstain from doing any act (United Nations, 1999, l. 38). 
Thus, terrorists seek to achieve political goals such as overthrowing or replacing a government, or 
more goals of forcing policy changes or influencing political decisions. The political motive could be 
ideological, such as the desire to influence or change a government or its policies, and not necessarily 
to seize and control a territory, as with insurgents (Thompson, 2014: 85). In other instances, terrorists 
advocate for the inclusion and granting of better access for a minority or politically marginalised groups 
in society. Where this is the case, they mobilise along identity lines, such as ethnic, racial, interest or 
religious affiliation (Shultz et al., 2004). However, several contemporary terrorist groups advocate for 
a form of religious or mystical goal that is interwoven with the political aim of establishing a religious 
state, or replacing the secular laws of a state with religious laws (Laqueur, 1990; Hoffman, 2006: 87; 
                                               
9 Word in italics added for emphasis. 
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Kurtulus, 2011: 478). A few examples include Al Qaeda operating in the Middle East, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic State (IS), which is active in about 28 
countries. In Africa, the Al Shabab terrorist group operates in Somalia and Kenya, and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria and its neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (Institute for Economics and 
Peace, 2015). 
Targets of terrorist attacks are usually civilian groups that are neither related to their interest group, 
nor supporting their cause. Other non-human targets, such as critical state infrastructures (airports, 
train stations, water sources, etc.) that could cause serious disruption, fear or panic among the 
population, are also attacked (Shultz et al., 2004: 21; Thompson, 2014: 82). Unlike insurgents, terrorists 
rarely engage in any form of warfare with state forces, unless directly confronted and seeking to 
escape. For this reason, terrorists mostly direct their attacks at civilian targets and critical state 
infrastructures (soft targets). Thus, given that the primary targets of terrorists are non-combatant 
civilians, the civilian casualty from its attacks are usually high. Attacking soft-targets also helps terrorists 
create fear and panic, which they advance through media propaganda, aimed at eroding the legitimacy 
of the state by presenting it as incapable of defending its population. 
Terrorism thrives on media publicity disseminate knowledge and information about their activities. 
Through this, they reinforce fear and insecurity, and highlight the excesses and atrocities of state forces 
confronting them (Fletcher, 2006: 909). This publicity plays a vital role in placing the government under 
intense pressure to avert terrorists’ attacks, or to comply with the demands of the terrorists. 
However, as terrorists attack civilian targets, they often lack the popular support from the citizenry, 
even when the concerns of the terrorist groups are legitimate. The deliberate and indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians makes them lose the support of both the local population, and the state. When 
terrorists continue to attack civilian populations, it affects their existential security. Countering 
terrorist attacks is often a challenging task for state security forces. Where the state is unable to 
counter the threats and violence from terrorist and other armed groups, citizens are likely to resort 
to militias who could provide them with needed security. In fact, Thompson (2014: 89) argues that 
civilians often join militias primarily for protection from state forces, or attacks from other armed 
groups. 
Unlike insurgents, terrorists often lack a popular support base and do not enjoy the same material and 
financial support from civilian populations as insurgents. Typically, terrorists’ finances come from 
predatory and criminal activities, and they often prey on the livelihood of civilians in their strongholds 
through the imposition of levies and taxes. Others attack and rob banks, and some engage in high-
profile kidnapping for ransom collection. Another source of funding is from other foreign groups who 
share similar aims (Shultz et al., 2004). For example, in “the 1990s, al Qaeda created an elaborate set 
of connections with … likeminded terrorist groups in as many as 60 countries… It also developed a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 19 
 
sophisticated financial network for collecting and transferring money for the organisation and its 
operations” (Shultz et al., 2004: 22). Through this means, they elicit financial assistance from individuals 
sympathetic to their cause, and from groups they have established linkages with. 
Although the consensus is that terrorism displays the abovementioned characteristics, many claim that 
we are seeing a new form of terrorism emerge (Laqueur, 1990; Hoffman, 2006; Kurtulus, 2011). New 
terrorism differs in many ways from old terrorism and has been called super-terrorism (Schweitzer & 
Dorsch, 1998), post-modern terrorism (Laqueur, 1990), and catastrophic terrorism (Carter, Deutch 
& Zelikow, 1998). It has been argued that “there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, 
in the character of terrorism” (Laqueur, 1990: 4). The main argument is that a change or 
transformation has occurred in the motivation, organisation, instruments of violence, and target 
selection. This involves a shift from an ethno-nationalist motivation to a mix of religious and political 
motivation; a change from hierarchical structures to horizontal networks of cells; a change from 
selective targets to indiscriminate attacks; and a change from crude implements to sophisticated 
weaponry and the potential to acquire weapons of mass destructions (Laqueur, 1990; Hoffman, 2006; 
Kurtulus, 2011). Concisely, Kurtulus (2011: 477) calls this “a qualitative change in the nature of 
terrorism, which has allegedly taken place during the 1990s.” 
While this provides us with an insight into the transformation and sophistication of terrorism, critics 
argue that the features of the ‘new’ terrorism do not differ from what was previously known, and 
should rather be seen as new waves of terrorism (Copeland, 2001; Tucker, 2001; Kurtulus, 2011). 
However, terrorists and insurgents are not the only armed groups whose activities requires attention. 
Other armed groups such as militias equally pose significant threats and security challenges that could 
destabilise a state and undermine the provision of public goods and services, hence the need to 
understand the militia armed group. 
 Militias 
Militias are the most common type of armed groups. They are both a product and a cause of failed 
and failing states. Given this, various forms of militias exist, and a multiplicity of definitions attempt to 
describe them. One such definition presents militias as small units of de facto non-state armed groups 
who use violence to achieve their goals, but this does not account for state-backed militias (Zahar, 
2000: 108). Others define militias “as a recognisable irregular armed force operating within the 
territory of a weak and/or failing state” (Shultz et al., 2004: 23). Militias often occur where the state 
security forces are unable to protect citizens and where leaders lack political legitimacy and the 
support of the populace. 
When a state is unable to provide security, rule of law and basic essential public goods, this vacuum is 
often filled by militias (Shultz et al., 2004: 23; Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2012: 250). However, different 
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militias pursue different causes and their operations mostly occur within specific local communities. 
For some, their operations aim to provide security to an ethnic or religious group that are part of. 
Other militias are economically motivated, where their activities and operations are focussed on 
reaping financial gains for the group and its leaders, mostly through illegitimate and predatory means 
(Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 4). Others are simply a political tool of desperate politicians or ‘warlords’ 
with various political ambitions.  
When a state is unable to provide basic public goods, including security, individuals, groups, and 
communities often unite along identity or interest lines to seek alternatives. Often, given the absence 
of the rule of law, this evokes hostilities as the pursuit of the interests of one group threaten the 
interests of other groups. Militias fill this vacuum as the armed extension of the group to protect, fight, 
and defend their interests (Vinci, 2009: 5). Typically, they rely on small arms and light weapons to carry 
out their operations, but as their threat levels increase, they could acquire more advanced weaponry 
and improvised explosive devices that could cause maximum damage to their opposition. Their pattern 
of violence is mostly unconventional surprise attacks on unsuspecting opponents. Unlike insurgents, 
they rarely challenge state forces. 
Although different militia groups follow different aims, they share some common features. One is that 
they are comprised of mostly private and informal irregular forces, consisting of unemployed young 
men with little or no conventional military training (Shultz et al., 2004: 23). They are often small in size 
and typically a product of circumstance and opportunity (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 13). Their 
activities revolve around a leader, or leaders, who exert control over the group through a system of 
patronage. They tend to be highly disciplined due to members’ communal feeling of togetherness, and 
the need to defend or preserve certain values and ideologies (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 4). As such, 
it is common for militias to use violence in pursuit of their goals and also direct violence against those 
opposing their values and ideologies. Given this, “militias have a more predatory relationship with the 
population than other armed groups” (Thompson, 2014: 89). 
While civilians can form militias, there are numerous examples of state-sponsored, state-patronised, 
or state-supported militias (Stanton, 2015). Such militias act as a de facto coercive tool for repressive 
regimes, and a typical example is the Janjaweed militia in Sudan. Their de facto status does not confer 
legal recognition to the group, and their existence and activities are often largely illegitimate (Zahar, 
2000: 108; Thompson, 2014: 90). State-sponsored militias are commonly used by authoritarian and 
oppressive governments wishing to avoid international sanctions, in order to crackdown on 
opposition, inflict electoral thuggery, and other human rights abuses (Carey et al., 2012; Stanton, 2015). 
State-sponsored militias are highly clandestine and their sponsors, suppliers of arms, and funders are 
secret and often not known to recruits. As militias are often a product of a weak, failed or failing state, 
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it explains why both state-sponsored and non-state militias are the most common armed groups in 
Africa today (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010c,a; Carey et al., 2012: 250). 
As numerous forms of militias exist, so one finds that their sources of funding differ. For local ethnic, 
religious, or community-based militias serving the interest of a specific population group, the members 
may provide the necessary funding. This could be in the form of voluntary contributions, levies, or 
other forced contributions. Warlord militias whose motives ranges from the “advancement of clan, 
tribe, or ethnic goals to political ambition, localised power, and personal wealth” may simply receive 
funding from the income of the group leader (Shultz et al., 2004: 25–26). State-sponsored militias, in 
turn, receive funding from undisclosed state sources that may not be known to the foot-soldiers of 
the group. 
 Organised Criminal Groups and Transnational Criminal Organisations 
Criminal and transnational criminal organisations (TCOs) are typically income/profit oriented armed 
groups. They are often a private conglomerate owned and controlled by a leader who directs the 
activities of the group towards making financial profit. Although such groups are income/profit 
oriented, they are illegitimate for several reasons (Giddens, 2009: 970). One is the activities, product, 
or service the groups deal in. These can include human trafficking (of mostly women and children), 
illegal migration and prostitution, drug trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling, piracy, robbery, intimidation, 
and blackmail (Schneckener, 2006: 27). Others include poaching and illegal mining and exploitation of 
natural resources. Due to the criminal nature of their activities, they evade and avoid tax payments 
and are typically involved in money laundering and financial racketeering. As such, criminal armed 
groups do not require financial support, as their operations aim at maximising profit, albeit 
illegitimately. They are illegitimate as their operations are in direct violation of the laws of most states. 
Given this, criminal armed groups steer away from actions that draw attention to their activities and 
operations in order to avoid alerting authorities. They tend to operate on a low profile using threats, 
blackmail, and other non-coercive means to achieve their aims (Schneckener, 2006: 27). Some groups 
also collaborate with members of state forces through bribery and other corrupt means, to keep 
security agencies away from their trading and business routes. Typically, this is because some TCOs 
have the capability to seize and take hold of market territories, where they can enforce their authority 
and dominance. Where this fails, they resort to violence and coercion achieve to their goals. However, 
their use of violence is mainly directed against rival groups “to either intimidate or eliminate them as 
competitors,” though violence is also used to enforce internal discipline among members and to 
prevent defection (Shultz et al., 2004: 28–29; Thompson, 2014: 87). 
Similarly, TCOs also use threats and violence against state forces and competitors that disrupt their 
illegitimate business activities, especially when non-violence fails (Shultz et al., 2004: 28). This can 
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involve cross-fire exchanges when there is a threat of being arrested and prosecuted. However, to 
ensure their survival, strong and powerful TCOs can also extend their activities and influence into 
politics through direct or indirect means. Through direct means, they influence policy decisions by 
sponsoring a political candidate into power or placing stooges to help limit government interference 
in their activities. Indirectly, as noted above, they use bribery, blackmail, intimidation, and threat as a 
means of reducing state interference. In turn, this provides them and their illicit businesses with a level 
of immunity from state crackdown and prosecution (Mackinlay, 2000: 60; Schneckener, 2006: 27). 
Most criminal armed groups share similar characteristics. A common feature is that they are highly 
clandestine and, unlike terrorist groups, want to avoid media attention. They only use violence when 
non-coercive options fail to provide the desired outcome, unlike insurgents, militias, and terrorist 
groups. Another common feature of criminal armed groups is their ability to create global networks 
to facilitate illegal trade. Poor governance, global networks and effective transport and communication 
systems facilitate their ability to illegally exploit crude natural resources, poach wildlife, and transport 
these products (Mackinlay, 2000: 60; Shultz et al., 2004: 28). 
In terms of organisational structure, criminal organisations such as drug cartels, mafias, gangs, and 
criminal syndicates are highly clandestine and have an organised chain of command. Examples of such 
armed groups include the Irish Mafia, Indian Mafia, the Chinese Triads, Primeiro Comando da Capital 
(PCC), and the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). One interesting feature of these groups is that many of them 
“began not as deliberately criminal groups but as protective-benevolent or secret societies for the 
welfare of persecuted ethnic or political groups” (Godson & Olson, 1995: 20–21). Over time, they 
metamorphose into criminal groups, with the objective of economic dominance over transacting or 
distributing certain unlawful products and services. In terms of recruitment of members, patronage 
and lineage play a role in generating a support base. The use of this “tight-knit community” ensures 
the secretiveness of the organisation, its activities, leaders, and areas of operation (Godson & Olson, 
1995: 21). 
Reflecting on the discussion in this section, one can argue that an armed group could simultaneously 
fit into all the categories, as it is possible for a group to engage in the various activities described. For 
example, the activities of Hezbollah in Lebanon shows it is possible to be classified as a transnational 
criminal organisation, a militia, and a terrorist organisation, all at the same time (Shultz, 2013: 103). 
This demonstrates the difficulty in classifying and distinguishing between armed groups, and the fluidity 
and flexibility of their operations. Notwithstanding, they all present a significant threat to human 
security, because of their ability to evoke political instability and create humanitarian crises. This links 
back to the new war thesis, in terms of how contemporary violence blurs the distinction between war 
and crime (Kaldor, 2012: 2). To a greater or lesser extent, these non-state actors pose a threat to 
state security, legitimacy, and the protection of citizens. 
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2.4 EFFECTS OF NEW WARS 
New wars are associated with internal violence that involves all the actors discussed in the previous 
sections. Since the end of the Cold War, armed groups in their various forms have become a major 
security threat and challenge to individuals, states, and the international community. They have the 
ability to conduct coordinated attacks on high-value, critical, and strategic infrastructures in both weak 
and strong nations. Understanding the goals of an armed group, as well as the danger and threats they 
pose, are essential to a state’s ability to respond (Shultz et al., 2004: 36). Failure to do so could plunge 
the state into normlessness and anomie, which erodes not only the legitimacy of the state, but also 
their ability to govern (Merton, 1938; Durkheim, 1952). These challenges are discussed as a precursor 
to understanding why some states feel compelled to use the military in an internal role to address the 
security concerns armed groups evoke. 
 Posing Threat of Violence and Undermining Security 
Armed groups are violent by nature and because they have access to weapons, they pose serious 
security challenges to both states and citizens. When they resort to collective violence, armed groups 
challenge the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and in so doing evoke serious security 
challenges for both citizens and the state. Armed groups threaten the life of citizens through various 
violent and predatory activities, but also threaten the state when they destroy valuable infrastructure 
such as power grids, water supply bases, airports, and military installations. This results in a redirection 
of valuable state resources to security, which affects the provision of other public goods and services 
to citizens, like education, health services and infrastructural development. 
The result of any single successful attack by an armed group extends beyond the primary target, and 
often results in several consequences. For example, when a tribal militia attacks another ethnic group 
or community, the immediate and direct consequence of this is the loss of several lives, properties, 
and other sources of livelihood. Typically it evokes reprisal attacks that increase the level of fear and 
accelerate the breakdown of social cohesion within societies (Alimba, 2014: 191). This is exacerbated 
when distrust and intolerance emerge along religious and ethnic fault lines. As with the conflict in 
Plateau State in Nigeria, this can plunge a state into a vicious cycle of  reprisal attacks that threaten 
insecurity (Kalu, 2011). It is important to recognise that armed groups use violence to achieve specific 
goals. For some, it serves as a means of getting rid of competitors, in order to gain monopoly over 
market territories. Whatever the aims and objectives, ordinary civilians bear the brunt of the violence 
and suffer the consequences of the breakdown of social order, and the provision of public goods and 
services. Where a government is unable to contain the threats and violence caused by armed groups, 
this may give rise to other groups emerging to counter existing threats. 
In times of ethnic or religious conflict, the victim population might resort to taking up arms, setting up 
a militia, or joining and strengthening such groups if they feel the government is not doing enough to 
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protect them. A typical example is the incident leading to the United States’ intervention in Iraq 
following the deadly cycles of attacks and reprisals by Al-Qaeda on the civilian population in the Sunnis 
Triangle (see Shultz, 2013: 98). In this regard, it becomes clear that increasing insecurity and minimal 
state control creates the environment for escalating violence. In turn, it could increase skirmishes, 
community invasion, ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses, hostage taking, forceful displacement, 
sexual abuses, and predation (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 2; Podder, 2012: 10). 
This often results in high levels of injuries, and physical and health threats to the victim civilian 
population. Terrorist attacks by militia groups, such as religious fundamentalist and clan or ethnic 
militias, typically cause high human casualties. The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and 
Development reported that about 508,000 people were killed in non-war violence in the period 2007 
– 2012 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Relatedly, data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) reveals that about two million fatalities resulted from armed conflict between the period 
1989-2014 (Melander, 2015: 2). A breakdown of the figures reveals that although violence including 
state actors contributed to most of the fatalities, attacks by non-state actors contributed about 39% 
of the recorded casualties. This shows that violence from armed groups occurs frequently, and is highly 
likely to extend over a long period (Eck & Hultman, 2007: 237). 
Figure 2. 1 Non-State Conflicts by Region, 1989-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Allansson, Melander & Themnér (2017) Organised violence, 1989-2016. 
When one looks at the distribution of the violence across geographical areas of occurrence, it provides 
interesting indicators on the incidence of armed conflicts perpetrated by armed groups (see Figure 2.1 
above). The graph shows the incidence of non-state violence by region (Europe, Middle East, Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas). The diagram indicates that Africa persistently accounts for the highest 
incidences of violence by non-state actors, supporting the claim of the new war thesis that predatory 
warfare is ubiquitous in this region (Kaldor, 1999, 2012: 13, Bauman, 2001, 2002; Shaw, 2003). 
Although there is indication of a decrease in some years, violence in the continent is yet to subside. 
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 Instigating Political Instability 
The activities of armed groups create political instability when they interfere with the effective 
functioning of a state. This is especially the case when they gain control of territory within the country 
(Shultz et al., 2004: 44; Ikelegbe, 2010: 129; Shultz, 2013: 95), or aim to influence government policies. 
Terrorist attacks on civilians and strategic targets place governments under immense pressure to 
prevent future attacks from occurring. This not only creates doubt in the ability of the state to protect 
the citizenry, but compels individuals into cooperating with or joining militias that can protect them 
(Hoeffler, 2011: 278). In turn, the insecurity created hinders and cripples the ability of the state to 
effectively plan and implement its policies and developmental action plans. From another angle, militias 
instigate critical divisions that undermine the social fabric of society and worsen in-group/out-group 
disparity. 
In several African states, militias have not only undermined developmental efforts and the provision of 
basic services, but they threaten state sovereignty too. What is important to note is that militias are 
often used as political tools to seek or cling to power (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010a: vi). This explains 
why election periods in several African countries are often associated with increased conflict and 
political violence, thuggery, and electoral malpractices (Cilliers & Schünemann, 2013; Cilliers, 2015). 
Similarly, collaboration between armed groups, state officials and political elites occur with organised 
criminal armed groups, especially TCOs. Such collaboration is described as the “political-criminal 
nexus” (Shultz et al., 2004: 43). It presents a further opportunity for the upsurge and proliferation of 
several rival armed groups. Thus, it is unsurprising that Africa alone encountered about 52% of global 
armed conflicts in 2014 (Cilliers, 2015: 4). 
 Economic Consequences 
The activities of armed groups be it illicit business, threat of violence, intimidation or the actual use of 
violence, pose serious challenges to the economy of a state. Through violence, armed groups create 
chaos and disorder that disrupt the peaceful environment necessary for economic activities to thrive. 
To continue operating, government and business enterprises have to bear the costs of protection 
through increased security budgets, or contracting private security firms (Pattison, 2011; Adeyeri, 
2012: 102; Aghalino, 2012: 148). This not only increases the cost of production and cost of doing 
business but also affects profit margins, especially when infrastructure is disrupted, damaged, or 
destroyed. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attack, the cost of clearing up the rubble, replacing 
lost assets, replacing the destroyed World Trade Centre and adjacent buildings, and restoring the 
transport, power and telecommunication facilities was estimated at about US$36.9 billion (Shultz et 
al., 2004: 39–40). 
In terms of the costs of violence to both individuals and corporate organisations, it is often difficult to 
quantify the extent of loss and damages evoked (Sköns, 2005; Rose, 2009; Rose & Bloomberg, 2009, 
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2010; Virgo, 2009; Smith, 2014). On an individual level, persons affected by violence risk losing their 
jobs and becoming unemployed. As properties are destroyed and business premises vandalised, the 
fear of insecurity heightens, and people are unable to continue with economic activities such as farming 
and trading. Typically, the first to flee violent-prone environments are skilled and qualified persons, 
and this situation leads to a brain drain. Business enterprises and corporate organisations are more 
likely to stop operations or move to safer environments, impeding economic growth (Collier, Elliot, 
Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, et al., 2003: 13–19). An economic recession could also occur because 
the state must allocate more resources or a higher proportion of its income to combatting violence, 
rather than to productive activities (Collier et al., 2003: 19–23). 
When a state apportions most of its resources towards combatting violence, it means a reduction in 
their investment on other public infrastructures. Where such diversion of resources occurs, the state 
could encounter a “double loss: the loss from what the resources were previously contributing and 
the loss from the damage that they now inflict such as destruction of infrastructure in the cause of 
repression”10 (Collier et al., 2003: 13). Given this, it is obvious that security and development are 
interrelated, and that an increase in one enhances the other (Stewart, 2004: 261; Collier, 2006: 10). 
By implication, this means that weak and underdeveloped nations are more likely to face security 
challenges, as armed groups thrive in societies with little government presence, weak law enforcement 
and ineffective criminal justice systems (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
 Overburdening the Police 
The police are primarily responsible for providing internal security services (Baker, 2004: 204). This 
makes them the principal government agency responsible for law enforcement, maintaining internal 
security, detecting threats, and preventing crime, public disorderliness and civil violence (Herbst, 2004: 
367). However, the multiplicity of threats and violence from armed groups has proven overwhelming 
for African countries facing recurrent violent conflicts (Soeters & Van Ouytsel, 2014: 253). Several 
factors account for the inability of the police to effectively curtail these threats. Key is that most 
African police forces are poorly equipped and trained to deal with the challenges armed groups pose 
(Baker, 2010: 2). In addition, several police forces have lost public trust and legitimacy due to their 
brutality, corruption, and exploitation of the citizenry (Baker, 2008: 31–332, 2010: 3; Hills, 2011). 
Citizens become unwilling to cooperate or share useful information that could aid in the arrest or 
prevention of armed groups from succeeding with their plans (Wambua, 2015: 15). The fact that 
several African police forces  tend to serve and protect the elites, while subjecting the general populace 
to untold hardship, extortion and harassment, makes this worse (Hills, 2007: 403, 2008: 219). 
                                               
10 Words in italics added for emphasis and clarity. 
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Another challenge undermining the ability of the police to suppress armed groups is the shortage of 
personnel (Baker, 2010). Several African and Asian nations have low ratios of police to civilians. Added 
to this, most police work in the cities and towns, while the rural areas have little or no security 
personnel. Rural areas act as a place where armed groups camp, recruit and train, and a safety zone 
to which they withdraw (Okenyodo, 2016). As these areas may be difficult to reach, armed groups 
are able to establish a stronghold long before the state even becomes aware of their presence and 
activities (Herbst, 2004: 361). As these groups operate clandestinely, their activities only become 
noticeable when civilians are no longer able to bear the exploitation, torture, or extortion. Once they 
have become a stronghold, it becomes difficult for the police to combat them, especially where state 
revenues do not allow for an increase in personnel to overcome the challenge. 
Lack of funding and insufficient equipment pose another challenge undermining the ability of the police 
to effectively contain the hostilities (Baker, 2010), along with corruption and mismanagement within 
the ranks (Alemika, 2007; Hills, 2007, 2008). In several African States, widespread bribery, corruption 
and intimidation of civilians has become the norm associated with the police (Baker, 2008: 31–332, 
2010: 3, Hills, 2008: 219, 2011). Clearly, this undermines state control and the ability to check the rise 
and proliferation of armed groups. Added to this, police are easily susceptible to bribery or to 
collaboration with armed groups because they are often poorly paid. As a result, many African States 
resort to using the military in an internal role as a neutral arbiter to force a ceasefire and mediate 
conflicts. Given this, it is important to understand the dynamics of conflict resolution and the 
challenges the military is likely to encounter when it acts in this capacity in society. 
2.5 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 
Conflict resolution refers to different techniques of managing, settling, negotiating, mediating, or 
bringing to an end, various forms/types of conflict situations (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999: 
21). The aim of conflict resolution is to provide alternatives to violence, and to end the use of violence 
by armed groups or hostile belligerents. Several scholars, analysts, policy makers, and mediators have 
proposed models and frameworks for managing and resolving conflicts of interpersonal, group or 
interstate nature, depending on the context in which conflicts manifest (Kriesberg, 2009). This made 
Hansen (2008: 414) describe the field as a “pluralistic discipline requiring a number of conceptions and 
methods to address different kinds of conflict.” However, one framework which provides important 
insight for understanding the resolution of new wars using military might, such as the Plateau incidence 
in this study, is third-party intervention, a common approach in contemporary conflict resolution 
(Fisher, 2011: 158). 
Third-party intervention involves an external actor acting in various capacities such as conciliation, 
mediation, arbitration or as a peacekeeper (Fisher, 2011: 165–166). In recent times, “there has been 
a shift from seeing third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies towards 
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appreciating the role of internal ‘third parties’ or indigenous peacemakers” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
& Miall, 2011: 28). Often this includes the use of the military to suppress violence and force the return 
to peace. Contemporary counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and the fight against criminal and 
transnational armed groups are militarised and executed by the armed forces with little support from 
the police and other intelligence agents (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000; Vreӱ, 2010; Weiss, 2012).  
Using the military to suppress conflict can be successful, but can also exacerbate insecurity where 
military power is not effectively controlled, or when it becomes “sucked into the conflict as a full 
party” (Miall et al., 1999: 221; Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 22). The military is hardly a neutral arbiter in 
the resolution of internal conflicts, and this situation can be worsened when it misuses or abuses its 
power (Enloe, 1977, 1978; Desch, 1996; Ouédraogo, 2014). The three categories of power 
(destructive, productive, and integrative) advanced by Boulding (1989: 25–29) explain this most aptly. 
Boulding contends that a combination of the various ways power is used produces three different 
categories of power. The first is love, which works on the principle of respect and esteem towards 
others. The second category, exchange power, involves negotiation and reciprocity with both parties 
shifting to accommodate the other where a positively valued stimuli or goal is introduced.The third 
category of power, which is the most insightful for this study, is threat power.  
For Boulding (1989: 25), threat power is “when A says to B, ‘you do something I want or I will do 
something you do not want’ because A possesses destructive power against persons or structures 
that B values.” Threat power is therefore destructive, unproductive, and a less integrative use of 
power, especially when state forces act as conflict mediators. Threat power lacks general support 
because it is coercive, and it may lack legal legitimacy when it is not used judiciously. Notwithstanding, 
intimidation and coercion are common strategies used by the military in the arena of warfare and 
armed conflict to force a ceasefire and to pacify a conflict situation. Coercion in this case means the 
“blocking of the capacity of one side (A) to implement its will because of preventive actions of the 
other side (B), despite the continuing efforts of the blocked side (A) to implement its will” (Sharp, 
2012: 89). 
In this context, coercion cripples the ability of one or more conflict parties from continuing with their 
objectives while protecting the other party/parties – often, the weaker side. While this measure could 
be highly effective in forcing a ceasefire and suppressing violence, it is a difficult strategy to implement 
because it can raise the suspicion of third-party bias and further erode public trust. Thus, it is common 
for the military to employ both coercion and intimidation to force a ceasefire and bring episodes of 
conflict to an end. Typically, intimidation involves using “sanctions, or the threat to use sanctions, to 
induce others to take, or not to take, certain actions because of their fear of the likely consequences 
if they do not comply” (Sharp, 2012: 162). Such sanctions involves the use of “punishments, pressures, 
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and means of action used to penalize, thwart, and alter the behaviour of other persons, groups, or 
institutions … for failure to behave in the expected or desired manner” (Sharp, 2012: 259). 
From the foregoing, one sees that both coercion and intimidation are legitimate strategies used by 
State forces when managing a conflict situation to forestall further outbreak or the worsening of 
violence. However, several studies indicate that the use of these tools by state institutions could also 
be questionable and illegitimate (see Collier, 1999; Mitchell, 2012). This is especially so in cases where 
it results in the violation of human rights and the extrajudicial killings of suspects without following the 
normal judicial process. Typically, where the military is abusive, it elicits several reactions from those 
subjected to it. Victims could submit and obey the illegitimate abuse when they lack the means or 
capacity to counteract the threat. 
When the victims have access to similar threat power, they could be defiant, or elect to challenge and 
counter the threat. One way this could happen is through collaborating or forming alliances with 
armed groups that could help them confront and retaliate against the threat they face. The recent 
violence which forced the Rohingya Muslims to flee Burma to a region of safety (Bangladesh) is a good 
example of victims choosing to flee conflict zones when the threat power from state forces 
undermines their security (see Human Rights Watch, 2017). A last possible reaction is a ‘disarming 
behaviour’ which basically involves collaborating with the threatener (Boulding, 1989: 27). Where a 
party to a conflict adopts this, insecurity could worsen as this could threaten all possible peace efforts 
and undermine the role of the third-party intervener, which in this case is the military.  
From the discussion, we see that using the military in society for peace enforcement operations as 
third-party interveners could serve as a useful strategy, particularly when hostility overwhelms the 
police, but its activities require close monitoring. This is because the military has ‘destructive’ power, 
which can be abused when they support a particular ethinic or religious group. Instead of promoting 
peace and the smooth resolution of conflict, this can generate furher insecurities and threaten the 
already fragile situation. This made Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999: 10) conclude that “hard 
power has always been important in violent conflict, but soft power may be more important in conflict 
management.”11 Given this, it is important to understand the ambiguity that arises when the military is 
used internally to suppress and contain the threats they pose. 
2.6 THE AMBIGUITY OF THE INTERNAL USE OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY 
The inability of the police to deal with the threats armed groups pose has compelled several states to 
use their military to aid the police (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5). Using the military in this capacity has 
evoked several concerns, as it blurs the distinction between internal and external security spheres 
                                               
11 Words in italics added for emphasis. 
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(Bigo, 2000; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). Typically, the police are responsible for internal security 
problems, such as crime control and law enforcement duties. The military is responsible for the 
external sphere, which involves defending the territorial sovereignty of the state against external 
threats and enemies (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000: 19; Howe, 2001: 30). Therefore, using the military in 
policing functions for which they are not trained is problematic. Essentially, the police are trained for 
law and order duties which requires minimum use of force, while the military are trained for warfare, 
requiring maximum use of force. Along with this, the police are typically reactive, while the military is 
proactive in deterring threats12 (Bigo, 2006; Dambazau, 2014: 70). 
Given that the police are ill-equipped to suppress the threats posed by armed groups or to counter 
insurrections, ideally a constabulary (gendarmerie) force should be used for this (Lutterbeck, 2004; 
Bigo, 2006). However, in several instances, the only alternative has been to use the military to protect 
the lives and property of citizens. Failure to do so could result in the citizens shifting their allegiance 
and aligning themselves with factions or armed groups that can offer them security and protection. 
This occurs because both government and armed groups wield arms, and are able to achieve political 
control over the population through the use of violence (International Council on Human Rights 
Policy, 2000: 34–35).  
Unlike the police, the military is a coercive force that is sanctioned to use legitimate violence to protect 
the state (Nwolise, 2007; Peterside, 2014b). Given that armed groups make use of high powered-
weapons and ammunitions, the military is often the only way a government can deal with the threat 
they pose (Vinci, 2006; Krause & Milliken, 2009; Peterside, 2014b). Victory over armed groups is 
achievable through military means because they can force a ceasefire, the de-escalation of violence, or 
an immediate victory over belligerents.13 For this reason, the internal use of the military becomes a 
necessity given that the police are generally not able to perform such combat duties. 
In this regard, a military presence is capable of restoring relative peace to volatile societies (Ferreyra 
& Segura, 2000: 19). In fact, it is on this basis that international systems such as the United Nations 
(UN) and African Union (AU) deploy troops for international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement 
duties (Olonisakin, 2000). However, the problem with this arrangement, as is the case in Nigeria, is 
that alternatives towards peaceful resolution are neither explored nor used to address the root causes 
of conflicts. Rather, the state relies on the presence of the military to force peaceful coexistence, and 
for the prevention of further escalation of violence. This entails deploying the military on active duty 
                                               
12 See the arguments put forward by Enloe (1977, 1978), Lutterbeck (2004) and Weiss (2011, 2012). 
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for a prolonged or permanent basis to forestall aggrieved groups from reprisal and returning to 
violence. 
In addition to the problem of excessive reliance on military presence to forcefully compel belligerents 
towards tolerance and peaceful coexistence, several reasons explain why internal violence protracts 
and is prevalent in Africa. These include but are not limited to stalled peace agreements, indecisive 
victory, failed ceasefire agreements, and the alteration of existing power structures through a change 
of policies, especially by a new government (Kreutz, 2010). Another significant factor is the role that 
peacekeeping or military forces play in managing the conflict and citizens’ perceptions of their security 
situation. When civilians feel their security is threatened by belligerents and the coercive force of the 
state, they are likely to resort to arms, or join armed groups whom they feel can guarantee their 
security (Regehr, 2011: 6). This plunges the state into a conflict trap of spiralling violence. Instances of 
these are seen in the many inter-communal or interethnic conflicts and civil wars occurring in Africa, 
where several states have become conflict-prone and likely to return to violence (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 
2000: 244). This raises the need to carefully explore the challenges of the internal use of the military 
and the effect this has on civil-military relations (CMR). 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Various datasets indicate that armed conflicts are a ubiquitous security challenge in many African 
countries. Characteristically, these conflicts are new wars, a distinct warfare perpetrated by numerous 
armed groups protesting or attempting to influence state policies, overthrow a government, or simply 
seek personal interests such as protection or profit. Given the numerous motives and actors, these 
new wars combine a mixture of war, crime, and human rights violations, which undermines the 
autonomy and legitimacy of states. Armed groups pose a major security challenge to states due to the 
mode and pattern of operations they adopt. Not only are they a threat to the security of citizens, but 
their destruction of property and infrastructure places a huge burden on any government due to the 
fear, panic, tension, division, and insecurity they create. The threat and use of violence makes it 
immensely difficult for the police to deal with the level of hostilities they evoke. 
The problems in dealing with armed groups are enormous. Unlike conventional warfare where there 
are few actors and the objective is concise, both the actors and goals of warfare in the new wars are 
numerous, and this makes attempts at conflict resolution difficult. The effect on governance, delivery 
of public goods, protection of civilians, and legitimacy of the state are insurmountable. To curb the 
violence, states typically adopt a third-party intervention strategy that involves using the military to 
counter the threats as the only alternative means to suppress violent armed conflict. For both the 
police and military, this is a challenge given the fluid, flexible and clandestine nature of armed groups. 
Waging war against them is difficult, especially where they hide and seek refuge within civilian 
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populations who are unaware, unable, or even unwilling to report, expose, or reveal their identity to 
state forces. 
In this regard, military campaigns against armed groups come with several challenges. Key among this 
is the excessive focus on achieving military victory, with little effort to address the root causes of the 
violence and restore peaceful coexistence among belligerents. When the military themselves become 
abusive or responsible for extrajudicial killings, and this goes unchecked and unpunished, their 
legitimacy is called into question. In such instances, citizens may resort to arms, seek protection from 
armed groups, or revolt against the state security forces. In turn, this situation could plunge the state 
into even more violence, where the military does not act impartially and professionally, and where 
there is insufficient civil control of the military. Thus, there is a need to understand how states exercise 
civil control over the military, especially when the military is deployed in an internal role to protect 
citizens. The next chapter focuses on this subject.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined the threat that armed groups pose and why governments resort to 
using the military for ISOPs to suppress the violence and insurgencies. The focus of this chapter is 
how the state exercises control over the military to ensure its professional conduct and to curtail the 
excessive use of force. Accordingly, this chapter presents the theoretical foundation of the study. The 
chapter examines the theoretical debate on civil control of the military, how this impact on CMR, and 
the control and regulation of the military. It also looks at the complex interaction between the 
citizenry, political elites, and the armed forces to highlight the problems and issues at stake. These 
issues are central to CMR, a subject which has solicited widespread debate (Feaver, 1999: 211). 
The chapter begins with an overview of the literature on military professionalism, culture, socialisation, 
and training. Next is a review of CMR to understand the interaction between the military institution, 
the state, and the citizenry, especially when the military conducts ISOPs. Following this is a discussion 
on why democratic civil control of the armed forces is necessary and important in present-day 
democracies, be they strong, weak or emerging democracies. From here, the chapter reviews the 
contributions of some early and other key theories of CMR, noting their shortcomings and the 
limitations they pose for this study. The CMR debate concludes with a discussion on how this study 
addresses the shortcomings of extant theories. 
 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, CULTURE, SOCIALISATION, AND TRAINING 
Several scholars have attempted to explain what makes the military a profession or a professional 
organisation? One explanation indicates that as a profession, the military must have (1) formal training 
to equip personnel with the requisite skills to perform the job and engage in military missions (2) the 
military must have a cultural tradition that is distinct from society, a culture that promotes unity and 
strength to enable it maintain a force that is strong enough to wage sustained combat and be successful 
in warfare and (3) the military must be socially responsible to the state which is its client (Parsons, 
1968, 1980: 29–30). For Perlmutter & Bennett (1980: 3) a professional military is one which recognises 
and respects the primacy of the civilian institution over the military. Accordingly, the professional 
military does not intervene in politics, but where it does, it is for a short duration. Perlmutter & 
Bennett note further that the professional military is not necessarily removed from politics. As such, 
the military can be involved in the political decision-making process through a fusion of “bureaucracy 
and politics, government and administration experts, and politicians” (Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980: 13). 
However, to maintain its professionalism, the military does not engage in active partisanship, and it 
does not abuse its power position to influence policy decisions. 
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 Military Professionalism and the Consequences of Unprofessionalism 
Given that the military is a professional institution, it is necessary to understand the debate on military 
professionalism, what it means for the armed forces, and the consequences of unprofessionalism. In 
this respect, I examine some key indicators of military professionalism and the consequences of the 
loss, or a lack of such professional attributes. 
The task of protecting a nation against serious threats and external ‘enemies,’ and enhancing “the 
military security of the state” is the sole responsibility of the military (Huntington, 1980: 47). As such, 
the military holds the monopoly of knowledge and expert skills on the use and management of the 
coercive violence of the state. Traditionally, disseminating the knowledge has been the exclusive role 
of the military, and it does this through the numerous military training institutions that have been 
established for this purpose. To be effective, the military instils the knowledge through “prolonged 
education and experience” by training and also engaging in warfare missions to consolidate theoretical 
knowledge with practical skills (Huntington, 1957: 8). However, numerous studies indicate that the 
military no longer holds this exclusive control as an increase in outsourcing of military duties to private 
military and security companies is undermining this monopoly (Schreier & Caparini, 2005; Singer, 2005; 
Hedahl, 2009; Schaub, 2010). 
The problem with the loss of monopoly is that, it challenges a fundamental feature of the military 
profession, given that “control over knowledge is what gives the profession its status and power” 
(Heinecken, 2013a: 7). Without this, Volti (2012: 159) claims, the profession could lose aspects of 
‘professionalization as a means of control,’ thereby making it unable to determine those who perform 
the training, the preparation for the work/course, and the evaluation of the job. Certainly, this has 
implications for the military profession. A typical example is a reduction or a loss of income and power 
as military roles are outsourced to private contractors, many whom pay their personnel higher than 
the military (Latham, 2009; Hammes, 2011; Barnes, 2017). Ultimately, this entails the military could 
become a consumer of this service. Other concerns includes the likelihood of a ‘competition’ with the 
military, and an increasing tendency for attrition as personnel may resign from military service to take 
up higher paying jobs with private providers (Heinecken, 2013a: 8). In states facing recurring armed 
conflicts, the profit motive of private military and security companies (PMSC) forms another source 
of concern that requires close monitoring. Some have observed that without strict regulation, PMSCs 
could deploy employees as mercenaries or tools for political violence (Avant, 2005: 22–25; McCoy, 
2010: 675). Even where there is strict regulation, there is the tendency that employees who are 
relieved of their duty could become a potential army for armed groups given the ‘military’ skills they 
have acquired. 
A second indicator of military professionalism concerns military autonomy, a dimension which refers 
to the degree of self-governance and the relative independence of the military over the institutional 
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decision-making process (see Stepan, 1978; Agtiero, 1989). As Heinecken (2013a: 8) aptly notes, 
military autonomy entails “the authority to decide who is allowed into the profession and to specify 
the requirements that legitimise their members to perform certain duties.” This means that a 
professional military is one which exerts “greater control over their internal decisions and less control 
over ostensibly political ones” (Pion-Berlin, 1992: 84). In theory, it is possible for the military to 
maintain and exercise a high degree of institutional autonomy on issues affecting the institution. The 
military can restrict entry into the profession, determine the process of training, define the 
organizational hierarchy and command, and define and enforce certain rules and regulations which sets 
it apart from other institutions. 
In practice, several factors interfere with this institutional autonomy of the military. The emergence 
of private military and security companies for instance has meant a loss of monopoly over the 
knowledge and skills of the institution. As states outsource public security, it affects the decision-
making process of the military on several areas that undermine the institutional autonomy of the 
military. Whereas judgement “on matters such as the size, organization, recruitment and equipment 
of the forces were the sole responsibility of top military leaders” (Finer, 1962: 27), outsourcing has 
undermined this institutional prerogative of the military. This is mainly because military leaders must 
now make decisions together with PMSCs when they are both deployed to serve on the same mission. 
In other instances, where there is much reliance on PMSCs, their influence affects the ability of the 
military to make “decisions on staffing, equipment, training, and even how the military conducts 
operations” (Heinecken, 2013a: 8–9). However, the problem with institutional autonomy of the 
military is that it could lead to ‘military political autonomy,’ a situation which results from military 
accumulation and protecting acquired interests/power over civilian leaders (Stepan, 1988). The 
problem is more likely in countries where civilian supremacy over the military is not the tradition and 
where there is weak institutionalisation of the military. Hence, “the more valuable and entrenched 
their interests are, the more vigorously they will resist the transfer of control over these to democratic 
leaders” (Pion-Berlin, 1992: 85). Where officers begin cultivating such interests, it affects military 
corporateness, an important indicator of military professionalism. 
For Huntington (1957: 10), corporateness entails that “members of a profession share a sense of 
organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group.” As an institution distinct from other 
societal institutions, the military requires a high degree of unity, teamwork, and interdependence, 
across the rank and file of the service. The corporateness of the institution serves as the basic 
functional imperative for the military to succeed and to be effective during combat missions (Downes, 
1985; Heinecken, 2013a: 11). The importance is that it ensures loyalty and obedience to command, 
and commitment to achieving mission objectives which would not have been possible where personnel 
involved are not committed to the task. 
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Where corporateness is lacking, it signifies that the bond and cohesion which glues personnel together 
as one and an indivisible force is eroded, and disunity and dissent could result. In such situations, it is 
difficult for the military to be successful in missions, especially because a lack of cohesion means the 
likelihood for insubordination and disobeying commands. The discussion of the Nigerian Civil War in 
the following chapter presents a typical example of the danger of the loss of corporateness and a lack 
of cohesion within the military. A major consequence is that it undermines the way of life of the 
military. Also, given the instruments of violence available to the military, where the problem is not 
addressed promptly, it could become a threat to both society and the political stability of the state. 
This points to another important dimension of military professionalism, the service ethic and social 
responsibility of the military. 
As Feaver aptly observes, the responsibility of the military is to protect the state against threats and 
attacks from enemies and competing nation states (Feaver, 1996). Although “the client of every 
profession is society, individually or collectively,” what distinguishes the military apart from other 
professionals is the fact that the service of the military is “essential to its immediate existence and 
functioning” (Huntington, 1957: 9). Also, as the military wields the superior coercive instruments of 
the state, it is important that it shows a deep level of commitment to serving and protecting the state. 
The importance of this is that it provides the basis for the legitimacy of the military to maintain “its 
monopoly over the profession”(Downes, 1985: 159). Clearly, this has implication for this study, which 
seeks to examine the experiences of civilians with military ISOPs to understand whether the military 
is upholding this professional ethic as it interacts with the civilian population. Where the military fails 
to uphold this professional standard, it affects interaction with civilians and the state of CMR, thereby 
creating room for questions on the behaviour of personnel and the legitimacy of the existence of the 
institution. 
When the military performs ISOPs in society, it can create problems where the sense of selfless service 
ethic is not engrained within the service. Ideally, serving in the military is considered as an institutional 
calling for the military man, “the responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill furnishes the 
professional motive” and provides the necessary job satisfaction (Huntington, 1957: 13). However, 
studies have since shown that personnel join the military for a variety of reasons which are not 
necessarily connected with the institutional calling to serve (Battistelli, 1997; Manigart, 2005; 
Heinecken, 2013a: 13). The problem arises where the motive for joining the service is based on 
‘occupational’ incentives such as pay and benefits and not on altruistic values of selfless service. In 
other words, where it is seen as a job rather than a calling (Janowitz, 1960: 117; Moskos, 1986: 378). 
Under such conditions, self-interest as against defending the interest of the group/society tends to 
trump and this weakens team spirit, interdependence, and corporateness. Given this, the service ethic 
of the military requires the subordination of individual interest to the interest of the group as the key 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 37 
 
to success, and to achieving the required professional posture (Huntington, 1957: 63, 1980: 48). These 
professional values signify that the military is a collectivist institution where individual interests are 
subjugated for the unit and are necessary for achieving military tasks and objectives. 
At this point, it is essential to emphasise that the nature of military work is completely different from 
those of civilian institutions, including the normal police forces whose duty is the enforcement of law 
and order (Von Bredow, 2006: 89). Typically, the logic of military strategy follows the extremes of 
warfighting which has no limit on the use of force (Clausewitz, 1989: 77). As such, the tasks and roles 
of the military revolves around “the use of maximum force in order to defeat the power and will of 
the opponent as quickly as possible with minimum costs” (Weiss, 2011: 401). Huntington earlier 
stressed this when he states that: 
The function of a military force is successful armed combat. The duties of the military 
officer include: (1) the organising, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning 
of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat (Huntington, 
1957: 11). 
What this indicates is that the primary mission of the military is warfighting and combat missions as 
typical in the pre-Cold War era. However, while the traditional work of the military focuses on 
external defence, in the post-Cold War period characterised by ‘new wars’, there is an increase in the 
involvement of the military in the internal security sphere to suppress violence and contain the threats 
posed by armed groups (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000; Lutterbeck, 2004; Weiss, 2012). State militaries 
have needed to adapt to the new security environment by equipping personnel, or sections of the 
military with the requisite skills to deal with the threats posed by armed groups. However, military 
have continued to train for war, as their primary mission and purpose is to use these skills in collateral 
roles (Dunivin, 1997; Heinecken, 2013b: 251). Warfighting continues to define military culture 
(Winslow, 1997: 261), norms and practices and this has a profound impact when the military is 
deployed in internal roles designed to protect the population. 
 Military Culture 
As Volti (2012: 133) aptly states, “the workplace is not just a place for accomplishing job-related tasks 
and earning a living in the process. It is a repository of values, attitudes, norms, and accepted 
procedures.” Most organisations/institutions have a culture that guides and shapes the actions and 
behaviour of workers, and how the work should be done. The military has a distinct culture unlike 
civilian institutions and organisations which influences their behaviour, norms and values (Collins, 
1998). As such, “military culture eventually directs, shapes, informs and provides the context to every 
single military action, whether of an organisational or operational nature, and irrespective of how big 
or small such action is” (Esterhuyse, Vreÿ & Mandrup, 2013: xvi). 
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Several scholars have attempted to define military culture and how this affects institutional functioning 
and the conduct of military personnel (Dunivin, 1997; Burk, 1999; King, 2006; Soeters, Winslow & 
Weibull, 2006; Esterhuyse et al., 2013; Okros, 2013). For Lang (1965), military culture consists of three 
organizational aspects that are necessary for the survival of the organization: communal life, a clearly 
defined organizational hierarchy, and discipline. Burk (1999: 447) viewed the elements from a different 
angle, adding to military discipline, cohesion, esprit de corps, etiquette, ceremonies and, professional 
ethos. In a similar manner, Sun, Sung & Chu (2007: 602) conceptualise military culture as “characterised 
by authoritarianism(discipline and subordination), hypermasculinity (profession of arms and military 
ethos), formalism (ceremonial display and etiquette), and a siege mentality (cohesion and esprit de 
corps).” For clarity and a coherent discussion, I briefly explain the elements of military culture in line 
with the four elements conceptualised by Sun et al. (2007: 602). 
As the above definitions highlight, military culture is typified by high elements of authoritarianism in 
aspects of military discipline, subordination to command, and strict adherence to institutionalised 
hierarchical structures. Discipline is a core element of military culture, and it encompasses both 
discipline at individual level and discipline as a unit, on a group level. As Burk explains: 
Military discipline refers to the orderly conduct of military personnel – whether 
individually or in formation, in battle, or in garrison – most often as prescribed by their 
officers in command … This may explain why many believe that the military is an 
institution that requires uncritical and instant obedience to orders. This belief is 
exaggerated (Burk, 1999: 448). 
Whereas Burk dismisses the belief that the military institution requires a level of ‘blind obedience’ to 
orders from personnel, one fact is that the military treats disobedience as insubordination, and this is 
often punished by harsh military codes. Such punishments are also swift to serve as an example and a 
deterrent for other personnel in order to discourage disobedience and the spread of insubordination 
across the organisation (Heinecken, 2013b: 253). The norm for the military is for personnel – whether 
individually or as a unit to strictly obey orders from superior without asking questions. Where they 
have concerns, it is channelled through superior officers as prescribed in the military hierarchy of 
command. 
A second element of military culture is the masculine nature of the working environment. Traditionally, 
military culture is male dominated, combat focussed or warriorlike, and dominated with masculine 
values and norms.  Masculine traits such as dominance, aggression, toughness, physical strength, risk-
taking, crude behaviour and the concealment of emotion is embodied in military culture. Such 
militarized masculinities are ‘highly functional in an organization whose raison d’être is combat, which 
requires the killing of enemy forces (Enloe, 1993; Williams, 1994; Bulmer & Eichler, 2007). However, 
it does give rise to a culture of hypermasculinity that legitimises the dominance of men and use of 
violence. In turn, this subjugates femininity as women are perceived as weak, thereby reinforcing a 
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misogynistic institutional practice of warriorism and bravery, the consequences which is depersonifying 
women as ‘weak’, and in combat situations, objects. As a result, personnel reproduce this in combat 
situations, especially by abusing women as ‘spoils of war’ (Morris, 1996; Odoemene, 2012: 229). 
Another element of military culture pertains to formalism in terms of ceremonies, display of military 
artefacts and etiquette of the armed forces. This component of military culture is one of the most 
visible aspect of the military as it pervades the everyday life of personnel across the rank and file of 
the military (Burk, 1999: 451). Typical example of military artefacts and military displays includes 
wearing of military uniforms, saluting as a sign of deference, military marches, and bugle calls. In the 
same way, the military performs many ceremonies to mark different functions and occasions. There 
are “ceremonies of induction and promotion or change of command, for military weddings, 
retirements, and funeral” (Burk, 1999: 452). Other ceremonies include routine practices for everyday 
work, typical here is ceremonies to “mark the life cycle of soldiers as formations at dawn and dusk, 
ceremonies for changing the guard, marching in review, and periodic inspections to mark the passing 
of the soldier’s working day” (Burk, 1999: 452). This also serves to distinguish the military from 
civilians, and to indicate their status, importance and influence within society. 
As the military is a collectivist institution where individual interests are subjugated for the unit, 
cohesion is important for achieving mission objectives. Several scholars have defined how cohesion 
should be understood, approached and measured. One approach considers cohesion as “the bonding 
together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to 
each other, their unit, and the mission” (Vennesson, 2015: 235). Buckingham (1999: 33) considers 
cohesion as “predicated by mutual confidence between members of a unit in each other’s skill, physical 
ability and courage.” Burk sees it as “the feelings of identity and comradeship that soldiers hold for 
those in their immediate military unit; it is an outgrowth of face-to-face or primary group relations or, 
in formal terms, of horizontal integration” (Burk, 1999: 453). Siebold (2007: 288) conceptualises it “as 
an ongoing process of social integration among the members of a primary group, with group leaders, 
and with the larger secondary organizations to which they belong.” For King (2007: 643), cohesion is 
about social relations such as tasks and ‘collective military practices’ that unites soldiers as members 
of a group. The definitions illustrate the importance of cohesion as the military requires a shared 
commitment for achieving mission objectives. 
However, while cohesion is necessary for effectiveness and success in missions, the solidarity, bonding, 
and loyalty it creates in units or primary groups can be problematic. Winslow (2000: 298) for example 
observed that “group bonding is a double-edged sword.” While it is necessary for achieving 
organisational goals, it can impede same when some unit refuse to work towards achieving the goals, 
or when mission objectives are not well articulated (Janowitz, 1974). In mission field or during 
operations, this becomes the more critical because small units are deployed at various locations, with 
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some isolated from the command authority (Winslow, 2000: 298). Under this condition, where some 
unit members decide to derelict, disobey or act contrary to mission objectives, the danger is that 
other unit members may not report this as it may pose certain consequences for them. This is because 
military units/groups are inflexible for members to move from one to another, hence, the fear of been 
ostracised can hinder some from reporting misconducts (Rampton, 1970; Peck, 1983). Some have also 
observed that because the behaviour of unit members affects the entire group/unit, it is expected that 
group loyalty, bonding, and solidarity would hinder some group members from reporting 
unprofessional conducts (Brotz & Wilson, 1946; Winslow, 1997, 2000). 
 Military Socialisation and Habitus 
Having examined military professionalism and military culture, one sees that although the values of the 
military profession differs from those of civilian society, they are necessary for military effectiveness 
and successes in missions. Given this, one question that immediately comes to mind is, how does the 
military transfer these values and skills to new recruits whose civilian values are different from those 
of the military? The question can be answered through military socialisation using military education 
and training. Socialisation is the process through which individuals are equipped and empowered with 
the norms and requisite skills and knowledge about the culture, training and skills, and the traditions 
of a workplace (Soeters et al., 2006: 249–250). As different organisations have different cultures, 
socialising new members becomes necessary “because nobody chooses an occupation or takes on a 
job knowing everything he or she needs to know about doing the work” (Volti, 2012: 135). As such, 
socialisation is an important part of indoctrinating the workforce to learn the basics and values of the 
institution. For the military, socialisation is crucial given the difference between military culture and 
civilian values, and the need to transform new recruits from civilians into becoming soldiers. Typically, 
military training for new recruits occurs within the framework of what Goffman considers as a total 
institution. For him: 
A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number 
of like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of 
time, together they lead an enclosed formally administered round of life (Goffman, 1961: 
xii).14 
The military trains new recruits in camps and training bases separate from society in order to 
reconstruct civilians into soldiers and to inculcate a different value system which is functional to 
military effectiveness (Ricks, 1997). In other words, military training is an enculturation process which 
involves reconstructing recruits into becoming soldiers (Winslow, 2000: 298). As they are enclosed 
and trained in units, it further ensures “that everyone does what he has been clearly told is required 
of him, under certain conditions where one person’s infraction is likely to stand out in relief against 
                                               
14 Words in italics not in original text. 
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the visible, constantly examined compliance of the others” (Goffman, 1961: 7). During military training 
for example, recruits live a regimented live, they have little or no control over their daily routine and 
are provided with little or no information about this. In return, the military provides them with feeding 
and caters for their basic needs and when to have access to this. The aim of this training and relative 
deprivation is to transform the civilian recruits from their liberal civilian values into obedient soldiers 
who do not question superior command or authority. 
The problem with military culture and indoctrination is that the deep-seated militarisation is embodied 
in the soldiers and for many, it affects their relationship when they interact with civilians in society. As 
Bergman (2014: 63) explains, few serving, and mostly, senior personnel get to reintegrate in civilian 
society where they get exposed with the liberal norms of society. As such, the study of the newly 
recruited American marines during and after their training remains salient here (Ricks, 1997). Ricks 
described how military training and socialisation affected the reintegration of marines after 11 weeks 
training in a military camp. Upon the completion of the training and their reintegration with society, 
the marines’ found their home (civilian) culture appalling, they loath civilian life, and some experienced 
difficulty in reintegrating with family members and civilian friends. This situation considered as the re-
entry or reverse culture shock, a situation in which recruits/members of a culture find it difficult in 
adjusting to their parent culture when they return because of the exposure they had with other 
cultures (Sussman, 1986; Bergman et al., 2014: 63). Typically, through the process of military 
socialisation, soldiers acquire a military habitus that makes it difficult for the personnel to maintain 
healthy relationship with civilians. Bourdieu defines habitus as: 
[S]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990: 53). 
The definition illustrates that people develop a habitus based on the groups they belong to (for example 
working class families, elites). Thus, as the habitus exists in the human body, it guides the way people 
act or behave throughout their life course (Jenkins, 1992: 45–46; Reed-Danahay, 2005: 23). Habitus 
embodies people “into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and 
thereby of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1990: 69–70). Important to note is that just as habitus is 
learnt, it can also be unlearnt because people have agency (Vest, 2012: 605). However, what is 
important for this study is that where the military acquires a harmful military habitus, through its 
behaviour and conduct which has become normalised, it requires a process of re-socialisation and 
enculturation to change this (Vest, 2012). At this point it is necessary to make some crucial 
observations as it relates to this study. 
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One is that where culture of the military is in stark contrast with those of society, it can become very 
problematic when soldiers are deployed for military ISOPs. This could be caused by a failure to 
understand and strike a balance between military values (discipline, obedience, timeliness, prompt to 
use violence, etc.) and the liberal values of society (permissive, discussion and compromise, comfort, 
etc.). As such, it is possible that they could engage in numerous human rights violations while 
attempting to enforce discipline, law and orderliness. The implication is that the military habitus of 
soldiers, especially where they have acquired a culture of abuse can undermine and strain interactions 
between the military with society and this can have impact on CMR. Given this, it is important to 
understand CMR, and how the civil control of the military can ensure the military remains professional 
and not pose a threat to society. 
 OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
CMR looks at the relationship between the military, political decision makers and its host society. In 
other words, it encompasses the “relationship between the military and the state, societal structures, 
and institutions” (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). It also covers several other issues that connect 
the military with the state and society in general. However, over the years debates in the field have 
largely focussed on two broad areas: political control over the institutional and operational use of the 
military, and how to maintain a military that is apolitical so that it does not intervene in the domestic 
politics of its state (Feaver, 1999: 211). This is mainly because, as an agent of the state, the military 
holds the monopoly on collective violence, which it can use either in the interests of the state and 
citizens, or against them. Hence, the main aim of CMR is to unravel “the meaning, nature and the 
importance of the phrase” ‘civilian control of the military’ (Eccles, 1979: 125). 
Studies on the interaction between the military, society and political leadership only evolved in the 
20th century when scholars began studying the institution from different perspectives (Rukavishnikov 
& Pugh, 2006: 131). Much of the literature arose from the American theory of separation of powers, 
the use of objective control, and from the theory of integrating the military into society (Huntington, 
1957; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver, 2003a). These different approaches are examined in the latter part of 
the chapter. However, having looked at what CMR entails, it is necessary to examine the contributions 
it has made in understanding the interaction of the military with society, especially when it is acting in 
an internal role. This helps to understand how civilians experience this interaction and how it affects 
the state of CMR. This is important because in several states the military has become more involved 
in an internal role of law enforcement and internal security maintenance (Enloe, 1977, 1978; José & 
Rasmussen, 1999: 5). 
 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
The 20th century saw an increasing shift from autocracy to democratic rule in several states across the 
world. The move entailed civilians becoming the key policy makers whose decisions are final and 
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binding on all state institutions, including the military. Democracy, therefore, confers control over the 
military to elite civilian political leaders. In the same way, civil control is the right of legitimately-elected 
civilian authorities to make key decisions on issues concerning the duties and operational use of the 
military, and expect compliance from the military (Kohn, 2002; Collins, 2009: 178). As such, the 
military is the servant of its society, and is subject to the authority of elected civilian representatives 
(Kohn, 1997: 147). This has implications for democracies and states that have previously been subject 
to military rule. In such states, the culture of civilian supremacy over the military is not yet an 
institutionalised principle, or the extent of such institutionalisation may still be feeble (Cilliers, 1995; 
Bellin, 2004; Baker, 2007). Where the military has previously held political power, it often retains 
certain significant prerogatives which gives it an edge over civilian leaders. These could be in the form 
of diplomacy and negotiations, technical skills, and influence over the use of the coercive power of the 
state. Stepan (1988) defines the prerogatives as: 
[T]hose areas where, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right 
or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal 
governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even 
to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society (1988: 93). 
These assumed rights make the subordination of the military to civilian authority difficult to achieve, 
particularly in emerging democracies. When the military perceives itself as a law unto itself, or above 
the law of the state, this can pose a threat to the civil liberty of citizens and the democracy of the 
state. Another concern is that the military could abuse their power by threatening to intervene in 
politics, given their possession of the superior coercive power of the state. Other prerogatives include 
the possession of funds that were ill-acquired, and the unofficial role of  ‘anointing’ loyal civilians or 
retired servicemen who would continue to obey the military when ‘elected’ to positions of authority 
(Adeakin, 2015: 77–79). 
Some have argued that the threat of a military coup in emerging democracies is the greatest challenge 
facing political leaders (Collier, 2009: 8). In Africa, by the early 1990s about half of civilian governments 
in the continent had been supplanted by military coups (Cammack, Pool & Tordoff, 1993: 135). Further 
data shows that, since 1945, out of the 357 successful coups globally, 82 were in Africa, along with 
109 failed attempts and 145 plots that were uncovered before execution (Collier, 2009: 8). The data 
indicates the importance of understanding the nature of CMR and civil control of the military 
(Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 136). 
Civil control of the military attempts to solve the problem of having to guard the guardians against 
excesses and self-serving actions, which is particularly crucial in emerging democracies where civil 
control over the military is not an institutionalised value. Civil control curbs the coercive might of the 
military to ensure that it does not threaten the social, political, and economic development of the 
state. A professional military should exist as the agent or servant of its civilian society, and respect 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
 
democratic principles such as civilian supremacy and the rights and liberty of citizens. As such, 
democratic civil control includes overseeing and making the final decisions on the budgets, the 
operational use, and national security policies of the military. It also ensures that the actions of the 
military are effectively under check to ensure that it acts within acceptable limits, and not beyond its 
mission and mandate (Pelle & Schendelen, 1991). 
Another crucial reason for democratic civil control of the armed forces is that the military is typically 
undemocratic in terms of its culture and values (Kohn, 1997: 141; Born, 2006: 154). Military 
indoctrination and socialisation make it difficult for personnel to adapt to civilian values when deployed 
into society. While these values are important for the military to function effectively, they set the 
military apart from society and civilian culture, and this is problematic as it could result in tensions 
between the military and society. Hence, civil control is a fundamental framework to guide and define 
the interaction between the military, the citizenry, and the civilian government. The importance of this 
is that it ensures the military is not predatory on civilians, and that it does not interfere with, or 
intervene in the political decision-making processes. This serves as the mechanism for ensuring the 
military remains apolitical, a view that Sarkesian (1981) argues is impossible as no military can be 
completely politically insular and, to a lesser extent, without self-serving interest. Thus, it is important 
to examine the theoretical debates on CMR to understand how to effectively deal with this and other 
issues concerning civil control of the armed forces. 
 THEORETICAL DEBATES 
Several CMR theories have attempted to explain how states could exercise civil control over the 
military. Key among these are the classical political separation theory of Samuel Huntington, and the 
opposing integration approach of Morris Janowitz. Both address issues of the primacy of civil control 
and maintaining a professional military institution (Nielsen, 2005: 63). Other contemporary theories 
include Peter Feaver’s agency theory, which interrogates the day-to-day control dynamics between 
the military and elite civilian leaders, and Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory which introduced new 
perspectives, including cultural and historical variables to the topic. These theories are reviewed in 
this section to understand how civilian governments control the military in a democratic setting, how 
the citizenry experiences the action of the military, and the consequence this holds for the state. This 
chapter is limited to these four theories due to their theoretical relevance, wide usage, and 
‘acceptability’ in the CMR discourse. However, it is important to acknowledge that other contributions 
abound, some of which have attempted to unify extant theories.15 
  
                                               
15 See Rukavishnikov & Pugh (2006: 132–135) and Lambert (2009: 35) for details of these contributions.  
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 The Separation Theory 
Samuel Huntington, a political scientist, developed this classical theoretical approach to civil control 
of the military. To Huntington, the key focus of civil control is how to minimise the power of the 
military so that it does not become disobedient and a threat to the state (Huntington, 1957: 80). This 
aligns with similar problems earlier posed by Plato and Juvenile when they asked who ‘guards the 
guardians’ or who ‘watches the activities of the watchmen?’ (Lambert, 2009: 35). This problem forms 
the major theoretical concern of Huntington who identified two strategies to minimise the power of 
the military, to ensure that it does not lose its professional posture or become a threat to the state. 
These strategies are the use of “subjective civilian control to maximise civilian power; and the use of 
objective civilian control to maximise military professionalism”16 (Huntington, 1957: 80–83). The 
subjective civilian control mechanism focuses on minimising the power of the military, while maximising 
the political power of civilian leadership. By minimising the power of the military and its professional 
capacity, it reduces the military to a political tool serving the interests of one or more civilian groups 
in a position of political or economic power. In turn, this enhances the interest of the government 
ruling the state. 
Subjective civilian control has several setbacks that can undermine the security of states seeking to 
implement it. One is that it civilianises the military and denies it the opportunity for professional 
advancement and political neutrality (Huntington, 1957: 83). The implication is that it reduces military 
power to an extent that the military becomes unable to defend the state against external threats and 
attacks. As Huntington (1957: 80) observed, “subjective civilian control involves the power relations 
among civilian groups… it is advanced by one civilian group … to enhance its power at the expense 
of other civilian groups.” In conflict situations, for instance, the ruling political elite can seize power 
and direct the military to coerce or raid opposition and opposing communities. Such incidences are 
more likely to occur when recruitment into the military is biased, or not representative of class, ethnic, 
racial, or religious backgrounds. 
Additionally, subjective civilian control means that a political party or an individual ruler could hold 
power indefinitely without resolving to handover or allow for a tenure system. With the support and 
backing of the military, the ruling political elite can direct the military to clamp down on agitators and 
opposition to ensure the survival of the regime (see Lutterbeck, 2013). In such situations, hostility is 
likely to erupt as certain groups feel disadvantaged by the power exercised by the ruling political elite, 
and this can affect the legitimacy of the military. As Lambert (2009: 41) makes it clear, political 
interference with the military by the ruling political elite means that the military becomes a political 
                                               
16 My emphasis. 
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tool. Typically, this occurs because subjective civilian control presupposes military involvement and 
engaging in divisive actions that favour the ruling class, or some groups at the expense of others. 
Given the challenges with subjective civilian control, Huntington proposed the use of objective control 
to ensure that the military acts professionally, within the confines of its political mandate to protect 
society. Objective civilian control aims at militarising the military as a tool of the state, which is 
“politically sterile and neutral” (Huntington, 1957: 83–84). In effect, objective civilian control is an 
insular model based on the separation of the military from the policy decisions of the state. Huntington 
maintained that the key to effective civilian control is to separate the military from the civilian sphere, 
and to professionalise the military as experts in the collective management of violence of the state. To 
achieve this professionalism, the theory proposes the use of incentives to motivate the military into 
adopting and behaving in certain professional standards. These incentives include an increase in military 
budget and keeping the military busy with external missions. Other mechanisms involve the use of 
laws and statutes, with clear lines about how the military receives command from civilian authority, 
where and how to channel its concerns, and maintaining adequate civilian oversight (Rukavishnikov & 
Pugh, 2006: 133). 
As the key to achieving objective civilian control is increasing military professionalism, Huntington 
(1957: 11–18) outlined three indicators of military professionalism. One is the expertise of officership, 
which distinguishes the military from civilians due to their specialisation in the management of violence. 
Accordingly, this involves the monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive violence, and developing and 
possessing the skills and knowledge required for this (Huntington, 1957: 8). Personnel acquire these 
skills by learning, training, and experience from serving in missions and combat operations. However, 
as armed groups have also developed the capacity to obtain and use arms, what distinguishes 
professional militaries from armed groups is the purpose for which the skills and knowledge are used. 
This points to a second indicator of military professionalism – responsibility of officership to the state. 
Beyond doubt, states create militaries to serve their interest, and to protect and defend the state 
against threats and aggression from predominantly external enemies (Feaver, 1996: 150). Under this 
condition, a professional military must exhibit high levels of selflessness and a deep commitment to 
service by using its expert skills and knowledge for the good of society. The third indicator, “the 
corporate character of officership,” distinguishes the military from other professional and non-
professional organisations (Huntington, 1957: 16). For Huntington, corporateness entails a shared 
“sense of organic unity and consciousness… a common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique 
social responsibility” which makes members distinct from laymen (Huntington, 1957: 10). Because of 
this, Huntington argues that a professional military “lives and works apart from the rest of society; 
physically and socially… has fewer unprofessional contacts than most other professional men” 
(Huntington, 1957: 16). In effect, a professional military is characterised by a strong bond and internal 
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cohesion amongst its members. However, Huntington emphasised that the best condition for this is 
when the military is separated from civilian society. 
One important contribution objective civilian control provides is its emphasis on professionalising the 
military because it benefits the state when the military focuses on its core functions, professionalism, 
and effectiveness. Considering this, Eva Bellin’s notion of ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘patrimonialism’ of 
coercive apparatus immediately comes to mind. In her examination of transformation from military 
and authoritarian regimes to democracies in the Middle East, Bellin (2004) emphasises that military 
professionalism is critical to CMR. She argues that this affects the action of the military in society and 
the polity in general, especially when the state faces unpopular protests and agitations. Bellin defines 
the attributes of an institutionalised professional military thus:  
An institutionalised coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed, predictable, and 
meritocratic. It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; promotion 
is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between public and 
private that forbids predatory behaviour vis-à-vis society; and discipline is maintained 
through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based 
hierarchy (Bellin, 2004: 145). 
Certainly, these qualities are embodied in the principles of objective civilian control. Conversely, a 
military could be patrimonial, where decisions on recruitment are “ruled by cronyism; the distinction 
between public and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power; 
and discipline is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage, often relying on balanced 
rivalry between different ethnic/sectarian groups” (Bellin, 2004: 145). Lutterbeck (2013) adds to this 
when he points out that the relationship of the military with society has a significant impact on CMR, 
as it affects how the military acts in cases of popular uprisings. While Lutterbeck’s focus was on anti-
regime/reform protests, he clearly pointed out that the more professional and institutionalised the 
military, the more it is likely to act in a manner that does not bring harm to society or threaten the 
political stability of the state. Thus, a weakness in Huntington’s theory of CMR was that the interaction 
of the military with society was not considered, nor the agency of the citizenry. 
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that objective civilian control does not only seek to 
further militarise the military, but to separate the military from politics and society. This results in an 
autonomous military, with a division of labour between civilian representatives that formulate military 
policy, and the military that executes this for the greater good of providing security to the state and 
the citizenry. While the military provides professional and operational advice in this process, civilians 
can choose to adopt or reject this when they formulate policies. This includes when and how to deploy 
the military for any mission. Ideally, this would make the military focus on its core responsibilities: 
acquiring the essential skills for fighting wars, combat operations and the total destruction or 
elimination of the ‘enemies’, but removed from the political realm (Gray, 2007: 37). This ensures that 
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the military focuses on preparation for military operations, and not on diplomacy and international 
relations. However, with the decrease in contemporary warfare and an increase of new wars (Kaldor, 
2005), the military has become more involved in internal constabulary roles, which undermines the 
separation theory (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5). 
Huntington’s classic theory provides an important lens through which we can understand CMR by 
examining the separation of responsibilities in democratic states. In states where civilian supremacy is 
not an institutionalised value, adopting this separation theory could be an important starting point for 
developing healthy CMR. However, the theory has several shortcomings related to the separation 
theory. Nielsen & Snider (2009: 291) argue that the separation of the military, especially the officer 
corps, at the level of policymaking is neither feasible nor realistic. This is because the military is 
represented by its leadership at the highest level of decision-making with political leaders for security 
meetings (Nielsen & Snider, 2009: 302). Their contribution is therefore significant, and the possibility 
of self-serving interest cannot be completely ruled out at this level. Even when the military assumes a 
non-partisan posture, the fact that it has a registered presence with one or more ‘permanent seat’ 
means that Huntington’s separation thesis can work in theory, but not in practice. In effect, this theory 
can pave the way for “unanticipated militarism” in states where civilian institutions and control are 
weak (Janowitz, 1960: 14). 
Another problem with Huntington’s objective civilian control separation thesis pertains to the 
supremacy of civilian government, or its representatives. Although civilian supremacy may be 
normative and an institutionalised value in the USA, this is not the case in several African countries, 
where decades of military rule and praetorianism testify to this (Cilliers, 1995: 38; Baker, 2007: 116). 
The fact that military coups are still being experienced in the 21st century highlights that establishing 
and re-establishing civilian supremacy over the military is a daunting task, as the military is not a passive 
actor (Chick & Mazrui, 1971: 294). Thus, one can argue that this key assumption of civilian supremacy 
has undermined the value of the theory as it does not apply universally. From another angle, as the 
officer corps has become more involved in areas of decision-making, it stands to challenge the 
supremacy of civilians in decision and policy-making (Kohn, 1997: 141). This raises questions regarding 
what the reaction of the military would be should civilians prefer different alternatives, and how to 
protect democracy in such circumstances (Burk, 2002: 13). 
In addition, some have argued that civilian supremacy is not only an acquired value, but a product of 
the cultural and historical politics of a nation (Finer, 1962: 226,240; Born, 2006: 151). In several African 
states, because warriorism has been held in high esteem, the military is prone to intervene in politics. 
This is especially the case in situations where the military feels that civilians not accountable and 
transparent, and where they feel the state is failing to provide public goods and services, including 
security to the citizenry (Chick & Mazrui, 1971: 281; Welch, 1995). One would imagine that 
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professionalising the military as Huntington proposes would make the officer corps more answerable 
to the political authority, but historical experiences in several countries show otherwise. In Nigeria, 
although the senior officer corps received several international professional education and training, it 
has not deterred them from intervening in politics (Luckham, 1971; Auma-Osolo, 1980). Because of 
this, Auma-Osolo argues that “professionalisation of the military alone would not deter the military 
from intervening, unless it is accompanied by the military's complete satisfaction with civilian control” 
(1980: 29). This implies that the military has to first recognise and consider civilian supremacy as the 
accepted norm. 
 The Integration Theory 
The integration theory developed by Morris Janowitz, a military sociologist, focuses on the professional 
stature of the military and its changing role in society. He views the military as a profession which has 
defined structures, rules and self-imposed professional standards (Janowitz, 1960: 420). This ensures 
that the military remains obedient to the rule of law, and he asserts that civilian control of the military 
can only be achieved when the military is integrated into society and the political decision-making 
process. Janowitz proposes that common civilian, social, institutional and cultural values must be 
shared, so that the military does not develop a sub-culture and risk becoming a “state-within-the-
state” (Lambert, 2009: 42). He puts forward several arguments why this is crucial to ensure civil 
control of the military. One of these is the changing pattern of security problems, which has meant 
that the military is used increasingly in constabulary roles. This means that the military is used in an 
internal role in several states, blurring the lines between policing and military functions, and between 
peace and war. He predicted that the military will become more involved in constabulary roles and 
come to act as “the reserve instrument of ultimate legitimate force” (Janowitz, 1960: 420). 
Given this, it is imperative that the military shares and embraces the democratic values of society, and 
respects the supremacy conferred upon political leaders. Where the military shares the democratic 
values of society, it will be more committed to achieving the political goals of the state (Janowitz, 1977: 
73). Once more, this is dependent on the balance of power between the military and political sphere. 
Especially in weak and autocratic states, where the military is not completely satisfied with the civilian 
leadership and where it influences the political decision-making unduely, this can be problematic 
(Auma-Osolo, 1980: 29; Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980: 3). 
When military leaders become more politically conscious due to their internal role and importance in 
providing political stability and security, it exposes the state to the risk of domestic military 
intervention in politics. The more the officer corps becomes politicised, the more it develops the 
desire to seize political power when dissatisfied with the decisions or actions of civilian political 
authorities. This is particularly true in states where civilian supremacy is not institutionalised, and in 
states with weak democratic structures and institutions. Perlmutter & Bennett rightly observe this 
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when they note that “the modern military officer is oriented toward maximising his influence in politics 
and/or policy” (1980: 3). Thus, because military leaders understand the political decision-making 
processes, it is easy to motivate self-serving interest using the failure and shortcomings of civilian 
leaders to intervene in the governance of the state, unless this is curtailed (Feaver, 2003a: 298). 
From another angle, while Janowitz’ idea of constabulary forces appears relevant as it concerns the 
use of the military in constabulatory roles, it does not address aspects of CMR that deal with the 
interaction of the military with the citizenry. This includes areas such as the incidence of military abuse 
and excesses as witnessed in several internal security and peacekeeping operations. Using the Nigerian 
context for instance, since the independence of the country in 1960, the military has been involved in 
several internal security and law enforcement operations (Okoli & Orinya, 2013; Dambazau, 2014). It 
has also been a major player in politics as Nigeria has been under military rule for about 29 years (Ojo, 
2006; Omede, 2012; Adeakin, 2015). However, this has not resulted in the military internalising social 
values that uphold civilian supremacy and respecting the rule of law or democratic values (Agbu, 2004; 
Amnesty International, 2015). My reading of Janowitz is that he overlooked how the military can 
militarise the state in terms of their military culture and professionalism, which affects the way they 
perform constabulary type roles. 
Key among the concerns of using the military internally are military excesses, militarism and the 
militarisation of society, and the violation of the human rights and civil liberties of the citizenry 
(Nwolise, 2007; Odoemene, 2012). Often, the problems arise because military training and combat 
orientation are not suited for law enforcement and crowd-control purposes (Weiss, 2012). Also, while 
it is “capable of controlling crowds, the military still remains a force to fight wars and is very distinct 
from the police” (Weiss, 2012: 462). Its basic and most important skill is the ability to incapacitate, 
destroy and inflict grievous pain on the enemy (Gray, 2007). This accounts for the numerous challenges 
and discrepancies experienced when it is deployed in an internal role, especially where this entails the 
use of force. In states were victims of military abuse and excesses are not subject to judicial remedy, 
this can affect the military’s legitimacy and relationship with the citizenry. What one can deduce from 
this is that neither the separationist nor integration theories are sufficient to explain CMR, especially 
in authoritarian states, or states with weak institutions of civil control. 
 Agency Theory 
This brings us to the work of Peter Feaver, who developed the agency theory to address the 
shortcomings discussed above (Feaver, 2003a: 2). Feaver observed that these theories failed to address 
issues which transcend beyond military professionalism and domestic military intervention in politics, 
an issue brought about by the civil-military problematique. The civil-military problematique is a 
situation where there is the fear that the military would become too powerful and pose a threat to 
society and the state (Feaver, 1996: 150). This situation arises because, to be effective, the military is 
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required to be strong enough to engage in sustained combat to defend the state and citizens from 
external attacks (Feaver, 1996: 151–152). However, as the military is strengthened to cope with 
security threats (external or internal), the state becomes vulnerable to the coercive force of the 
military, including seizing of political power. 
One possible explanation for the civil-military problematique is the existence of a dysfunctional civil-
military gap, with that is, differences in opinions, attitude, and values between the military and the 
civilian population, particularly policy-makers (Feaver, 1999: 230). Basically, the gap results from the 
pressure for the military to adapt to systemic forces, such as the changing security environment since 
the end of the Cold War, and numerous other social, moral, and demographic changes (Feaver, 2003b: 
2). Some have argued that the gap could be categorised into distinct (though not often) mutually 
exclusive types.17 One of this is a cultural gap which has to do with the differences in “the attitudes 
and values of civilian and military population” (Rahbek-Clemmensen, Archer, Barr, Belkin, Guerrero, 
et al., 2012: 671). Typically, this includes differences between military values of patriotism, courage, 
loyalty, “unity, discipline, and sacrifice, and the civilian life of individuality, hedonism, and self-gain” 
(Ricks, 1997; Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012: 672). 
A second gap is a demographic or functional gap which relates to the representativeness of the military, 
and whether the military conforms with social, political, and moral societal imperatives. Some of the 
issues here include whether the military reflects the different population groups (such as ethnic, racial, 
social classes), and issues of rights and gender equality (Feaver & Kohn, 1999; Rahbek-Clemmensen et 
al., 2012). Policy preference, the third gap, focuses on the differences of the opinions of civilians and 
the military on the execution of public policy issues. This includes questions such as whether the 
military should be deployed in non-traditional military missions, and the amount of force to be used 
when it assumes such roles (Feaver & Kohn, 1999: 3; Gelpi & Feaver, 2002: 779–780). The fourth gap, 
knowledge or institutional gap, concerns the level of understanding or harmony between the military 
and the civilian society, and the effect this has on decisions and support on matters affecting the military 
(Feaver & Kohn, 1999: 3; Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012: 673). Here, “questions relating to civil 
control of the military, the influence of the media and the status of the military reflect the implications 
a growing knowledge gap has for civil-military relations” (Heinecken, Gueli & Neethling, 2005: 128). 
The problems with the gap are numerous and of utmost significance for civil control of the military. 
When the differences grow too wide, the military could become too isolated from society and develop 
or retain values that are counter to those of society. This becomes problematic, firstly because civilian 
society cannot influence defence policy, and secondly because the military becomes irritated because 
                                               
17 Heinecken, Gueli & Neethling (2005) discussed the South African civil-military gap using the Egromas questionnaire along 
three levels: cultural, functional, and knowledge gaps. 
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politicians do not understand the military and the effect that their policies have on the professionalism 
of the military. As such, this can undermine civil control of the military and “threaten the effectiveness 
of the armed forces and civil-military cooperation” as officers may resist subordinating to civilian 
authority (Cohn, 1999: 1; Feaver, Kohn & Cohn, 2001: 1). Accordingly, Feaver developed the agency 
theory to explain the day-to-day interactions of the state with the military and how political leaders 
can influence civil control of the military to avoid this problematic. 
Agency theory argues that theories of CMR need to take into consideration the day-to-day control 
over policy decisions that affect the military and its interaction with civilian society (Feaver, 2003a: 2). 
Thus, while both Huntington and Janowitz considered military professionalism as key to subordination 
to civilian authority, Feaver (1999: 235) considered this a faultline, and that the rationality of the actions 
of the actors is a more important explanation of CMR than military professionalism. Feaver developed 
and modelled his agency theory along the rational choice theory to show how the day-to-day control 
over policy and decision-making between civilian political authorities and the military occurs. Agency 
theory considers CMR from a principal-agent perspective, in which the principal (civilian political elites) 
“seeks ways to assure appropriate behaviour from his military – agent” (Feaver, 1998: 409). The 
principal chooses a mix of monitoring mechanisms – whether to monitor the military intrusively 
through numerous parliamentary investigations and having many civilian staff in the defence office. The 
aim is to allow the military agent to choose how to act, either to comply and obey instructions from 
the principal, or to shirk by refusing to obey or by acting in ways that undermine the authority of the 
principal. 
Unlike Huntington and Janowitz, Feaver introduced proactive control strategies to ensure that the 
military carries out legitimate tasks assigned to it by the civilian principal. What this implies are 
measures to ensure that the military always acts in the interests of the state (Feaver, 2003a: 284). 
When they fail to do so, the measure proposed by Feaver is to use rewards to recognise and 
encourage obedience, and sanctions to punish disobedience and wrongdoing. The rewards can range 
from granting autonomy to the military to make decisions on less critical issues and operational 
matters, to granting certain benefits such as special recognition and providing pension and gratuity 
upon retirement. Sanctions can take the form of punishment in several ways, such as a reduced budget, 
honourable and dishonourable discharge from service, demotion to discharge an erring officer at a 
lower rank, as well as dismissing high-ranking military officers (Feaver, 2003a: 89–93). 
Thus, rewards and sanctions play a key role in his conceptualisation of the agency theory. Feaver claims 
that CMR is “an ongoing game of strategic interaction, in which civilian principals vary the intrusiveness 
of their monitoring of military agents and military agents vary their compliance with civilian 
preferences” (Feaver, 2003a: 282). Agency theory therefore considers both civilian leadership and the 
military institution as rational actors whose actions are based on expectations of the reaction of each 
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other, with both parties constantly seeking to exploit the weakness of the other to their advantage. 
Feaver (2003a: 89) observes this as a limitation of the theory, when he notes that the theory really 
only applies to societies where civilian supremacy is an institutionalised value and the military accepts 
its position as an agent of the state, as it is in the USA. Notwithstanding, it is unclear even in such 
societies whether serious sanctions from political leaders would not create a rift that could affect the 
state of CMR.18 
Feaver offers an important lens through which we can understand CMR, especially the contribution 
on the rationality of actors, and the argument that the action of actors is premeditated upon expected 
reaction. However, agency theory, just like the separation and integration theories, focuses extensively 
on civil control, while giving little attention to the citizenry as an important autonomous partner with 
its own agency. Although Feaver studied the civil-military gap extensively, he emphasises how the 
civilian society loses their agency and becomes detached from the military (see for instance Feaver, 
1999, 2003a,b, Feaver & Kohn, 1999, 2001; Feaver et al., 2001; Feaver & Gelpi, 2004). But what about 
where the opposite occurs, where societies experience a high level of militarisation due to the 
presence of the military within society? Agency fails to address how the citizenry experiences their 
interaction with the military, especially where this is experienced in a negative light due to the violation 
of the rule of law, or lack of professionalism. Under such conditions, to what extent can the citizenry 
exert pressure on the state to address the violations of the military? 
This raises an important question about the role of civil-society organisations such as NGO’s, social 
movements, churches/mosques, political think tanks, and trade unions on CMR. According to my 
assessment, it is grossly inadequate for the citizenry to be lumped together with political leadership 
or its representatives, because citizens play an active role in reacting to or protesting policies, human 
rights violation committed by the military. Given this, it is necessary to engage with other theories on 
CMR that may fill this void. One such approach is the concordance theory of CMR developed by 
Rebecca Schiff. 
 Concordance Theory 
Unlike the separation, integration, and agency theories of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver, 
concordance theory sees the citizenry as an autonomous actor in CMR. Rather than subsuming the 
citizenry with political leaders or its representatives, it highlights the agency of the citizenry as one of 
three partners in CMR (Schiff, 2009: 32). This theory has made an important contribution to the 
debate on civil control by exploring why the military intervenes in the governance of its state, and the 
                                               
18 See for instance the debate on the alleged American CMR crisis during the Clinton era (Weigley, 1993; Kohn, 1994; Feaver, 
1996: 170–171, 1998). 
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conditions that promote or inhibit this.19 The key argument against Huntington’s separation thesis is 
that for effective civil control to be achieved, there must be a cooperative relationship, and not 
necessarily a detachment of the military from society and the political decision-making processes 
(Schiff, 1995: 7). Schiff argues that separating the military from the civil sphere would not necessarily 
make it apolitical or prevent it from intervening in politics. Rather, it is cooperation and agreement on 
shared values that inhibits it from intervening in the domestic politics of its state (Schiff, 1995: 12, 
2009: 13). In this way, concordance theory favours neither the integration nor separation of the 
military but it considers both as part of the distinct existing cultural elements that the partners must 
cooperate and agree upon. 
The primary concern of concordance theory is the factors that promote or inhibit military intervention 
in the politics of its state. The theory proposes that the institutional and cultural conditions of the 
state and society impact on its CMR. Irrespective of the form of government, concordance can be 
achieved in a state if some key conditions are met (Schiff, 1995: 12). These conditions are the 
cooperation, dialogue, accommodation, and sharing of common values among the three partners on 
four key indicators – the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, 
method of recruitment, and the style of the military (Schiff, 2009: 44). These indicators are the key 
elements that the government, military, and citizenry must agree upon. Thus, concordance argues that 
what inhibits the military from intervening in domestic politics is compliance with the terms of this 
agreement on the four indicators. 
On the first indicator, the social composition of the officer corps, Schiff (1995: 13) maintains that the 
officer corps forms the managerial and top leadership positions of the military. They handle decisions 
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels that affect the functioning of the military. Ultimately, it 
is senior leadership that provides the link to government and the citizenry. Therefore, the three 
partners must agree on its social composition for concordance to be achieved. In a democratic state, 
for example, having an officer corps that is representative of the electoral regions/groupings or the 
demographic profile of the population is a necessary condition for concordance to take place. This 
could be through deliberate recruitment and promotion of individuals from the different groupings (be 
it ethnic, religious, or social classes) to the ranks of the officer corps in the military. However, for 
concordance to be achieved, this must be done in the context of the cultural and historical tradition 
of the nation. Concordance theory recognises the peculiarity of diverse cultures, their historical 
antecedents, and the effects these could have on the composition of officer corps of different states. 
Especially in deeply-divided heterogeneous nations this is crucial and even more critical in states that 
                                               
19 Domestic intervention in politics, as defined by Schiff (2009: 2), “include forcible actions like coups d’état, palace revolts, 
or other forms of takeover by a nation’s armed forces.” 
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have previously had communal conflicts, and military coups that are ethnically biased. For this reason, 
the three partners need to agree on the size and composition of the military in order to avoid 
disaffection or marginalisation. Failure to do so could result in discordance that affects the legitimacy 
of the military and even evoke protest and civil disobedience. 
The second indicator, the political decision-making process, comprises of individuals occupying 
positions of leadership, and the processes involved in deciding the needs of the military, and what to 
apportion to it (Schiff, 2009: 45). As concordance theory is not limited to any form or system of 
government, the political decision-making process takes different patterns across different countries. 
In some, it involves the participation of military officer corps, while in others, the military only has to 
present its needs and budgets through an assigned government channel. However, irrespective of the 
form it takes, what is important is that partners reach agreement on the best political processes that 
meet the needs of the armed forces. The importance of this indicator cannot be overstated. Especially 
in states where the culture of civilian supremacy over the military is not the norm, this is crucial in 
order to ensure that the military concurs with political decisions and to prevent it from intervening in 
politics (Auma-Osolo, 1980: 29). Hence dialogue, agreement, and accommodation are critical when it 
concerns political decision-making to forestall the risk of military intervention. 
The method used to recruit civilians into the armed forces is the third indicator of concordance. As 
concordance theory is not limited to any particular system of government, it argues that the three 
partners must agree on what recruitment method serves the state best.20 Schiff (2009: 46) argues that 
concordance is only achieved between the military and the citizenry when the state uses non-coercive 
methods of recruitment to enlist civilians into the military. Concordance theory therefore considers 
persuasive recruitment as a form of agreement between the three partners on how to conscript or 
enlist volunteers into military service. This may pose a challenge for all-volunteer forces who may fail 
to attract certain ethnic or religious groups into its ranks, making it unrepresentative of society.21 
The composition of the military is a critical factor underpinning the legitimacy of the armed forces in 
society. Where for instance recruits are not a fair representation of the diverse social groups 
(religious, class, ethnic or racial), it could undermine its general acceptance and the cooperation it is 
likely to receive from ‘marginalised’ groups. In this regard, concordance argues that targets for 
enlistment, and the persons attracted and recruited, should be a fair representation of the diversity in 
society. To achieve this, it requires that the three partners agree on the recruitment pattern, the 
                                               
20 For an expanded discussion on the styles and cycle of military recruitment, see Finer (1975: 95–96). 
21 The persuasive non-voluntary conscription into the Israeli Defence Force and many others are notable exception (Schiff, 
2009: 120). 
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composition, and the characteristics of the recruits to ensure that it does not result in dissatisfaction 
from the citizenry or ‘marginalised’ members of the armed forces. 
Military style is the final indicator of concordance, and it relates to the human and cultural aspects of 
the armed forces. It covers broad issues affecting the external characteristics of the military and how 
other partners think about it, such as how the military relates to society, its status, the perception of 
the citizenry, and the symbols that distinguishes it from the rest of society (Schiff, 1995: 15–16, 2009: 
47). However, as Schiff maintains that the primary goal of concordance theory is to predict the 
conditions that promote or inhibit domestic intervention (Schiff, 1995: 8,12, 2009: 42–43), 
concordance theory, generally, failed to account for the everyday implication of military style. The 
theory is limited by its inability to reflect on the effect of military style on society. It did not account 
for the implication of othering of civilians and extoling military values over those of society, especially 
where the military has a pervasive presence in society. Thus, although Schiff highlighted the importance 
of the human and cultural aspects of the armed forces, she failed to consider its negative implication 
for society when she developed concordance as a predictive theory. Where civilians are dissatisfied 
by their othering from the military, they can exercise their agency in ways that can affect CMR, 
however, concordance theory failed to explain this.  
Overall, concordance theory has made important contributions that could help us understand why 
the use of the military has become problematic in Plateau State, Nigeria. This is particularly because 
of the specific recognition it gives to the citizenry as an important partner in CMR. With this, it is 
possible to understand some of the tensions that emerge in relation to the interaction and experience 
of the citizenry with the military. The four indicators also reflect issues of interest in a deeply divided 
state, such as Nigeria, where the daily presence and impact of the military on civilian life is constantly 
felt, which is discussed in the following chapter. However, it oversimplifies the complex relationship 
between these actors as a given (Ali, 2014: 544). Schiff simply presumed that dialogue, accommodation, 
and sharing of common values among the three partners would lead to concordance and inhibit 
military intervention, as though this is a very simple and an established process across diverse cultures 
and societies (Ali, 2014: 549). However, as this study will show, this process is not a given and several 
other factors affect CMR, despite agreement on the indicators. 
In emerging democracies where governance institutions are weak or non-existent, civil societies are 
generally either weak, crippled, or self-serving, it is difficult to imagine how the citizenry could be an 
influential partner. Along with this, the opinions of citizens are only heard during elections in such 
societies, making it even more difficult to assume that a cooperative relationship could easily be 
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achieved. In the states of the ‘Bottom Billion,’22 because the voices and opinions of the citizenry do 
not necessarily matter, their votes do not count and are not a guarantee for electoral victory. We see 
the citizenry further overshadowed by both the political and the military partners (Collier, 2009: 36). 
As Collier (2007: 46) makes it clear, because these states derive a significant portion of their revenue 
from natural resources and not from the taxation of citizens, it undermines the ability of the citizens 
to demand delivery of public goods and services. It also undermines the influence of the citizenry to 
demand accountability and transparency from elected officials. Thus, concordance suffers from another 
weakness, which is the inability to explain ‘how’ and ‘the ways’ in which the citizenry could influence 
or exercise agency in the relationship. 
Although Schiff noted that concordance applies across different systems of government, the theory 
made no attempt to show how the citizenry could exert influence in the decision-making process. 
Whilst the citizenry could organise collectively into civil-society organisations, social movements, or 
interest groups to petition government using several platforms, these avenues are limited, and less 
effective especially in praetorian, authoritarian and weak democracies. From another angle, empirical 
evidence has shown that in several societies, especially in Africa, multi-cultural diversity and religious 
identity has been divisive, affecting social cohesion and often leading to conflict when the state is unable 
to contain this (Fearon & Laitin, 1996, 2003; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). In societies where communal 
violence continues to manifest along these dividing lines, conflict, distrust, and disunity inhibit the ability 
of the citizenry to collectively act as an important collaborative partner, as concordance theory 
suggests. Rather, the citizenry becomes deeply divided, weakened and incapable of acting as a partner 
with the ability to influence the decisions that affect their security. 
Another major weakness of concordance theory, as with the other theories, is its limited focus in 
terms of scope and application. The theory explains why the military intervenes in domestic politics, 
and the conditions that promote or inhibit this intervention (Schiff, 1995: 7). As this study explores 
the interaction of the citizenry with the military and how they experience its presence in their daily 
lives, concordance is useful but limited. This is because of the failure of the theory to advance beyond 
the traditional focus of CMR, which is how to prevent the military from intervening in domestic 
politics. Schiff acknowledges this limitation when she says that concordance “is limited by its causal 
objective, which is to predict the prevention or occurrence of domestic military intervention” (2009: 
42). Concordance theory thus fails to provide an adequate lens through which to study the interaction 
of the military with the populace, and how this affects the delivery of the most important public good 
of all - the security of citizens. 
                                               
22 ‘The Bottom Billion’ is a concept referring to a combination of several African and Central Asian and other countries 
characterized by high incidences of civil war, plagues, ignorance and high economic dependencies (Collier, 2007: 3). 
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In conclusion, although dialogue, accommodation, and sharing of common values among the three 
partners could lead to a cooperative relationship, it does not guarantee that the military will act 
professionally. While agreement on the indicators of concordance are important, they are not 
sufficient to guarantee that the military will uphold professional ethics and not prey on citizens, seek 
self-serving interests, or engage in excesses and human rights violations. Notwithstanding these 
shortcomings, concordance makes an important contribution to CMR by introducing the citizenry as 
an autonomous partner with agency, but not in the context of the conduct of the military in its 
interaction with the citizenry. My argument is that aspects of CMR dealing with the interaction of the 
military with citizenry have not received adequate attention. Therefore, there is a need for theoretical 
reconsideration and modification to explain this, especially because of the frequency of internal 
conflicts caused by armed groups, and the increasing internal use of the military. The following section 
tries to clarify this in terms of the agency and impact of the citizenry on CMR. 
 CMR BEYOND DICHOTOMY: A QUADRUMVIRATE INTERACTION THEORY 
In the previous section, some key theories of CMR were reviewed, and the shortcomings highlighted. 
One of these is that the theories focus mainly on the prevention of military intervention in politics and 
civil control of the military, while largely ignoring the role of the citizenry. A second shortcoming 
concerns the dichotomous approach which lumped the citizenry together with the political sphere, 
while disregarding the agency of the citizenry as a partner in the relationship. Thus, the interaction of 
the military with the citizenry, how it experiences the military, how this affects CMR, and the 
numerous ways the citizenry could influence the relations is still largely undertheorized. What this 
means is that studies which focus on the interaction of civilians with the military, their experiences, 
and reaction to military actions suffer theoretical limitations. 
Given this, there is a need to advance beyond the political-military dichotomy, as concordance has 
shown, but also beyond focusing on preventing domestic military intervention in politics, which limits 
concordance theory. This section advances a quadrumvirate interaction theory as an alternative that 
could help to fill this void. My assessment of the CMR literatures is that the concordance theory is the 
most relevant theory that can be applicable to any state, irrespective of the system of government it 
practices. Chiefly, this is because concordance recognises the agency of the citizenry (even though it 
did not explain how they exercise this), and it adopts both institutional and cultural explanations (Schiff, 
1995: 12). Given this, the quadrumvirate interaction theory upholds a significant aspect of concordance 
theory explanation of CMR. 
In Chapter One (section 1.6.3), quadrumvirate interaction in CMR was defined as a fourfold interaction 
occurring between three partners, namely, the military, political elites, and the citizenry. As a theory, 
quadrumvirate interaction in CMR aims to achieve two objectives. The first is to provide a theory of 
CMR that is both descriptive and predictive to explain the conditions that promote or hinder domestic 
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military intervention in politics. The theory achieves this by explaining the complex everyday 
interaction between the partners in CMR using both micro level issues and institutional explanations 
at policy decision-making level. The second objective is to identify the indicators necessary for a 
healthy state of CMR, the sources of an unhealthy or strained CMR, and how the citizenry exercise 
agency in ways that influences the state of CMR. 
 Indicators of Concordance/Agreement 
To maintain a healthy CMR and prevent the likelihood of a domestic military intervention in politics, 
the quadrumvirate interaction theory holds that the partners have to share common values, agree, 
and cooperate on five indicators. Schiff (2009: 44) identified four of these indicators as – the 
composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and the 
military style. As these four indicators have been discussed, I focus on the fifth indicator advanced by 
the quadrumvirate interaction theory. The fifth indicator, namely the ‘military approach’ is the 
reflective and interactive aspect of military style which considers both human and relational variables 
which affects the military’s interaction with society. 
Military approach recognises that the military style, that is the status, symbols, and military culture can 
affect its conduct and (ab)use of power can have a dysfunctional effect on society. Hence, the military 
approach serves as the reflective and interactive indicator of how military personnel act or behave in 
terms of their professionalism and the authority it wields. However, where the military’s approach 
undermines the culture, tradition, and values of society, it is likely to create a gap between the military 
and the citizenry. As with the separation approach of Huntington, the challenge is that the military can 
become isolated from society, and this could result in several negative effects to the state. As earlier 
discussed in section 3.5.3 this can result to the abuse or misuse of power (see Ricks, 1997; Cohn, 
1999; Feaver et al., 2001; Feaver, 2003b; Heinecken et al., 2005). 
Another challenge is the likelihood that the military could develop a sub-culture different from that of 
society. Typically, this is based on the effects of military socialisation and the attributes assigned to the 
military as a profession and an institution (Lambert, 2009: 42). In states where the military conducts 
frequent internal security duties, the problem could be worsened where personnel take advantage of 
their position to ‘other’ civilians or to engage in other forms of unprofessional conduct. Therefore, as 
the reflective and practical aspect of the military style indicator, military approach ensures that 
personnel inculcate and respect the values of society. The importance of sharing the values and 
traditions of society is that it promotes a cordial relationship between the military and society, and 
also fosters high degree of institutionalisation of the military in society (Bellin, 2004: 145; Lutterbeck, 
2013: 33). 
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 Quadrumvirate Levels of Interaction 
In terms of the partners in CMR, the quadrumvirate interaction theory holds that CMR comprises of 
the interaction of three partners who have the capacity to exercise some level of autonomy. The 
partners are the military, civilian political elites, and the citizenry. As with concordance theory, 
quadrumvirate interaction theory recognises the autonomy of the citizenry, and it further explains 
how they exert their agency in the relationship. It maintains that the citizenry is separate from elite 
civilian political leaders who act as the representative of the people, and exercise civil control over 
the military. This way, the theory presents a holistic account of CMR showing the distinct interactions 
between the military and the citizenry, the military with the political elites, and the political elites with 
the citizenry. Zeki Sarigil illustrated this relationship between the three partners in what he calls “the 
three intersecting spheres in a polity” (Sarigil, 2011: 267). 
Figure 3. 1 Sarigil’s Three Intersecting Spheres in a Polity 
 
Source: Sarigil  (2011: 267) Civil-military relations beyond dichotomy 
Figure 3.1 above shows how the interaction in CMR occurs in society. For Sarigil, three levels of 
interaction occur between (1) the military and political elite, (2) the military and society, and (3) the 
political elite and society. Here, the military sphere, the political sphere, and the sphere of the 
citizenry/society (social) are in a discontinuous interaction in society, which is influenced by several 
factors. This includes the political system in place, the presence of the military in society in peace and 
conflict, and the role of the military in both social and political spheres. However, as Figure 3.2 shows, 
a fourth level of interaction exists to make it a ‘quadrumvirate interaction’ among the three partners, 
and not three levels as Sarigil identified. Accordingly, the quadrumvirate interaction comprises of one 
major level of intersection among the three partners, represented with the number ‘1’, and three 
other subunits of interaction, represented with the numbers ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’ in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3. 2 The Quadrumvirate Interaction in Civil-Military Relations 
 
Source: Modification of Sarigil’s three intersecting spheres in a polity23 
Although all the units of interactions are distinct levels of interaction, they could overlap in real life 
situations, and this means that they are not always mutually exclusive. Important to note also is that 
the subunits of interaction have a crucial determinant role that indicates the sources of strained CMR 
that can lead to a domestic military intervention in politics. Understanding the nature and pattern of 
interaction at each subunit is thus important. Where for instance, a relational problem exists in one 
or more subunit, failing to address it could create a problem that can alter any understanding or 
cooperation reached at the major level of intersection. The concern as historical evidence has shown 
in various countries is that this can in the long run act as the condition that favours/instigate some 
personnel to seize political power in order to save the situation. For conceptual clarity, I discuss these 
levels. 
 The major intersecting level 
Interaction at this level takes place among all the partners – the military, the social (citizenry) and the 
political sphere. This is the level of interaction Schiff describes in concordance theory while not 
emphasising the three-subunit level of interaction. Schiff argues that concordance occurs when the 
three partners enter a cooperative relationship of mutual accommodation, which in turn lessens the 
likelihood of domestic military intervention in politics. However, while there could be an agreement 
at this level as Figure 3.2 shows, there are three other levels of interaction with a causal impact on 
the relationship which concordance did not explore. Similarly, it is also possible to relate this level of 
interaction with Janowitz’s theory, which posits that the key to civil control of the military is integrating 
it into society and the political decision-making process. However, although Janowitz did not recognise 
the agency and causal role of the citizenry, his proposition for integrating the military produces the 
intersection of the three spheres of CMR.  
                                               
23 The quadrumvirate interaction, my modification of Sarigil’s three intersecting spheres in a polity. 
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As with Schiff’s concordance theory, because Janowitz did not consider CMR from this tripartite 
partnership, his theory did not envisage the likelihood of problems outside this intersecting level. 
When he argues that sharing common institutional and cultural values would help prevent the military 
from forming other sub-cultures outside of the state, he did not consider the distinct level of 
interaction between the citizenry and the military in peace and conflict. He also did not consider that 
a distinct interaction exists between the military and the political elite, and between the political elite 
and the citizenry. This has meant that his theory did not discuss the causal effect these subunits have 
on CMR at this intersecting level. This supports Schiff’s contention that failing to theorise CMR from 
this tripartite partnership “reflects only a partial story of CMR” (Schiff, 1995: 13). While we can make 
the same conclusion with Huntington’s separation theory, his proposition for detaching the military 
sphere from the political sphere differs significantly in terms of the intersection of the partners in this 
level. Thus, his theory explains neither the causal relationship at this level, nor the subunits of 
interaction and their causal effect at the major level of interaction. This raises the need to understand 
the subunits of interaction between the partners. 
 Interaction between the military and citizenry 
This level of interaction between the military and the citizenry (one of the three subunits) is 
represented with the number ‘2’ in Figure 3.2. Together with the two other interaction levels (‘3’ and 
‘4’), I consider these levels as the subunit because interaction at the level occurs outside of the centre 
or the intersecting level. In this subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, the 
interaction is between the military institution, made up of recruits, privates, and officer corps, and the 
citizenry (civilians and different civilian and civil society groups). Some of the interactions in this subunit 
occur because of the decisions made at the intersecting level. These include decisions to recruit 
citizens into the military, which requires enlisting civilians either by conscription or voluntary 
enlistment. Another instance is the decision to deploy the military internally for law enforcement and 
security duties in times of conflict, or the decision to site a military infrastructure such as a military 
base within a local community. These present instances which bring the military into close and frequent 
interaction with civilian society, and the interaction between the military and citizens occurs outside 
of the major intersecting level of interaction.  
In this subunit, it is possible to see the interplay of human and relational variables as the military 
interacts with the citizenry. The military and the citizenry could have a cordial or a strained 
relationship, which can affect the general state of CMR at the intersecting level. As Bellin (2004: 145) 
and Lutterbeck (2013: 33) illustrate, where there is high degree of institutionalisation of the military, 
the military upholds professional standards in its interaction with civilians when it acts internally. 
However, when the military has no firm relationship with society, it can result in predatory actions on 
civilians, especially in deeply divided societies facing communal conflicts. In such a situation, one can 
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only but agree with Buzan (1991: 45) that the state and its institutions constitute a major source of 
threat and insecurity to the citizenry. 
Faced with military abuse and violation of their human rights, the citizenry can retaliate against the 
abuse, and certainly, when civilians revolt against the military, it affects CMR. In societies where chastity 
is esteemed, and ‘immoral’ behaviours are culturally proscribed, issues such as sexual involvement of 
soldiers with unmarried women could evoke condemnation, tension, and hostility towards the military. 
Where the citizenry perceives the military as biased in military ISOPs, or predatory on civilians, 
discontent and hostility could result. When such incidences occur outside the major intersecting level, 
they could be dismissed as merely society-military issues, and not necessarily CMR issues, but CMR is 
concerned with the “relationship between the military and the state, societal structures, and 
institutions,” so this cannot be overlooked (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). Discontent and hostility 
between the military and citizens could affect and undermine the interaction and relations at the major 
intersecting level. When there is distrust and hostility towards the military’s role in addressing internal 
conflict, it whittles away the legitimacy of the military and its professional stature. Thus, the relationship 
and interaction of the military with its civilian population is an important aspect of CMR that needs 
careful attention. 
There is no doubt that basic aspects of military culture differ from those of civilian society, as the 
military is authoritarian and, as Finer (1962: 5) argues, it enjoys some advantages over civilian 
organisations. However, it becomes problematic when they abuse this power and authority to 
intimidate or denigrate and ‘other’ civilians (Jamieson & McEvoy, 2005; Brons, 2015). For example, 
‘othering’ extends beyond the differences between persons or groups, it encompasses strategic actions 
such as denying privileges and fundamental human rights of the othered persons/groups, such as 
civilians, or those of other ethnicities, religions, classes or races. Thus, it paves the way for further 
exploitation, coercion, and intimidation. Instead of protecting the citizenry, soldiers engage in abusive 
behaviours when they depersonalise civilians, and this could result in mass atrocities such as genocide, 
collaborating with armed groups to attack the othered population, and gender-based violence (GBV) 
(see Enloe, 2004; Kelly, 2010; Odoemene, 2012). When this occurs, it erodes the legitimacy of the 
military, weakens professionalism and strains CMR, especially where civilians react or retaliate. 
 Interaction between civilian political elites and the citizenry 
Interaction at this level is represented with the number ‘3’ in Figure 3.2. It depicts the interaction 
between the political institution and the citizenry. At this level of interaction between the polity and 
society, several factors influence the relationship at both the subunit and the level of intersection. One 
key factor is the ability of the political elite to constantly maintain the supply of public goods and 
services, including the security and welfare needs of the citizenry. When the state is unable to provide 
this, and the citizenry has a general perception that the political elite are unable to guarantee their 
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needs and safety, it creates dissatisfaction. In other instances, pro-reform movements and agitation 
movements by opposition emerge from outright dissatisfaction with the political elite or political 
system in an authoritarian regime. A typical example here is the recent waves of anti-regime protest 
in the Middle East (the Arab spring, or Arab renaissance) (Lynch, 2012; Nepstad, 2013).  
The point here is that the political elite or the political level of policy and decision making differ from 
the general population, in contrast to the view of several CMR theories. Political elites make policy 
decisions for the state, while expecting compliance from the citizenry (Stepan, 1978: xii). However, 
although the state defines social relationships through its political institutions, it derives legitimacy and 
ability to govern through the approval and support of its citizens. As such, the citizenry as a collective 
play a significant role in this level of interaction when it exercises its agency. Thus, irrespective of the 
system of governance, if the state enjoys a growing approval and legitimacy amongst the citizenry, it is 
likely to obtain their loyalty, support, and allegiance (Boudon, 2017: 287–288). This forms the 
necessary conditions for the state to not only extend its presence, but also its ability to govern its 
people (Mann, 1984; Yashar, 2005: 6). 
The process of legitimising or disregarding political decisions makes up a crucial aspect of CMR, 
especially when these decisions revolve around the operational use of the military and other military 
matters. Key among these options is the collective action of the citizenry using civil-society 
organisations to influence political decisions. Lobbying, protest actions, strikes and demonstrations are 
common tactics used to influence or oppose political decisions. However, while this option follows 
legitimate and non-violent means, the citizenry may also use violence to protest or react to abusive 
state actions. Often, social movements and interest groups metamorphose into armed groups with 
clear political goals to compel governments to concede to their demands. This sphere of interaction 
in CMR between the political and social realms holds crucial indicators for the state, its security, and 
its economic, political, and social stability. Not only does wide disaffection result in the loss of political 
legitimacy, but historical evidence shows that growing insecurity, hostility, and dissatisfaction with a 
government does lure the military into intervening in politics to ‘salvage the situation’ (Ojo, 2009a; 
Cohen, 2012: 464; Sarigil, 2015: 286). 
 Interaction between the civilian political elites and the military 
In the last level, marked number ‘4’ in Figure 3.2, the interaction occurs between the political elites 
and the military. Here, most of the interaction occurs between political elites occupying political 
positions of authority and military officer corps. However, in contrast to what extant theories argue 
(with concordance as an exception), this level is only a subunit and not the major level of interaction, 
given that the citizenry is not involved. What occurs at this level is the interplay between political 
actors and military officer corps on several issues concerning the day-to-day control over the military, 
and its roles and functions (see Feaver, 1997, 2003). However, as the military is not a passive actor, it 
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also tries to influence the political sphere on several issues through various mechanisms. As Feaver 
(2003a: 57–62) indicates, the options available to the military include working diligently or shirking.  
In societies where civilian supremacy is not an institutionalised value, heightened discontent and 
dissatisfaction by the military could result in military coups or other forms of forceful intervention in 
politics (Feaver, 2003a: 58–60). Also, as we have previously seen, in states where the military has 
previously intervened in politics, it is likely to have acquired certain prerogatives that provide a firm 
grip on the political sphere (Adeakin, 2015). Among others, these include the “constitutionally 
sanctioned independent role of the military in the political system, special military relationship to the 
chief executive, coordination of defence budget, and military operation outside of civil and criminal 
laws” (Stepan, 1988: 94–97). Such prerogatives and influence of the military could lead to a situation 
of “unequal civilian accommodation” of the military, thereby undermining the ability of the legislature 
to carry out effective oversight (Stepan, 1988: 101). In such circumstances, the military’s predation can 
be overlooked or unchallenged, or the ruling elites could be the ones sanctioning or supporting such 
predatory action. Several instances of this are discussed in the following chapter. 
 A Typology of the Exertion of Agency by the Citizenry in CMR 
As a partner in CMR, the citizenry exerts their own agency that can influence the relationship with 
the military. However, extant theories have failed to explain the various ways the citizenry does this. 
Typically, this is because most of the theories have lumped the citizenry with the civilian political elite, 
hence, the dichotomous approach which only recognised the military and political elites has 
undermined this recognition. Also, concordance theory which recognised the citizenry as a partner in 
CMR failed to do so because the theory is overly predictive by design, a limitation which undermines 
its general value and application in different countries. The problem with a predictive theory such as 
concordance, is that it does not account for the agency of the citizenry in CMR. It simply indicates 
that the cooperation of the citizenry is required to deter the military from intervening. Hence the 
need to indicate how the citizenry exert agency and influence CMR is needed. The citizenry can exert 
agency in CMR in four different ways. Verweijen (2015: 191–192) identified three of these ways as 
compliance, contestation and collaboration, to which I add confrontation to this. 
3.6.3.1 Compliance 
One way the citizenry exercise agency in CMR is through compliance. Compliance simply denotes 
obedience to instructions, demands, agreements reached on the nature of CMR at the major 
intersection level, a policy instruction or an order from either of the other partners. In other words, 
compliance is “a form of behaviour that implies fulfilling a demand” (Verweijen, 2015: 191). However, 
the demands or instructions issued can be a legitimate instruction or an illegitimate order. Hence, 
compliance from the citizenry can either be willingly because the citizenry are law abiding or unwillingly 
because they wish to avoid stiffer sanctions or punishments for non-complying. For example, the 
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citizenry could comply to instructions such as an imposition of a curfew by the civilian political elite 
to restrict movement in times of serious internal threats. They could also comply to the instruction 
out of fear of running into trouble with the military where they are deployed internally to enforce 
such regulations, and not necessarily because they wish to comply. 
A typical example of an illegitimate instruction is the demand for money by soldiers at checkpoints, 
which can also attract willing or unwilling compliance. Usually, those issuing the instructions/demand 
are in a higher position of power than the citizenry, hence, the citizenry tends to comply even where 
it causes them some dissatisfaction. The consequence of this is that it reinforces the dominance of the 
military, and where the demands are illegitimate, it promotes the culture of impunity and a lack of 
transparency and accountability. However, as the citizenry obeys and complies to such instructions 
and demands, it tends to have little impact on the state of CMR. 
3.6.3.2 Contestation 
A second way the citizenry exert agency is through contestation, especially non-compliance or non-
obedience to demands, actions or practice(s) they are dissatisfied with. Contestation could also be in 
the form of active resistance by the citizenry against military authority, or the way it uses its power, 
given that power attracts resistance, especially when it is perceived to be abused or used 
indiscriminately (Foucault, 1978: 95). This position was re-emphasised by Scott (1985: 290) when he 
stressed that resistance comprises of numerous actions and strategies employed by a subordinate 
group against the domination by a superordinate group or class. However, resistance in this sense 
does not involve the use of violence but a myriad of actions such as protests, strike and 
demonstrations, lobbying, and the use of legal remedy to contest certain demands, actions, or 
practices. 
Other forms of resistance include “negotiation and bargaining; trickery, hiding, and avoidance; irony; 
the use of rumours” and spreading and propagating ‘fake’ or mostly unverified information/news that 
may not be true or that has been exaggerated (Verweijen, 2015: 195–208, 2018). Typically, resistance 
by the citizenry could be directed against demands or actions of the military, or against the decisions 
of the civilian political elite. Hence, unlike compliance, a prolonged or sustained contestation effort 
can alter the state of CMR. However, until the resistance gains popular support and momentum, the 
change it could force may be slow. 
3.6.3.3 Collaboration 
The third way the citizenry exerts agency in CMR is through collaboration. Collaboration is a form of 
alliance or cooperation with the military or civilian political elite to achieve certain aims or demands. 
Unlike compliance, collaboration could either involve the citizenry requiring certain actions from 
either of the partners or could require a close-involvement of either of the partners with the citizenry 
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in order to achieve a given aim. This makes it “a more interactive process in which civilians might 
(also) place demands on the military in order to further their projects, or which concerns jointly 
developed and/or executed projects in which civilians actively participate” in contrast to just obedience 
from the citizenry (Verweijen, 2015: 192). 
Given this, it becomes clear that collaboration achieves two aims; a legitimate and/or an illegitimate 
aim. Legitimate aims are legally sanctioned processes, demands or projects that are within the domain 
of the partners to achieve within a given period of time and under certain stipulated conditions. For 
example, cooperating and sharing vital information with the military towards achieving mission success 
during domestic deployment. This could also be in the form of “voluntarily alerting24 the military to a 
certain detour that people take in order to avoid passing a roadblock” (Verweijen, 2015: 192). In 
contrast, illegitimate aims simply denote illegal, extra-legal, and unprofessional acts, inactions, demands, 
or practices by two or more of the partners. Typical examples include a section of the citizenry or 
armed groups cahooting with compromised soldiers, or the political elite aiding an attack on 
unsuspecting groups or communities, or to overlook an attack when it is occurring. 
3.6.3.4 Confrontation 
The fourth and final strategy the citizenry uses to exert agency in CMR involves the use of 
confrontation against the military or political elites over demands, actions, or practices they are 
dissatisfied with. Normally, confrontation could be moderately used in the form of contestation or 
resistance. However, as Scott & Smith (1969: 1) observed, confrontation is more frequently associated 
with a “radical and revolutionary” connotation which involves the use of threats, force, or/and 
violence. Thus, as a strategy of exerting agency in CMR, the citizenry could engage in violent hostility 
towards the military - be it towards a soldier, some soldiers, or a certain unit such as those at a military 
checkpoint. Generally, such confrontation from the citizenry only occurs occasionally and is mostly 
triggered by a threat action on a civilian group, such as the killing of a civilian by a soldier, or when 
soldiers fail to respond to a call for distress in time. Similarly, where the citizenry feels dissatisfied by 
a government which it sees as lacking legitimacy and is been unable to provide basic public goods and 
services including public safety and security, it could result to confrontation against the civilian political 
elites. 
As confrontation is used in this context as radical and sometimes, revolutionary, it involves various 
forms of violent hostilities directed against the other partners – the military or/and the political elite 
as they case may be. Typical confrontation tactics involves retaliating military abuse through mob 
justice and attacking personnel/political elites, resisting state control, forming and/or collaborating with 
                                               
24 My emphasis. 
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armed groups, and violent uprising against the state. The Arab spring especially in Libya where violent 
uprising led to the overthrow of a civilian government is a typical example here (see Lynch, 2012; 
Lutterbeck, 2013; Pion-Berlin, Esparza & Grisham, 2014). Unlike the other three forms of exertion of 
agency which reinforces the power position of especially, the military, confrontation is an expression 
of the agency and power position of the citizenry. Given this, confrontation has a higher tendency to 
force a change in the state of CMR than all the other forms of exertion of agency because of the 
hostility, aggression and possible violence this can evoke. 
Hostility such as directing violence against the military, pulling down a military checkpoint and chasing 
away the personnel indicates a collective action which re-enforces the agency and power of the 
citizenry, when they act as a united force. Where civilian communities are  marginalized or oppressed, 
they may employ this as a way of expressing local autonomy (Godoy, 2004: 637–639). Such conduct 
is more likely to occur in states where the military is frequently deployed in an internal role and where 
the military assumes a military approach that undermines the values and traditions of society. Given 
this, it is necessary to understand the various forms the military assumes based on their conduct and 
interaction with the political elite and citizenry. 
 THE FOURFOLD MILITARY TYPOLOGY 
From this discussion of the quadrumvirate interaction between the three partners in CMR, it is 
possible that the military assumes different postures in its interaction with society and the polity. Sarigil 
(2011: 267) developed a fourfold military typology which I find relevant and useful to this discussion. 
An attempt will be made to summarise his submission, but first it is necessary to emphasise Perlmutter 
& Bennett’s submission, that the professional posture of the modern soldier symbolises a fusionist 
portrait. The fusionist ideation “recognises that bureaucracy and politics, government and 
administration experts, and politicians are all symbiotically connected” (Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980: 
13). This reinforces the intersectional position of Sarigil, and it further supports Janowitz’s position of 
integration and sharing of common values between the political and military spheres. Another point is 
that, irrespective of the type a nation’s military assumes, it is bound to have some level of political role 
and societal integration, be it minimal or high, hence the rationale behind Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3. 1 Sarigil’s Fourfold Military Typology  
 
Source: Sarigil (2011: 268) Civil-military relations beyond dichotomy 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 69 
 
 
As Table 3.3 indicates, the professional military is one with low political role and low societal 
integration. Following Huntington, the military is professional when it has low or minimal political 
role/interference and a low level of integration in society, upholds civilian supremacy and is committed 
to fulfilling the wishes of its civilian ‘master’, to whom it is subordinate. Some examples of this type of 
military are found in Western European and North American countries (Sarigil, 2011: 268). Typically, 
a professional military recognises its roles and its position as distinct and different from political duties, 
which it keeps away from. As Huntington contends, “the vocation of officership absorbs all their 
energies and furnishes them with all their occupational satisfaction. Officership is an exclusive role, 
incompatible with any other significant social or political roles” (Huntington, 1956: 381). Thus, the 
professional military has minimal interaction with the social sphere. However, as we have seen with 
Huntington’s separation theory and the agency theory, a detached military can lose touch with civilian 
values, creating a civil-military gap that could pose a threat to the state. Typically, this could result in 
separate institutional cultures which disregard those of society, thereby, evoking problems for the 
state. 
 
In the case of the nation’s army or military, it also has very low or minimal political roles and 
interference. However, it is very much the military of the people because it has a firm connection with 
society and has similar values with society. As a result, it enjoys high popularity, backing and support 
from the social sphere, and the military is also unlikely to be predatory on the citizens. Lutterbeck’s 
(2013: 33) discussion of the experiences of the military of four Arab countries – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
and Bahrain – during the Arab spring presents a typical example. He noted that because the Tunisian 
military had a high degree of institutionalisation and a firm connection with society, they did not clamp 
down on protesters when deployed to quell civilian uprising against the state. The support a nation’s 
military receives arises from its careful interaction with the citizenry, resulting in a high level of 
understanding and harmony. 
Lutterbeck argues that a key explanation for the understanding is because of the use of a “broad-based 
conscription” (2013: 35). Schiff  (1995) considers this the social representativeness of the composition 
of the officer corps, and the rank and files of the military. Other reasons could be that the military 
also engages in developmental services for the people, such as infrastructural developments and the 
provision of basic social support, as was the case in Egypt. Sarigil also contends that in this typology of 
the military, it is possible to see an overlap and sharing of common roles between the political and the 
military sphere. This can assume the form of the involvement of the military in the political decision-
making, and the interference into military affairs by political elites and vice versa (Sarigil, 2011: 268; 
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Lutterbeck, 2013: 36–38). However, the degree of involvement is typically minimal, and non-
praetorian. 
 
As Table 3.3 indicates, a predatory praetorian military is one that is influential in the political decision-
making process but has low societal integration. This often leads it to quest for political power through 
active partisanship or openly engaging in politics, such as financing and placing its political candidate 
into top political offices (Nordlinger, 1977: 13). As the military has low levels of societal integration, 
it lacks the support and trust of the citizenry. This type of military is associated with praetorian 
tendencies due to its detachment from civilian society and its inability to integrate and form social ties 
with society. They are mostly violent, and often engage in human rights violations, excesses, and 
atrocities. Thus, not only do they lack popular support, but they also lack legitimacy and prestige in 
society, and have been referred to as ‘monsters’ by some (Bamidele, 2013; Ojo, 2014). What one sees 
here is that predatory praetorian militaries continuously evoke problems in both the political and 
social spheres of interaction. Several countries in Africa and Latin America still have the signs of this 
type of military. 
As the focus of this study is on the societal sphere, it is also necessary to explore what kinds of 
interaction are possible between the citizenry and the political sphere when a predatory praetorian 
military is present. The lack of popular support of this type of military often leads to wide 
discontentment and dissatisfaction with the military. In such situations, the citizenry has few options 
available to them to seek redress, especially when this affects their security. These options involve the 
use of social movements and civil society to pressure the government to act on their demands (Allen, 
1997). Civilians are likely to resort to violence or form armed groups when the social movement does 
not yield success and the state continues to use heavy-handedness from the military to quash protests 
and demonstrations. Two explanatory variables could explain why civilians could turn to violence. One 
is when legal and non-violent means appears to be yielding little or no result over a prolonged period, 
and the other is the failure of the state to fulfil its part of the social contract by providing redress to 
its citizens.  
When states use coercive military might to repress internal violence and external aggression, it 
exposes the citizenry to threats/violence from armed groups and coercion from state forces. This is 
because the nature of military training and indoctrination focusing on warfighting is not well-suited for 
internal roles of law enforcement. Hence, the military struggles to police internal conflicts without 
incidences of excesses, heavy handedness, and rights violation and abuses. Empirically, data has shown 
that internal conflicts such as civil wars often last a long time and are also likely to reoccur (Elbadawi 
& Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2014).  This poses even more challenges for societies policed by a predatory 
praetorian military, because citizens have to live with military excesses and abuses over a long period. 
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Some may feel compelled to resort to some form of ‘self-defence’ by resorting to arms to protect 
themselves from armed groups, or by joining an armed group to provide themselves with security and 
the capacity to confront state repression.  
 
The last type military is the popular praetorian military. As with the predatory praetorian military, the 
popular praetorian military is highly politicised, and is highly involved in the political arena of the state, 
although it also receives high levels of popular support from society. The difference between the 
popular praetorian military and the predatory praetorian military lies in the motive for assuming 
political roles. Whereas the predatory praetorian military engages in politics for self-serving purposes, 
the popular praetorian military does so to restore order and end a political impasse, with no intention 
to remain in government. The recent military-aided political transition in Zimbabwe that led to the 
end of President Robert Mugabe’s 37 years rule presents a typical instance of this military at the time 
it intervened.25 Hence, popular praetorian militaries are the guardian of not just the political system 
but also of the state from the abuse of political office/power. 
The Palestinian forces in the second armed conflict with Israel between 2000-2005 (al-Aqsa Intifida) 
serve as another example of a popular praetorian military, because “the civilian leadership had only 
limited control over its security forces… yet the military made no attempt to take over the 
government and did not direct the decision-making process” (Cohen, 2012: 464). The Egyptian military 
during the Arab Spring is another example (Lutterbeck, 2013: 33). Thus, the military enjoys a high level 
of support and popularity among the citizenry, even when it takes over political power. As citizens are 
aware that the military is neither predatory nor self-serving, they are happy trusting and supporting 
the military to restore political stability in the state. It is possible that in situations where political 
instability becomes intense, large sections of the citizenry could encourage the military to intervene in 
politics. 
 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the CMR literature from various theoretical perspectives. While there is a lot 
of literature, there are theoretical weaknesses and inadequacies on several issues concerning the ‘civil’ 
(social) sphere of relations. An exception is concordance theory, which has tried to address the 
theoretical weaknesses by integrating the social sphere into the debate. However, concordance theory 
failed to advance beyond the traditional mantra of preventing domestic military intervention in politics. 
The literature has extensively focused on civil control, while not addressing the interaction of the 
                                               
25 Although the Zimbabwean military did not hold onto political power, the developments after the resignation of Mugabe, 
particularly the new cabinet which had several military officers, undermines the sincerity of the move. Along with this, the 
Zimbabwean military has always acted as a political tool in the hands of former President Robert Mugabe to suppress 
opposition and anti-regime campaigns (International Crisis Group, 2017). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 72 
 
military with its society, which has meant that there is a void in the studies on CMR. In this chapter, a 
quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation of CMR was developed to fill the void found in the 
literature. Using and modifying Sarigil’s ideas, I contended that while CMR is a tripartite relationship, 
the interaction between the partners occurs as a quadrumvirate which involves one major intersecting 
level and three subunits of interaction. 
The argument here (as Schiff rightly points out) is that, irrespective of the form of government in place 
and the posture the military assumes – integration or separation, if the three partners agree on the 
four indicators, concordance can be achieved. However, this agreement is subject to the interaction 
of the partners at the three subunits, which means that tensions at the subunit level could undermine 
concordance when not adequately addressed. In this regard, I contend that this study stands to benefit 
from this theoretical advancement by studying and examining the level of interaction of the citizenry 
with the military. In conclusion, this chapter has shown that although the subject matter of CMR 
encompasses the interaction of the military with the political and civilian spheres, little explanation has 
been offered on aspects of society from a theoretical angle. Because of this, the field has done little to 
increase our understanding of the interaction between the military institution and society, especially 
when it acts in an internal role. The aim of this study is to examine this and contribute to the 
theoretical debates by examining these issues in relation to Plateau State, Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THREATS POSED BY ARMED GROUPS IN NIGERIA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined some key theoretical propositions of CMR and the weaknesses of the 
theories. The chapter argued that these theories all contribute, but do not adequately explain the 
effect of the military on society, and how the citizenry responds to military abuse or the excessive use 
of force. This chapter therefore focuses on the internal use of the military in Nigeria, and has five 
objectives: (1) to explore the current threats posed by armed groups in Nigeria; (2) to identify the 
conditions that have necessitated the use of the military in an internal role; (3) to understand applicable 
rules of engagement of the military internal security operations in Plateau State; (4) to understand the 
image and professional posture of the Nigerian military since 1960; and (5) to examine how democratic 
civil control of the military is exercised in Nigeria. 
4.2 OVERVIEW OF THREATS POSED BY ARMED GROUPS IN NIGERIA 
Since Nigeria became independent from Britain on 1 October 1960, communal violence, threats and 
serious internal disturbances have continued to affect the country. Every part of the country has been 
affected (Odoma, 2014: 33), often plunging it into chaos, threatening political stability and the provision 
of essential public goods and services, including security (Ujomu, 2015). As Table 4.1 below shows, 
Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones, each comprising five or more States. These geopolitical 
zones depict the spatial distribution of all the States of Nigeria, including the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT) Abuja, according to their geographical location and composition (see Figure 4.1). 
Table 4. 1  Some Security Threats Across Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria 
SN Geopolitical Zones Security Threats 
Zones States Current Threats Previous Threats 
1 North 
Central 
FCT Abuja, Benue, Kogi, 
Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and 
Plateau State 
Communal conflict - Jos 
conflict; herdsmen attacks 
and violence across the 
region 
Communal conflict – Jos, 
Benue, Nasarawa 
2 North 
West 
Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, 
Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara 
State 
Communal conflict - 
Kaduna conflict and high 
scale kidnapping 
Sectarian conflict – Kano 
and Kaduna, Maitatsine 
terrorism 
3 North 
East 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, 
Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe 
Terrorism - Boko Haram Communal conflict – 
Taraba and Bauchi 
4 South-
West 
Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, 
Osun, and Oyo State 
Criminal & electoral 
violence 
Criminal & electoral 
violence 
5 South-
South 
Akwa Ibom, Cross River, 
Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, and Edo 
State 
Militancy and piracy by 
various militants (NDA, 
NDVF, MEND) 
Militancy, piracy and 
violence from self-
determination struggle 
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6 South-
East 
Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, 
and Imo State 
Secession, kidnapping 
(MASSOB, IPOB) 
Biafra civil war of 1967-
1970 
Content compiled from numerous sources including (Agbu, 2004; Isumonah, 2012; Omede, 2012; Okoli & 
Orinya, 2013; Agbiboa, 2014; Musa, 2014a,b; Odoma, 2014; Ujomu, 2015). 
The table provides an outline of some of the current and previous internal security challenges that 
Nigeria faces across each geopolitical zone. In the North Central and North West Zones, communal 
conflicts are pervasive because religious and ethnic diversity are exploited by desperate politicians and 
numerous armed groups to create a rift for political/economic gains (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005: 19). 
This is worsened by incessant herders’ (mostly, nomadic Fulani) attacks on indigenous population, 
comprising of Christians of numerous ‘minority’ ethnic groups. In the North-East Zone, where Muslim 
Hausa’s and Fulani’s dominate, religious fanaticism and terrorism pose the greatest security concerns 
for especially, the non-Hausa/Fulani Christian minority. In the South West Zone, criminal violence and 
electoral violence threaten peace, economic and political stability in the region. 
In the oil-producing region of the South-South, most security threats emerge from militancy, piracy 
and oil theft, and the struggle for ‘economic liberation’ by several militias and criminal armed groups. 
A typical example is the Niger Delta Avengers, a militia which successfully weakened oil exploration 
and crippled the economy of the country between 2016 to 2017. In the non-oil-producing South East 
Zone, kidnapping and secession agitation by criminal armed groups and ethno-nationalist armed groups 
remains the major problems to date. The secession struggles stem from the Nigerian Civil (Biafran) 
War of 1967-1970, which claimed over three million lives (Ugochukwu, 2010: 182). However, since 
Nigeria returned to democratic rule, these security challenges “have been worsening on a daily basis” 
(Dambazau, 2014: 65). Serious security threats (the Biafra secession crisis; the Niger-Delta Militancy; 
the Boko Haram terrorism; and the communal violence and herdsmen attacks in Plateau State) are 
raging at present in four of the six geopolitical zones. The aim of this section is to discuss the incidences 
of armed conflicts which spread across Nigeria (see Figure 4.1 below). 
Figure 4. 1 Map of Nigeria Showing the Various Geopolitical Zones of the Country 
 
Source: Ekong et al. (2012: 171) Spatio-Temporal Epidemiology of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
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4.2.1 Biafra Secession and the Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 to 15 January 1970) 
On 1 January 1914, the British imperial government amalgamated the Northern and Southern 
Protectorates into one colony, which was later renamed Nigeria, for administrative convenience 
(Osaghae, 1998: 1; Klieman, 2012: 156). This decision turned out to be the major factor that led to 
the Nigerian Civil War, which was fought in the Eastern Region in the self-declared independent State 
of Biafra. The amalgamation ignored the wide range of cultures, values, and social and political 
organisations of the people, which made national unity difficult to achieve. Along with this, two other 
factors propelled the outbreak of the war. One is the failure of both the colonial and the independent 
government of Nigeria to adopt constitutional reforms that unified the country in the post-
independence period (Obasanjo, 1981: 2–5). The second is the loss of military professionalism, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 4. 2 Map of Nigeria Showing the Four Regions of the Country in 1963 
 
Source: Osaghae (1998: xxii) Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence 
Nigeria gained independence in 1960, and became a republic in 1963, following the adoption of a new 
constitution. As Figure 4.2 above indicates, Nigeria adopted a regional federal structure by splitting 
the former Southern Protectorate, and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. This arrangement saw 
the adoption of four regions: The Western (comprised of mostly the Yoruba); Mid-West (former 
Bendel State comprised of Edo and Delta); Eastern (comprised of mostly Igbos and ethnic minorities 
in the Niger Delta); and Northern Region (comprised of Hausa/Fulani and most of Nigeria’s ethnic 
minorities) in a regional parliamentary system with representatives at the federal level. However, this 
political structure created division within the country at both regional and federal level as it meant 
that the Northern region had more parliamentary seats and representatives at the federal level than 
both the Eastern and Western Regions combined. This would form the basis for deepening division 
and the development of ethnic politics. 
Given the new political structure, the Igbos from the Eastern Region felt politically marginalised due 
to having fewer state governments than other regions, which meant less access to federal income 
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allocation. Added to this, two attempts to conduct national censuses in 1962 and 1963 were largely 
unsuccessful because the figures were allegedly manipulated and inflated in some regions, particularly 
the Northern Region (Obasanjo, 1981: 5). Despite this, the 1963 figures were passively accepted with 
several reservations. These events led to a deep division within the country based on ethnicity, which 
resulted in a struggle for political control and dominance over others in the region, the emergence of 
ethno-political factions and rivalries, and the outbreak of violence that threatened both the political 
and social stability of Nigeria as a country. 
One example was the agitation/violence by the Tivs, one of the many ethnic minorities against the 
political domination of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in the Northern Region (Maier, 2000: 12). The Tivs 
ethnic group were dissatisfied with their political marginalisation in the Northern Peoples’ Congress 
(NPC), the major political party in the region. As Agbu (2004: 20) observes, the politics of the NPC 
were isolationist, excluding non-Hausa/Fulani’s in what appeared to be an “internal colonialism,” 
leading to the Tivs forming ethnic militias who fought a campaign of violence against the ruling NPC 
which lasted from 1962 to 1965. Obasanjo (1981: 5) and Maier (2000: 12) reported that this was one 
of the earliest occasions of internal use of the military in Nigeria against dissents/uprisings. Similar 
political unrests were recorded in other regions following the 1964 Nigerian general elections. 
Electoral violence marred the election, due to electoral malpractice, widespread vote-rigging, and 
boycotts. The Western Region was plunged into a state of anarchy, similar to the Northern Region, 
where politicians were accused of the mismanagement of public funds and of large-scale corruption 
(Maier, 2000: 12). 
In the morning of 15 January 1966, Nigeria witnessed its first military intervention in politics by a group 
of mainly Igbo military officers who sought to restore peace and order, fight corruption, and unify the 
country (Nzeogwu, 1966). All the political elites and senior military officers killed during the coup 
were from the North and West, with the exception of one political leader and one Army Officer from 
the Mid-West and East respectively (Obasanjo, 1981: 6). Although the coup plotters were not able to 
take hold of political power, the coup brought Maj.-Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi (an Igbo) into power. To redress 
the ethnicity problem, Ironsi enacted the military Decree No. 34 of 1966 which ended the Federal 
State Structure and abolished all forms of tribal and regional association. The intention of this was to 
unite Nigeria as a nation-state where ethnic and tribal identity no longer had primacy over nationalism 
and citizenship. 
Ironsi’s decree was furiously rejected, and in May 1966 serious riots broke out in the North, whose 
leaders feared the move was aimed at empowering the South in order to dominate and subjugate 
them. On 29 July 1966, a counter-coup took place to take revenge for the killing of Northerners in 
the first coup and was led by Army Officers of the Northern Region. The coup plotters were unable 
to seize political power and after a three-day impasse, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (an ethnic minority 
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from Plateau State in the Northern Region) emerged as the new military Head of State. This deepened 
the already existing division, suspicion, polarisation, and ethnic segmentation within the country, largely 
as result of the massacre of many Igbos (of the Eastern Region) living in several parts of the Northern 
Region. This forced survivors to flee back to the Eastern Region for safety (Obasanjo, 1981: 7; Maier, 
2000: 13). 
These events resulted in the Nigerian civil war, led by Lt. Col. Chukwu-Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, 
an Igbo and high-ranking Nigerian military officer who was dissatisfied with the emergence of Lt. Col 
Gowon, a subordinate officer, as the military head of state over him. Ojukwu led the war between the 
Nigerian government and the Biafran militia, made up of soldiers of Igbo extraction and able-bodied 
young Igbo men and women. This war lasted for three years and was one of the earliest and bloodiest 
recorded in a post-independent African State (Akresh, Bhalotra, Leone & Osili, 2011: 2, 2012: 273). 
The war broke out when the Igbos in the Eastern Region seceded from Nigeria and declared the 
region as the sovereign and independent state of Biafra. Aggravating the situation was the discovery 
of oil in the Niger Delta in the Eastern Region before the war began. The discovery meant that the 
new state of Biafra was destined to have a promising source of income, but the military government 
of Nigeria was unwilling to concede this (Maier, 2000: 13; Klieman, 2012: 157). 
Both the Nigerian government and Biafra sought international aid and support. The Nigerian 
government received support from Britain, Italy and (West) Germany, while Biafra received 
international support, including weapons and logistic support, from France, Spain, Portugal, South 
Africa, and other countries. However, after three years of military combat, Biafra was overpowered 
and Ojukwu went into exile in January 1970. Following this, the Yakubu Gowon military government 
made a declaration of “no victor, no vanquish” on 12 January 1970 to officially bring the war to an end 
and to commence with the rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation of the East. Despite this, 
the Igbos continued to feel politically marginalised by the Hausa and Yoruba (the other two majority 
tribes of Nigeria). Similarly, their desire for secession continues, and numerous pro-Biafra groups and 
militias have been involved in this cause. 
To curb political instability and violence in the region, the government has used both the military and 
police to suppress the conflict caused by the militia groups, which include the Movement for the 
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), 
led by Nnamdi Kanu, whose current whereabouts is unknown. The groups appear to have no formal 
organisation given that their activities have effectively come to a halt since Kanu’s disappearance. Prior 
to his arrest, he founded Radio Biafra, the propaganda media of the group, and he has sought funds 
and support from the foreign diaspora in the United Kingdom, where he holds a dual citizenship. 
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4.2.2 Militancy in the Niger-Delta  
The Niger Delta region, also known as the South-South geopolitical zone, is made up of six States, all 
of which are among the nine oil-producing States of Nigeria. As with several other oil-producing 
regions across the globe, oil/resource racketeering, criminal violence, and the liberation struggle are 
the major security challenges (Joab-Peterside, 2007; Ross, 2012). In part, these problems are fuelled 
by the poor living conditions of the locals, and their desire to break out of the cycle of poverty. In the 
Niger Delta region, several studies have shown that locals feel deep-seated state neglect and 
marginalisation, despite the fact that the crude oil from this region is the major source of income for 
the country as a whole (Adeyeri, 2012: 98; Agbiboa, 2013a: 45; Ujomu, 2015: 178). 
Aside from the high poverty level in this region, gas flaring, and environmental degradation due to oil 
spillage continue to pose severe challenges to the locals (Agbiboa, 2013a: 46). As a result, local 
fishermen and farmers are unable to subsist, affecting their income and livelihoods, yet the government 
appears to have done little to address their concerns. Along with this, youth unemployment and low 
rates of education has meant that many have ventured into criminal activities such as militancy, piracy, 
and illegal oil bunkering. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region has aided this. 
In addition, the “struggle for control of illegal oil trade routes, ownership of oil bearing territories and 
the question of ownership of oil and gas deposits” contribute to the security problematic (Isumonah, 
2012: 333). 
Protests have become prevalent in the Niger Delta region, and have given rise to the emergence of 
numerous armed groups. One reason for this is the failure of the government to address the concerns 
of the locals through non-violent means, instead of using coercive force involving the police and military 
(Joab-Peterside, 2007; Odoemene, 2012). Several regimes and political administrations have attempted 
to address the problems, including the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC), which focuses on infrastructural development in the oil-producing state governments. 
However, this has not addressed the needs and expectations of the locals.26 
One early and infamous militia group, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by 
Muhajid Dokubo-Assari, emerged as the militant wing of the Ijaw Youth Council, an ethnic group in 
the Niger Delta (Isumonah, 2012: 340). The group began as an advocacy group focusing on the needs 
and underdevelopment of the locals, and the failure of the government to address this. However, the 
group felt the government response was inadequate, and it engaged in a campaign of violence against 
                                               
26 Adeyeri (2012: 99–101) provided an elaborate account of the various efforts of government to manage the problem of 
underdevelopment, poverty and the general needs and concerns in the Niger Delta. Some of the initiatives included the 
creation of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961; using the principle of derivation to ensure the region 
receives higher allocation of revenue from the Federal Government; creation of Oils Minerals Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992; and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. 
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the State, destroying oil pipelines and installations. As is typical in new wars, the group engaged in 
criminal violent activities, including kidnapping expatriates for ransom, and the illegal extraction and 
sale of oil. Over time, armed groups proliferated in the region. These included the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV). These groups 
constantly engaged in rivalry over control of oil resources and illegal oil trade routes (Cline, 2011; 
Action on Armed Violence, 2013). Given this, the security situation worsened, and it provided 
justification for the use of the military in an internal role to deal with the threats these groups created. 
At the height of state repression, the NDPVF led by Dokubo-Asari began seeking self-determination 
and secession of the Niger Delta through coercive violence and destruction of critical oil 
exploration/exploitation/carriage infrastructures. These activities slowed down oil production, as they 
targeted and kidnapped foreign contractors/workers working with international oil conglomerates. 
The action led to a sharp drop in oil exploration, resulting in a huge loss of income to the country, 
forcing the government to adopt non-violent means to end the spate of violence. Amnesty was 
declared and granted to all militants in June 2009, which entailed financial benefits and pardon for 
criminal activities (Hazen & Horner, 2007; Aghalino, 2012). However, the decision of the current 
Muhammadu Buhari’s government to phase-out the scheme, due to several factors including the 
decline in global crude prices, has led to the emergence of a new militia, the Niger Delta Avengers 
(NDA) in 2016. As with the NDPVF, the NDA also seeks rapid economic development or self-
determination for the Niger Delta region. Since its emergence, it has successfully carried out numerous 
attacks on critical oil infrastructures and has crippled the economy and ability of the State to provide 
electrical power supply (Donovan, 2016). Currently, the group has negotiated with the Federal 
Government, as the State has been unable to repress the group militarily. 
4.2.3 Boko Haram Terrorism 
Another form of armed conflict has arisen in North East Nigeria: the Boko Haram terrorist group, as 
a microcosm of the Maitatsine terrorist group which existed in the 1980s in Kano State, North West 
Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Chiluwa & Adegoke, 2013; Peterside, 2014a). Unlike the former, Boko Haram 
(which literally translates as ‘Western education is sacrilegious’) has been more resilient and powerful 
in its dogma and military capability. The group has a contested origin (Adesoji, 2010; Gray & Adeakin, 
2015). One account holds that it began in 2002 after a meeting between Mohammed Yusuf (an Islamic 
Cleric) and some drop-outs from the University of Maiduguri, where he claimed that ‘Western’ 
education is sinful (Gusau, 2009). Yusuf developed this ideology, asking followers to destroy their 
school certificates because they were in contradiction with Islamic culture due to their association 
with ‘Western’ (infidel) culture. This led to its popularity as Boko Haram, although it emerged as 
Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lid Da’awati Wal Jihad (‘people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's 
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teachings and Jihad’).27 From the name, the intention is made clear, although it did not begin waging 
‘Jihad’ until the execution of Mohammed Yusuf in state custody in 2009. This led to the resurgence of 
the group under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau who made true the threat to wage war on Nigeria, 
particularly on ‘infidels’ and those sympathetic to or aiding them. 
Since he assumed leadership of the group, Shekau has waged war on Nigeria, posing a serious 
existential threat to the political stability of Nigeria (Onapajo & Usman, 2015). In its 2015 report, the 
Global Terrorism Index named Boko Haram the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2015: 2). Its sinister campaign of violence has plunged the country and its 
neighbouring states into a humanitarian crisis, displacing over 1.5 million persons across Chad, Niger 
Republic, and Cameroon. Since 2009, it has launched several insurgent attacks against the military, and 
it has bombed/destroyed several critical infrastructures and international agencies, including the UN 
office in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city. The death toll from its attacks in Nigeria is between 13,000 and 
17,000 people, inclusive of security forces (Isine, 2017). The group is also responsible for the infamous 
kidnapping of the 276 Chibok girls from their school dormitory on 14 April 2014.  
Although the Nigerian government has negotiated the release of some of the Chibok school girls, as 
of today (1 August 2018), 112 of the girls are still missing or in captivity. Not only this, the group has 
shown it is a serious force with the ability to gain and exert its control over territory. Between 2014 
and 2015, it seized control of about 14 local government areas (approximately 20,000 square metres 
of land) in three States in North East Nigeria, and declared this an Islamic Republic (Blair, 2015). It 
took the efforts of a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (a group of hunters, vigilante members, and 
volunteers familiar with the terrain) and the multinational joint task collaboration of Nigeria, Niger 
Republic, Chad, and Cameroon before these areas were liberated from Boko Haram in 2016.28 
Several reports and studies have shown that Boko Haram attracts membership from Northern Nigeria, 
and migrants from neighbouring communities in Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon (Onapajo & 
Uzodike, 2012: 27; Chukwurah, Okechukwu & Ogbeje, 2015: 377). Some report that it has about 
280,000 members, comprising of “university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, 
unemployed graduates, Almajiri’s and migrants from neighbouring countries” (Danjibo, 2009: 6; 
Agbiboa, 2013b: 19). Most of the combatants are young uneducated youths, with a few young females 
that have served as suicide bombers. Poverty and high unemployment serve as major factors attracting 
youths to join the group. Corruption by political actors, mismanagement and poor governance are 
used to develop deep-seated grievances and dissatisfaction with the state. These factors serve as a 
                                               
27 Following its later allegiance with the Islamic State (IS), it renamed itself as Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). 
28 Although the Nigerian government has not confirmed this, reports claim that mercenaries from South Africa have also 
played a key role in the fight against Boko Haram. 
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recruiting mechanism for members ready to ‘revolutionise’ the system (Agbiboa, 2013c: 72). The 
Almajiri system prevalent in core States in Northern Nigeria has also acted as a major source of 
membership for the group, as it uses Almajiri’s (homeless and unemployed children usually under 10 
years old growing up under the mentorship of an Islamic scholar, but without parental care) as a ready 
tool for violence. 
Funding is secured through several illegitimate means, as is typical in the new war thesis. Some have 
argued that Boko Haram has acted as a militia for desperate politicians seeking political power, who 
in turn fund it before they lose control of the group (Omakhanlen & Babajide, 2012; Akinola, 2015: 9). 
Along with this, the group uses extortion, ransom/prisoner swap, and high-profile bank raids and 
robbery. By December 2011, it had raided about 30 commercial banks and stolen millions (Onu & 
Muhammed, 2011). Some funding originates from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Kingdom (Omakhanlen & Babajide, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013b: 23). However, the 
counterterrorist measures of the Nigerian government have weakened Boko Haram’s coercive 
capacity, regained control of captured territories from the group, and negotiated the release of some 
of the kidnapped school girls. Due to his weak and ineffective approach, former President Goodluck 
Jonathan contributed significantly to the group’s capacity to wage sustained warfare against the State. 
To date, Boko Haram continues to unleash terror and sporadic attacks in several parts of Borno State 
and North-East Nigeria, killing many civilians, causing a humanitarian crisis and disrupting social and 
political stability in this region of Nigeria. 
4.2.4 Communal Violence in Plateau State, North Central Nigeria 
The violence in Plateau State is one of the most enduring and protracted conflicts in Nigeria. Since 
violence erupted between Christians and Muslims in Jos on Friday, 7 September 2001, the State has 
remained a ‘flashpoint of violence’ (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001; Musa, 2014c). Geographically, the State is 
situated in the North Central Zone, or the middle belt region of the country, as shown in Table 4.1. 
It has a population of over three million inhabitants, and is home to over 40 of the minority ethnic 
groups of Nigeria (Blench, 2000; National Population Census, 2010). The temperate climate and rich 
tin deposits in the State attracted migrants to the city as wage labourers during the tin boom era of 
the colonial period in the 1940’s (Krause, 2011). The majority of these migrants, who later made the 
State their permanent abode, were Muslim Hausa- and Fulani-speaking Nigerians from neighbouring 
Northern States (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001). Today, the State is a microcosm of Nigeria, sheltering people 
of nearly all the ethnic groups of Nigeria. However, it is sharply divided between the majority 
Christians who are ‘natives’ to the State, and Hausa Muslim ‘settlers’ (Krause, 2011). 
The root causes of the conflict in Plateau State are reflective of other conflicts in Nigeria, most of 
which emanate from the problem associated with the ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ labels (Nwagwu, 2016: 
218; Olakunle, Joseph & Segun, 2016: 2). Although Chapter III, Section 25 - 32 of the 1999 Constitution 
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of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for numerous ways of acquiring citizenship of Nigeria, it 
makes no mention of indigenes or settlers (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). However, the term 
indigeneship was brought about by the attempt of the Constitution to address ethnic diversity through 
a Federal Character System. Section 147 (3) specifically introduced the concept ‘indigene’ when it 
states that “the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene 
of such State.”29 However, it failed to define the concept, its application, or its operational limit 
(Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999; Nwanegbo, Odigbo & Ochanja, 2014: 9). Thus, each of the 36 
States and the Federal Capital Territory issue certificates of indigeneship to natives as a requirement 
for accessing certain rights and privileges in the country. The dilemma is that it denies access to citizens 
who live or work in States other than their State of origin in Nigeria, because they are not indigenes 
(Sayne, 2012: 1). 
The decision to recognise one as an ‘indigene’ rests solely with each State government, through its 
Local Government Areas (LGA) or liaison offices. In most instances, the acknowledgement and stamp 
of one’s traditional ruler (district head) indicating ancestral lineage is required before the LGA 
approves the application. The problem with this system is that it favours indigeneship over citizenship 
within the country. It also provides several privileges to certified indigenes of a community or state 
over non-indigenous citizens. One key privilege is that it provides access/claim to land by ancestry, 
which serves as the basis for tracing ancestry (Nwagwu, 2016: 221; Olakunle et al., 2016: 3). Others 
include social, political, and economic benefits, such as appointments to civil service or political 
positions in the state; the right to run in local government or state elections; exclusive 
waivers/reduction of tuition; and exclusive bursaries (Ojukwu & Onifade, 2010; Best & Rakodi, 2011). 
Ojo (2009a: 697) adds that “during the 2006 headcount, Nigeria witnessed a mass movement of people 
from their base to their hometowns or States. Even the dead are rarely buried outside their state of 
origin.” This system therefore marginalises, oppresses, and deprives settlers as they stand to miss all 
these benefits irrespective of their contribution, or length of residing in such communities/States. 
In view of this, hostility began in Plateau State on 7 September 2001 when a group of Muslim youth 
scouts30 denied an indigenous Christian woman passage through her usual route while the Jumu’ah31 
was in process (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001). The incident led to a heated altercation that resulted in the 
infamous 7 September 2001 carnage. However, although this immediate trigger and the manifestation 
of violence were along religious lines between Christians and Muslims, the major cause of the violence 
                                               
29 My emphasis. 
30 The use of youth scouts by religious groups as guards during religious events is a common incident in Northern Nigeria. 
These youth groups often help coordinate the passage of pedestrians and with vehicle parking. However, with the escalation 
of violence in recent years, they also work as the security team or complementary to private security guards or State 
security agencies during religious events. 
31 Jumu’ah is a concept denoting the Friday prayer held by Muslims. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83 
 
is the indigene-settler distinction. This came as a repeat of an earlier incident in April 1994 when 
protest by indigenes compelled the State’s military administrator to rescind his appointment of a 
Hausa/Fulani as the Chairman of Jos North LGA. ‘Settlers’ protested this action as marginalisation, 
blocking access to roads. Due to its poor handling by the State, the situation led to full-blown violence 
resulting in the loss of several lives and properties (Ambe-Uva, 2010: 43–44; Crisis Group, 2012: 9; 
Human Rights Watch, 2013: 41). 
In the same way, the August 2001 appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Muhammed, a Muslim Hausa-Fulani 
settler, as the Coordinator of the Poverty Eradication Board of Jos North LGA sparked the violence 
in September 2001 (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001: 109). The conflict spread to most of the 17 LGAs of the 
State. Currently, several ‘unknown gunmen’32 (who are typically ethnic militias, particularly nomadic 
Fulani herders) use typical hit-and-run tactics in mostly rural areas which have little or no State forces. 
Local native communities have also formed vigilante groups, who act as ethnic and religious militias, 
to secure their communities from rampaging and invading herdsmen. Peace appears elusive in the 
State, and the recent carnage between 21st and 25th June 2018 led to the death of about 200 people in 
three LGAs (see Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018). 
The government has responded to the conflict by deploying the military to several parts of the State. 
Between 18 May and 18 November 2014, a state of emergency was imposed and Major Gen. 
Christopher Muhammed Ali (Rtd.) was made military administrator over the State. Subsequently, 
several other emergency rules were enforced in various parts of the State, and numerous curfews 
restricting human movement/activities (Fatile & Ejalonibu, 2014). Other non-coercive methods, such 
as the 2004 Plateau Peace Conference, Federal and State Commissions of Inquiry, and several other 
dialogue sessions, have also occurred but failed to restore peace and security (Segun & Jegede, 2013: 
39). Human Rights Watch (2013: 42) quoted a former Attorney General of Plateau State as saying that 
in spite of various arrests, “nobody has been prosecuted.” In addition to this, little or no attempt has 
been made to address the indigene-settler problematic arising from the ‘false’ federalism Nigeria 
practices. Hence, interethnic rivalry and competition is continuously spurring violence and internal 
warfare in every region of the country, as this section has shown (ActionAid Nigeria, 2008; Sayne, 
2012; Nwanegbo et al., 2014). Zeleza summarizes the challenge as follows: 
In Nigeria, democratisation has led to the resurgence of ethnic identities and the 
proliferation of regional and local struggles over the entitlements of citizenship 
expressed in the language of ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers.’ These struggles have increasingly 
                                               
32 This concept, as used in the local media, refers to seemingly faceless ethnic militias. The militias are continually engaged in 
attacks and reprisal attacks which are speculated to be motivated by Islamic imperial agenda. These include the Dogo 
Nahawa extermination-style execution of 7 March 2010; and the 8 July 2012 massacre that led to the death of the Senator 
representing Jos North constituency, Dr Gyang Dangtong, and Hon Gyang Danfulani, a State House of Assembly member. 
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spilled into the formation of ethnic militias that have wrought havoc on Nigeria’s civil 
society, unleashing periodic convulsions of inter-communal violence (Zeleza, 2008: 8).  
However, it is also important to note that Nigeria’s federal system reinforces the structure of 
traditional authority, which has undermined the democratisation process and prospects of unifying the 
country. Whereas maintaining traditional authority helps in sustaining the rich cultural values and 
diversity of the country, it promotes ‘legitimate’ discrimination, marginalisation, and the deprivation of 
Nigerians under the guise of indigeneship. Consequently, several violent communal conflicts have 
erupted, giving rise to the proliferation of various different armed groups across the country (Maier, 
2000: 12). To curb the violence and the consequences these pose for the political stability of Nigeria, 
the government has often felt compelled to deploy the military to suppress the insurrection.  
4.3 FACTORS COMPELLING THE INTERNAL USE OF THE MILITARY IN NIGERIA 
The preceding discussion showed that each geopolitical zone of Nigeria faces armed conflict. Ethnic 
groups that experience marginalisation/deprivation often mobilise as ethnic militias or some form of 
armed group to threaten or use violence against other groups or the Nigerian government. The use 
of coercive violence is a deliberate strategy to undermine the government (Kaldor, 1999). Fear and 
panic is created among the populace through targeted or random attacks on civilians; raiding 
communities; seeking territorial/political control by threatening or eroding state legitimacy; and 
engaging in asymmetrical warfare with state security forces. This shows that armed groups pose 
existential threats to both the lives and properties of citizens, and the ability of the state to effectively 
govern in Africa (Smith, 2003; Vinci, 2008; Vreӱ, 2010: 63). As seen from the different geopolitical 
zones in Nigeria, these armed groups/conflicts threaten national security, the ability of the state to 
maintain law and order, and ultimately to deliver public goods to the citizenry (Bowd & Chikwanha, 
2010; Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013). 
Threats or use of violence and terrorism in Nigeria have assumed worrisome dimensions, causing 
Caromba to dub the country the “African tinderbox” (2009: 1). These security challenges have a 
negative effect on governance, which drains state resources. Dealing with or curtailing such incidences 
is immensely difficult and requires a great level of force to contain the threats (see Ogah, 2011; 
Peterside, 2014b). This has compelled the national government to deploy the military in counter-
insurgency (COIN) operations (Crelinsten, 1998; Nwolise, 2007; Potgieter, 2010). This is not 
something new. One of the earliest uses of the military was in the Middle Belt (North Central Zone) 
in 1964, when the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, ordered the use of the military to 
quell riots (Maier, 2000: 12). Ever since then, the military has remained a dominant actor in law 
enforcement in ISOPs in Nigeria (see Omede, 2012). 
Conventionally, the provision of internal security and law enforcement are the core duties of the 
police (Hills, 2007: 405). This means that “the police are the domestic specialists in the exercise of 
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legitimate force” (Reiner, 1992: 762). However, in Nigeria as in many African countries, when civilian 
protest and violence breaks out, the norm is to deploy the military to suppress the 
situation/disturbances. A key reason for this is that the police are often overwhelmed and unable to 
handle situations that involve armed conflict. Although this dissertation focuses on the military, it is 
important to briefly outline some of the challenges facing the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), as this helps 
to explain the use of the military in an internal role. 
One major problem facing the NPF is the poor living conditions and lack of motivation of its workforce, 
particularly for entry-level constables. This is due to two major factors: poor staff salaries, allowances, 
and remunerations; and the state of police housing/barracks. Several studies/reports have shown that 
the salaries of Nigerian police personnel are meagre and lower than those of other countries. On 
average, low-ranking entry-level officers residing in barracks (police housing) receive about 
N60,000.00, equivalent to US$190 (Radda, Ibrahim & Dambazau, 2010: 32). While salaries vary by 
rank, reports suggest that senior officers skim off lower personnel’s salaries, which reduces the take-
home pay of low-ranking personnel considerably (Hills, 2014: 12). In addition, regular personnel are 
reported to have little or no “special allowances, insurance, monetary compensation for death during 
duty, medical care, allowances and perks” (Hills, 2014: 15). Mostly, only Police Mobile Force (PMF) 
personnel engaged in special operational duties receive special allowances, while regular police 
personnel have no such benefits. Added to this, personnel are required to pay for their uniforms from 
their salaries (Hills, 2008: 224). 
These factors affect the motivation of personnel and impede their performance and effectiveness in 
handling situations of public safety/security and violence. In cases where personnel are killed in the line 
of duty, as it happened with Sergeant Chukwudi Iboko who was recently killed in a crossfire exchange 
during a bank robbery, the Police Authority does little or nothing to assist the deceased’s family (see 
Punch, 2017). In addition to the poor or squalid working conditions of police personnel in Nigeria, the 
state of most police housing or barracks across the country is deplorable, as they are fetid and in need 
of repair. Describing the state of some barracks, Hills noted that they range “from inadequate to 
disgusting even though officers up to the rank of inspector (and in some cases assistant 
superintendents) live there” (2014: 12). This situation has continued as a trend irrespective of changes 
in government and the leadership of the NPF. Back in 2005, Sunday Ehindedro, a two-term serving 
Inspector General of NPF (the police chief in Nigeria) stated that police “live in a kennel... the 
conditions in some barracks are, to say the least, nauseating” (Nigeria Police Force, 2005: 26). In part, 
the combination of these explains why corruption is endemic among entry-level constables. 
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4.3.1 Endemic Corruption in the Police Force 
Across the Nigerian Police Force, bribery, corruption and extortion are pervasive, endemic, seemingly 
customary and the norm, while little is done to address it (Ojo, 2006: 267).33 Some have argued that 
the entire service is corrupt, and nearly all personnel are likely to receive bribes while serving 
(Dambazau, 2014). Police corruption is not only rampant in Nigeria, but across the African continent. 
However, as the 2013/14 data from the Afrobarometer survey of some African countries indicates, 
police corruption is more severe in Nigeria (Wambua, 2015: 4).  
Figure 4. 3 Ranks of Police Corruption (%) Across 34 African Countries 
 
Source: Wambua (2015: 4) Police Corruption in Africa Undermines Trust 
As Figure 4.3 above indicates, police corruption in Nigeria tops other African countries by a 
considerable margin, and the police are widely perceived to be the most corrupt institution of 
government in Nigeria (Alemika, 2007: 3; Hills, 2008: 216; Carolyn, 2017: 7). Several factors contribute 
to this. First, some serving and retired Inspector Generals of Nigerian Police (IGP) were involved in 
corrupt practices, such as IGP Mustafa Adebayo Balogun who served a six months sentence after a 
plea bargain and forfeiting properties, which later became the subject of another corruption trial. 
Other IGPs who also faced corruption charges include Mike Okiro and Sunday Ehindero. As with the 
top-ranking officers, both entry-level and mid-career personnel are implicated in corrupt practices. 
                                               
33 This study follows the definition of Kleinig, who defines corruption thus: “police officers act corruptly when, in exercising 
or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional 
advantage” (1996: 166). Also, see Agbiboa (2015) for a more elaborate discussion. 
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Hills (2008: 223) states that rather than serving the populace, “the main tasks of low-ranking officers 
often appear to be collecting tolls from drivers and supplicants, and waiting for something to happen.” 
This is particularly evident in the low-ranking personnel on patrol who preoccupy themselves with 
extorting money from motorists as non-official/authorised toll on highways. Given this, Dambazau 
concluded that “for the Nigerian police, it is not a case of a few rotten apples, but that almost all the 
apples are rotten” (2014: 70). 
4.3.2 Police Brutality, Extrajudicial Killing and Lack of Legitimacy 
Police brutality and excessive use of force in Nigeria is well-documented. One infamous case is the 
summary execution of Mohammed Yusuf (the leader of Boko Haram) and many of his followers while 
in custody. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, this “became the major driver of the current insurgency in 
the Northeast” (Dambazau, 2014: 70). Admittedly, the use of physical force in the performance of 
police duties in situations of violence may be unavoidable (Bryett, 1991: 286). However, in the Nigerian 
instance, numerous eyewitness and victim reports indicate that the police often act outside their 
mandate by committing extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 73–79; Crisis Group, 2012: 
21–22). Reporting on incidences in Jos, Kano, and Kaduna, Human Rights Watch (2005: 73) concluded 
that brutality and extrajudicial killing is the typical way the Nigerian police respond to violent conflicts. 
Similarly, in several instances, the Nigerian Police Force has been described as “internationally 
notorious for high levels of unpredictable violence, corruption, prebendalism, and ethnic and religious 
sectarianism” (Hills, 2008: 216, 2012a: 47, b: 94, 2014: 9). 
In Kano State, Hills (2014: 12) noted that although superior officers are largely Muslim Northerners, 
and not representative of the ethnic/religious diversity of Nigeria, it does not influence policing. 
However, it is difficult to substantiate this claim as reports of police brutality and human rights 
violations in Plateau State suggest the opposite (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001; Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 
2013). Therefore, the possibility of bias, and ethnic and religious sectarianism is high. Added to this, 
victims of police brutality report that the police tend to rely heavily on coercion to extract information 
from persons in their custody, which leads to a loss of trust in the police (Ujomu, 2015: 188). As a 
result, there is evidence that about 69% of Nigerians who were victims of crime or physical attack did 
not report it to the police out of fear of further abuse from the police (see Figure 4.4 below) (Wambua, 
2015: 15). This makes policing difficult, as well as intelligence gathering from the public. Ujomu 
observes that because Nigerians distrust the security forces, it has become a norm to rather provide 
or disclose information to the media, and on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and YouTube. 
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Figure 4. 4 Trust in the Police by Country (%) Across 34 African Countries 
 
Source: Wambua (2015: 7) Police Corruption in Africa Undermines Trust 
Several reasons explain the public’s distrust of the police and unwillingness to cooperate with it, one 
of which is the fear that the police could deal with civilians unfairly (Hills, 2008: 219). Other reasons 
include the lack of trust and confidence in the abilities of the police to address cases, and the fear that 
police may reveal the source of the information (Wambua, 2015: 16). 
4.3.3 Training, Shortage of Manpower, and Policing Equipment 
Training and education form the cornerstone of professionalism, yet for the Nigerian police, it appears 
that little attention is paid to the training of new staff. Several reports show that training new recruits 
and in-service training of police personnel is lacking or inadequate, particularly the training of 
constables and low-ranking officers (Hills, 2008: 216, 2014: 12; Owen, 2014: 3). Police personnel 
exhibit little knowledge of the content of the law and how to enforce it, and this affects the role and 
duties of the police, their relationship with the public, and the powers and the limits of their authority. 
The problem is made worse due to the politicisation of the police, who have been heavily involved in 
regime/government representation. It therefore seems that this is the true reality of policing in Nigeria 
since independence (Potholm, 1969; Hills, 2008: 223). Another implication of failing to train and equip 
police personnel with the basic necessary skills and knowledge is the quality of service the police 
renders. This affects not only its relationship with the public, but its image and professional posture. 
The Nigerian police are understaffed and lack basic policing equipment, which affects their ability to 
function effectively. Some have observed that the “shortage of manpower, vehicles and 
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communications equipment impacts on officers’ operational efficiency and morale and, therefore, 
relationship with the populace” (Olong, 2010: 25; Hills, 2014: 11). The shortage of manpower and 
basic policing equipment and logistics exists throughout Nigeria. The website of the NPF lists the 
following basic police equipment it lacks: (1) manpower; (2) operational vehicles; (3) toolboxes; (4) 
workshop and office equipment; (5) funds to maintain operational vehicles; (6) funding; (7) electricity 
and power-generating sets; (8) barrack accommodation for personnel; (9) medical facilities, medical 
staff and medicine; (10) kit and bullet-proof jackets; (11) serviceable arms and ammunition; (12) road 
network to link the police headquarters to the main road; (13) welfare for personnel; (14) 
communication gadgets; (15) official cars; and (16) physical infrastructures (Nigeria Police Force, 2013). 
Clearly, this undermines the ability of the police to function effectively. Given this, one can only support 
Dambazau’s claim that there exists a “poor relationship between the public and the police, the quality 
of police personnel, equipment, and facilities is extremely poor, and the combination of these factors 
makes it impossible to rely on police services in enforcing law and order” (2014: 70). 
4.3.4 The Nigerian Police Mobile Force (PMF/MOPOL) 
Studies have shown that using regular police forces to respond to riots and violent situations often 
creates an unpopular image for the civil police, because it is incompatible with their role or duties 
(Bryett, 1991; Ojo, 2009b; Weiss, 2012). This has necessitated the creation of paramilitary or 
gendarmerie forces which act as riot police and have some attributes of the military. In line with global 
practice, Nigeria maintains a PMF unit, popularly called MOPOL, which reports directly to the 
Inspector General of the Police. The unit acts as “a police striking force in the event of riots or other 
serious disturbances occurring within the Federation” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 41).34 It 
serves as an intermediary between the police and the military and is trained and equipped to manage 
riots and low intensity conflicts. Recruitment into the unit is restricted to serving members of the 
regular police force and is subject to a period of service not exceeding 36 months.35 The composition 
of personnel means that they are more able to manage civil disturbances without causing civilian 
casualties. Thus, the military only becomes involved in internal policing as a last resort, and preferably 
only for a brief period. However, the continuous involvement of the military in Nigeria suggests 
otherwise. 
The PMF has 52 police mobile squadrons, and each squadron has about 700 personnel, with a total of 
about 40,000 personnel which is grossly inadequate given the population of Nigeria, and the prevalence 
of violence in various parts of the country. The inadequacy has compelled the state to rely on the 
military or a Joint Task Force (JTF), which comprises of the military, the PMF, and other civil security 
                                               
34 Section 25 of the Police Act Cap. P19 NPR (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 41). 
35 Section 28 of the Police Act Cap. P19 NPR (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 41). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 90 
 
agencies, in situations of conflicts and other internal disturbances. However, the PMF faces similar 
constraints and problems as the regular police. These include lack of offices and inadequate equipment, 
and shortages of arms and ammunition, communication equipment, and operational vehicles (Nigeria 
Police Force, 2013; Owen, 2016). Like the police, the PMF has been accused of excesses and 
extrajudicial killings to suppress political opponents and control the population (Potholm, 1969; Hills, 
2008: 223; Owen, 2016). These challenges undermine the ability of the police, including the JTF, to 
effectively act as a professional state institution providing law enforcement and security in Nigeria, 
thereby compelling the involvement of the military. 
4.4 MILITARY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 
To guide and define the interaction of the military with civilians, the conditions, and limits on the use 
of force in an internal role, the State provides certain rules of engagement. Some of the key features 
for military ISOPs in Plateau State are summarised by Para-Mallam & Hoomlong (2013: 26–27): 
1. “To maintain the principle of minimum force and proportionality at all times. 
2. Use of force should be a last resort after every reasonable effort to contain a situation 
had been made. 
3. Use of force should only be resorted to if other means had failed or if non-use of force 
would result in the death or grievous injury to security personnel. For example, where 
there is evidence of a hostile act or hostile intent.36 
4. Use of force must be limited in intensity and duration and must be employed as a 
protective measure. 
5. Decision to open fire must only be upon the order of the on-scene commander unless 
there is no sufficient time to obtain such an order. 
6. Fire must be controlled and aimed at non-vital body parts in order not to kill. 
7. Avoid collateral damage. 
8. Render medical assistance and record deaths at incident after cessation of fire. Data 
gathered to be passed through appropriate chain of command.  
9. Protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) and assist agencies engaged in the distribution 
of relief materials. 
10. Undertake activities that would aid in diffusing tension.” 
                                               
36 “Hostile act refers to an action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated properties. 
Hostile intent refers to threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action, which appears to be 
preparatory to a hostile act” (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 27). 
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These terms provide an important measure to assess the adherence of the military to its mandate in 
Plateau State, and how non-adherence could strain the interaction with civilians, and foster insecurity. 
This is discussed further at a later stage of this dissertation. 
4.5 IMAGE AND PROFESSIONAL OUTLOOK OF NIGERIAN MILITARY SINCE 1960 
From the period before Nigeria’s independence to the end of the country’s first Republic in 1966, the 
military received several international commendations for its reputation, bravery, and effectivness in 
various international peacekeeping missions (Chick & Mazrui, 1971; Albert, 2007: 169; Oluyemi-Kusa, 
2007: 138). It was commended for having an “honoured reputation throughout the world for its 
gallantry and military bearing in many actions through its history” (Yaqub & Muhammad, 2007: 16). 
During this period, the military had low levels of interaction with civilian society, and it was not 
involved with politics, staying in its barracks, training, and engaging in routine military drills. It served 
internally in four different instances, the most critical instance being the 8 November 1964 deployment 
to suppress the recurring Tiv Riots (Obasanjo, 1981: 5; Maier, 2000: 12; Okoli & Orinya, 2013: 22). 
Up until the end of the first republic in 1966, “the officers and men occupied themselves with training, 
peacekeeping efforts in foreign lands, and other sundry military activities” (Ojo, 2006: 262). Military 
presence and impact on society was minimal, and its involvement in internal security operations 
occurred in few communities. 
Similarly, its political role and influence in political decision-making was limited. Whereas military 
praetorianism in Africa was pervasive, the Nigerian military appeared unconcerned about partisan 
politics or governance (Howe, 2001: 3). In part, colonial organisational structure and traditions served 
to limit the military into upholding civilian supremacy and self-restraint (Janowitz, 1977: 82). During 
this period, the military had more British commissioned officers than Nigerians. Table 4.2 below 
presents the nationality of officer corps in the Nigerian military between the period 1960 to 1966. 
Table 4. 2 Distribution of Britons and Nigerians in the Nigerian Army, 1960-196637 
Year No. of British 
Officers 
No. of Nigerian Commission Officers Percentage 
of Nigerians Combat Non-Combat 
1 Jan. 1960 228 48 2 18 
1 Jan. 1962 156 107 50 50 
1 Jan.1964 47 240 132 89 
1 Jan. 1966 0 336 181 100 
Source: Luckham (1971: 222) Authority and Conflict in the Nigerian Army 
                                               
37 No record was available for the year 1963 when Nigeria became a republic and Britain handed over full control. The official 
gazettes of the Federation of Nigeria (1960-66), which Luckham derived this data from, were incomplete. 
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As Table 4.2 reveals, by 1963 when Nigeria gained autonomy from Britain, it began withdrawing its 
officers from the Nigerian military. By 1964, Nigeria had more Nigerians in the officer ranks, many of 
whom were trained in Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, or other foreign military academies (Auma-
Osolo, 1980: 38). In part, this foreign training and the adoption of British values of civilian supremacy 
over the military influenced the posture of the Nigerian military in the period 1960-1966 (Alaga & 
Akum, 2013: 219). Therefore, it is possible to argue that before the first military coup, the Nigerian 
military was a professional military.38 The low societal integration and non-partisan posture typified 
that of a professional military, as described by Huntington (1957: 83–84, 1968). This was corroborated 
by several scholars, such as Alaga & Akum (2013: 221) and Ojo (2006: 262), who pointed out that “the 
Nigerian armed forces were a normal professional force.” However, this professional outlook was 
eroded after the first military coup of 15 January 1966. This coup provoked a counter-coup (see 
Section 4.2.1 above), both of which set the foundation for continuous military intervention in politics, 
which began to erode its professionalism. 
Prior to the first coup, electoral violence, ethnic politics, mismanagement, leadership ineptitude, and 
massive corruption in the civil service and among political office holders was pervasive in Nigeria 
(George, Shadare & Owoyemi, 2012: 194). The October 1965 election was marred by electoral 
malpractice and interethnic violence, particularly between the Hausa and the Yoruba in the Western 
Region, where the results were contested and rejected by two political parties. Political violence and 
assassinations, arson, and destruction of properties forced many to flee the cities due to the rising 
level of insecurity (Yaqub & Muhammad, 2007: 19). Nearly all the military coups in Nigeria occurred 
during periods of strong competition for political power, riots, strikes and demonstrations, and public 
disaffection with civilian government (Ihonvbere, 1991: 604). Because of this, some have argued that 
the weakness of the government, particularly in response to the deteriorating security situation, led 
to civilians inviting the military to quell the riots and violence (Ehwarieme, 2011: 496–503). In fact, 
Yaqub & Muhammad argue that: 
[I]t was highly the opinion of some concerned Nigerians that the Nigerian Army should 
step in and rescue Nigeria from total disaster which the Army willingly did by intervening 
in politics39 (2007: 19). 
This means that the Nigerian military was typically praetorian during this period, given its intervention 
in governance, and that the aim of the intervention was to restore peace and orderliness, fight 
corruption, and unify the country. While this is a valid argument, further examination reveals that this 
                                               
38 This argument is made with caution because some have accused it of heavy handedness during some of the ISOPs it 
conducted. See for instance Dode (2012: 409) and Audu (2015: 11–14). 
39 My emphasis. 
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marked the beginning of military predatory praetorianism in Nigeria, a point which I will return to 
shortly. 
The military could be described as a popular praetorian military during the first coup and the period 
between 8 June 1998 to 29 May 1999, when the former military despot Gen Sani Abacha died in office 
and Gen Abubakar Abdulsalami took over power. Gen Abdulsalami’s regime was the shortest of all 
military transitions, as he handed over power to the elected civilian government on 29 May 1999 (Ojo, 
2004, 2006: 255). He recognised the desire of Nigerians for civilian rule, having suffered 29 years of 
military dictatorship and tyranny. For instance, during the reign of Gen Sani Abacha, opposition parties 
were suppressed, political assassinations were rampant, and human rights violations occurred with 
impunity. Chief among these was the execution of nine Niger Delta activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa 
in November 1995, an act that later gave birth to the rise of insurgent groups and criminal violence in 
the Niger Delta (see section 0) (Idachaba, 2007: 280). In addition to this, military dictatorship brought 
about hardship and several international sanctions against Nigeria, fostering civilian impatience and 
resentment of the military (Idachaba, 2007: 281). 
From another angle, it is possible to argue that the first coup revolutionised the military into becoming 
a predatory praetorian military. The coup changed the professional outlook of the Nigerian military, 
resulting in no less than nine further coups and 29 years of military rule, laying the foundation for 
military predatory activities. This involved several years of draconian military policies, brutality and 
clampdown on activists and opposition, and the annulment of the election on 12 June 1993 (Welch, 
1995: 593; George et al., 2012: 194). During this 29 year dictatorship, the military engaged in 
mismanagement, bribery and corruption, and looting and accumulation of public resources 
(Ehwarieme, 2011: 499). Ojo described the nature of praetorianism thus: 
the military has become “political gladiators” in the battle for control of the state 
through incessant intervention in politics and government … As a result of the frequent 
coups and countercoups, the military has ruled Nigeria for a much longer time than its 
civilian counterparts. The civilians have held office for fourteen out of the forty-three 
years of Nigeria’s flag independence ... This is simply the picture of a praetorian state or 
what Leo Dare called the “Praetorian Trap” (Ojo, 2006: 262). 
Along with this, the military subjected civilians to draconian decrees, silencing human rights advocates 
and bringing about several international sanctions against the country (Idachaba, 2007: 280–281). In 
the international theatre of peace support operations (PSO), the military received more criticism than 
commendation (Osunyikanmi, 2011: 58), as not only was it abusing its powers, but engaging in looting 
or predatory actions in its areas of assignment (Hills, 1997: 44). The many years of military rule ensured 
that the military accumulated much ill-gotten wealth and preserved significant prerogatives in both the 
economy and the political process of the country. As argued in the following section, these include 
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the trend of retiring military officers moving into political offices, as well as them having a major stake 
in the national economy and economic activities of the country. 
4.6 DEMOCRATIC CIVIL CONTROL AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY 
The Nigerian military has acted as a predatory praetorian military, thereby making democratic civil 
control of the military a complex task. To overcome the problem, Section 218 of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers the civilian President with several 
responsibilities as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Federal Government of Nigeria, 
1999). These include the power to decide on the operational use of the military, appointment of the 
Defence Chief and the Chiefs of the various Services (Army, Air Force, Navy), and the regulation of 
the presidential power by the National Assembly. In effect, the law institutionalises and legitimises 
civilian supremacy over the military, and provides both “constitutional and legal basis for democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces” in Nigeria (Magbadelo, 2012: 257; Alaga & Akum, 2013: 231). 
Upon assuming office in 1999, former President Olusegun Obasanjo carried out two decisive actions 
to professionalise the military and to subordinate the armed forces to civilian authority, in line with 
the Constitutional provisions. 40  First, all serving officers who held political offices/appointments 
between 1984 and 1999 were retired as a measure to ensure that the remaining officers recognise, 
comply with, and appreciate the norm of civilian supremacy. The second action was the inauguration 
of a Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (Oputa Panel) to investigate incidences of 
human rights abuses committed during military rule (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 227; Babatunde, 2015: 51). 
In addition to this, the government engaged civilians as ministers of defence; established a senate 
committee on defence to oversee matters involving the military; and granted relative autonomy to the 
three wings of the armed forces by appointing a chief for each service (Omede, 2012: 301). These 
mechanisms demonstrate the attempt by civilian leaders to exercise civil control over the military. 
However, the principles of civil control are not firmly institutionalised and, “the laws, and legal 
procedures have not been fully implemented and observed” (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 231). 
Following the decision to formally hand over power to civilians in 1999, many serving military officers 
retired to go into politics. The electable position of the President and several State Governors were 
occupied by these retired military officers who had the ‘means’ to be ‘elected’ or ‘selected’ to these 
offices. These ‘means’ include power, positions, new-found wealth, ex-military connections, ‘old-boy’ 
networks, skills, prestige, and experiences or, simply put, military prerogatives (Stepan, 1988: 93; 
Adekanye, 1999b: 185). Using the economic advantage mostly ill-acquired as serving officers, the 
retired officers found themselves in an advantaged position in terms of gaining political power, which 
                                               
40 President Olusegun Obasanjo is a retired military officer and former military dictator who is credited for peacefully handing 
over power to civilian rule in 1979. He later ruled Nigeria as a democratically elected president from May 1999 to 2007. 
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also served to protect their economic wealth (Badmus, 2005: 61). 41  Unsurprisingly, political 
appointments, including the Minister of Defence, “National Security Adviser, Director of State 
Security, Aso Rock Chief of Staff (that is, chief of staff of the presidential villa)” were given to retired 
military officers, many of whom were partisan while in military service (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 227). 
Thus, Nigeria’s democracy became a pseudo-civilian government, with serving and retired officers 
dominating key political decision-making processes, agencies, government parastatals, and political 
party leadership. Lutterbeck (2013: 30) refers to this as a “military-ruler regime.” 
One can infer from this that the Nigerian military made a pact to civilianise and retire military officers 
into active political roles. While this was stated in the Nigerian Army Officers’ 1981 Terms and 
Conditions of Service, there appears to be no such formal policy of late, although the trend since the 
return to democracy in 1999 suggests otherwise (Agara, 2006: 51–52). In the light of the ascension of 
retired military officers into politics in a consciously planned swap from khaki to ‘agbada,’42 Nigerian 
democracy remains under the direct/indirect control of retired military officers (Maja-Pearce, 1999; 
Kolawole, 2014: 22). This explains the unwillingness of government to restructure the State, 
particularly as it affects CMR as well as the continuous militarisation of both society and the polity.  
Accordingly, Alaga & Akum (2013: 227) have argued that, rather than addressing the problem and the 
counter-effect it poses to the infant democracy and the process of consolidating it, government action 
encourages more involvement of retired officers. When states of emergency were declared in Plateau 
and Ekiti States, it was retired officers that were appointed as administrators, rather than civilians. In 
addition, while the commission charged with investigating human rights abuses was credited for being 
thorough and comprehensive, the government showed no interest in implementing its 
recommendations or prosecuting those found culpable. On the contrary, retired servicemen invited 
to answer to the charges against them refused to appear before the Commission, yet no 
action/sanction was taken against them, and neither was the recommendation of the commission 
implemented (Fayemi, 2002; Adeakin, 2015: 125). Clearly, the lack of political will to address the 
concerns indicates that some powerful forces associated with the military have ‘captured’ the State 
and are unwilling to change the status quo. 
In addition to this, two instances of military extrajudicial actions shaped the state of CMR in Nigeria. 
The Odi and the Zaki Biam massacres43 carried out by the military have gone unpunished, and the 
                                               
41 Badmus (2005: 61) described three patterns of how military officers usurped state finances for themselves during the 
military regimes. 
42 Agbada or Kaftan is a popular male attire worn in Nigeria and the West African region, it is characterized by long wide 
sleeves. 
43 The military raids and massacres in Odi village of Bayelsa State, and Zaki Biam of Benue State, are examples of excessive 
use of military force, and its seeming possession of unquestionable power in Nigeria. For detailed accounts of the massacres 
and the events leading to them, see Nwachukwu & Ojugbana (2001: 152–159), and Effiong (2001: 73–82). 
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victims were offered no form of compensation (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001; Nwolise, 2007). This shows 
that despite the transition to civilian rule, liberal democratic principles are subverted while the military 
continues to wield unquestioned powers. Omede (2012: 301) corroborates this when he points out 
that “more often than not, one has had to wonder whether the military is above the nation’s 
constitution.” Thus, some have claimed that involving the military internally in society for law 
enforcement duties terrorises the populace (Ojo, 2006, 2009b: 16–17). This raises questions as to the 
role of civil society in Nigeria, especially when it comes to addressing and regulating the excesses of 
the military. As I argued in the previous chapter, civil society is one of the key legitimate mechanisms 
through which civilians can ensure the government and its various institutions/agencies are held 
accountable. 
In Nigeria, civil society has little impact on the regulation of the military and holding them to account 
when it comes to military excesses and abuse of power. A number of reasons have been put forward 
to explain why this happens. Ojo (1997, 2006: 265) argues that the state constrains, suppresses and 
‘beleaguers’ civil society organisations using coercion or military might, even in the present democratic 
dispensation. This observation remains true in Nigeria. In addition to repressing civil society, the 
criminal courts have produced little or no convincing evidence on their ability to successfully prosecute 
matters of military extrajudicial killings. A more recent military raid and alleged massacre on Tarok 
communities in 2015 in Plateau State has made little progress in the criminal courts, and victims of this 
abuse are losing faith in the judiciary.44 
In several other instances, civil society has been unable to question government actions due to fear of 
repression, and because government leadership is often dominated by retired military officers, 
sympathisers or its ‘puppets.’ The three influential ethno-regional civil society organisations (Arewa 
Consultative Forum, Ohaeneze Ndigbo, and Afenifere) pursue ethnic agendas and are still being led by 
retired military officers (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 227). Another problem affecting the power and influence 
of civil society in Nigeria is that the citizenry is sharply divided along religious and ethnic lines, which 
undermines their ability to act as a united force. 
Another crucial area where the military has exerted an influence is the economy of the country. 
According to Agara (2006: 64), this developed through three different stages: intervention in politics; 
assuming political appointments on boards of parastatals and public corporations; and holding a firm 
grip on contracts with contractors and private business entrepreneurs. Since the military coup in 1966, 
the military became more politically involved and aware of both political and economic decision-making 
processes. Officers developed an interest in venturing into economic activities, especially because the 
                                               
44 Participant (a member of one of the communities affected) interviewed in Jos North LGA of Plateau State on 29 September 
2016. 
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civil war and its end provided promising opportunities for numerous business activities to thrive. Many 
tapped into the development and the public expenditure plans of the Nigerian government by 
establishing business enterprises to execute these projects (Adekanye, 1999a: 34). The coup made it 
possible for officers to be both military and political administrators, as well as economic managers of 
the various States and the Federal government, with the ability to direct policy and influence decision-
making. Through this, opportunities for the ascension of officers into the economic structure of the 
state were provided, which also disadvantaged civilians and the underprivileged (Adekanye, 1999a: 34). 
Agara succinctly sums up the situation as follows: 
The virtual monopoly of the state power by the military discriminated against other 
groups' access to economic and political largesse offered by their control of the state 
apparatus in as much as access to the office and its spoils is the object of politics. The 
military politicians by their actions had made it clear that their looting of public funds 
could not be challenged within the framework of electoral politics and military 
dictatorship because of the 'old boys' network and feelings of comradeship (Agara, 2006: 
67). 
This became instrumental in the military funding and winning elections. More so, as some have argued, 
the Nigerian political system became monetised, such that only the wealthy and their cronies are able 
to be successful (Badmus, 2005: 62; Ehwarieme, 2011: 501–502). This smooths the process for retired 
officers to consolidate their grip on both the economic and the political structures of Nigeria. 
To put this in context of the theories of CMR, I focus on the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (amended), hereafter referred to as the Constitution. The understanding is that, because 
the Constitution defines the establishment, roles, and functions of the armed forces, it sets the pattern 
for the civil control of the military. First, it does not make provision for the military to be involved in 
the political decision-making processes. Rather, section 144 (5) provides that the Executive Council 
of the Federation (the cabinet) shall only comprise a “body of ministers of the government of the 
federation” which has no military representative (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999: 66). A second 
point pertains to the role of the military in society as regards to military aid to civil authority. 
Accordingly, section 217 (2) C makes it clear that the military can be made to assume an internal role 
of a constabulary force to assist in suppressing insurrection when the need arises. A third and equally 
important provision is that the composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the military must 
reflect the federal character (ethnic diversity) of Nigeria. 
From this, one sees that the Constitution has aspects of Huntington’s separation theory, given that it 
favours an insular military that is detached from the political decision-making process. Where the 
Constitution involves the military and the police in the National Security Council, it provides that it 
shall only be an advisory body, and the President shall be the head of the body (section 25 and 26 of 
the third schedule of the Constitution). As such, it excludes the military from the political decision-
making process. Another consideration is that the Constitution favours the constabulary roles that 
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Janowitz observes the military assuming in society, hence, it embodies aspects of both the integration 
and separation theories. 
The implication of this is that it aligns more closely with Schiff’s concordance theory, which favours 
neither the separation nor integration of the military in the political decision-making process, but 
rather an agreement on the most suitable option. Importantly, the requirement that the military must 
reflect the federal character of Nigeria emphasises concordance on the significance of an agreement 
on the recruitment pattern, especially as it concerns the composition of the officer corps. Given that 
Nigeria has endured a civil war and is still facing numerous armed conflicts, the emphasis on 
concordance in the institutional and cultural conditions of the state becomes even more salient. 
However, although there has not been any military intervention in politics since the return to civil rule 
in 1999, there appear to be tensions in the state of CMR due to military excesses. While in theory the 
Constitution provides a framework for civil control of the military, in practice civil control is lacking, 
as the discussion in this section reveals. Where the issues are not addressed and civilians resort to 
arms or allying with armed groups to seek protection and to retaliate against military abuse, this can 
affect CMR. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Having examined the challenges armed groups pose to states, this chapter narrowed the discussion to 
Nigeria where every region in the country faces incidences of armed violence. One explanation why 
armed violence is so ubiquitous in Nigeria is a lack of political will to unite the country and address 
the political and economic marginalisation that the various groups suffer. As the grievances have not 
been addressed, several groups resort to arms to challenge their exclusion. However, this does not 
fully account for the resort to violence, and other explanations point to the constitutional lacuna which 
emphasises indigeneship over citizenship, and the exploitation of these sentiments by some for 
economic or political gains. When violence breaks out, it overwhelms the police agency, which suffers 
a legitimacy crisis due to its brutality and corruption, as well as the shortage of manpower, inadequate 
training, and a lack of basic policing equipment. 
The combination of these challenges compels the government to use the military internally in society 
for basic law-enforcement duties and the maintenance of security. However, using the military in this 
capacity results in numerous atrocities and abuses of human rights, which affect the relationship of the 
military with the citizenry. The professional image of the military is undermined by its predatory 
praetorianism and its grip on the political, economic, and social structures of the State. Consequently, 
the military has come to wield unchecked powers when it acts internally in society, and civil control 
is nearly non-existent to null and void. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
5.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses the research methods used for data collection and analysis, the ethics, and a 
reflection on the research process. The framework and the underlying techniques and assumptions 
that were made in collecting and analysing the data for the study are provided, as well as information 
that explains how the research was conducted, and why certain approaches were chosen over others. 
The chapter is divided into five sections: (1) the philosophical assumptions of the study, (2) the 
research design, (3) the ethical considerations, (4) the limitations of the study and (5) a reflection on 
the fieldwork. 
5.2 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Typically, research design follows certain assumptions that guide the conduct of the study, the data 
collection, interpretation and analysis. The approach is determined by several factors, key among which 
are the aim of the study, the sample size, time availability and the availability of funds to execute the 
project. Given that this study focusses on understanding human experiences of military operations and 
how it affects people’s security, a strategy which could explore individual accounts of the experiences 
is most suitable. I therefore adopt a social constructivist approach. Social constructionism is a 
philosophical standpoint that sees individuals as meaning makers who are able to socially construct 
their reality (Creswell, 1998: 76). The aim is to understand the meaning individual participants attach 
to their experiences and how this affects them, rather than focusing on the views and opinions 
contained in theories and the literature. It contends that humans understand their reality through an 
interaction with their historical, social and cultural reality (Crotty, 1998; Schwandt, 2000). For this 
reason, this study leans towards the social constructionist ontology, which strives to understand the 
reality of the participants, their experiences, and how it affects their daily livelihoods. To achieve this, 
the study used broad questions, rather than a structured interview questionnaire or guide. This helped 
to facilitate open conversation with the research participants, and it provided me an opportunity to 
carefully listen to the detailed experience of each participant, making prompts and inquiries, and 
seeking to better understand how each participant experienced the phenomenon (Creswell, 2003: 8). 
Several scholars have indicated that the interpretivist epistemology can be favourably used with social 
constructionist ontology to study human experiences (Creswell, 1998, 2003; Bryman, 2012: 36). As 
this research studied the experiences of civilians with the military operations in Plateau State, it adopts 
the interpretivist epistemology. This facilitated the understanding of how the citizens in this State in 
Nigeria experienced the use of the military in their communities, as well as their interaction with the 
military. Interpretivism offers the requisite conversational space necessary to elicit discussions and to 
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uncover the meanings participants attach to certain events. This aligns closely with the contention that 
the relationship between the researcher and the research participants plays a major role in determining 
the outcome of a study (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 111). 
Creating a close interactive link between a researcher and participants provides an atmosphere in 
which to uncover the subjective meanings individuals attach to their experiences. When a researcher 
allows participants to recount their reality and experiences, they can narrate and explain the meaning 
participants attach to certain events that affect their lives. Interpretivism thus recognises and respects 
the fact that individuals’ experiences provide different meanings to a given phenomenon. Unlike the 
positivist orthodoxy, it recognises the possibility of multiple views from different individuals, and an 
understanding of the meanings they attach to their reality (Bryman, 2012: 30). 
The process of interacting with each participant has implications for the values, opinions and biases 
researchers might bring into a study. This problem, considered as the axiological assumption in social 
research, tends to be inherent in social research. Rarely do investigators develop and conduct studies 
without prior values, assumptions, thoughts, and experiences about the phenomenon studied 
(Creswell, 1998: 76). This is certainly true for me in this study, given that I have first-hand experience 
of military abuse against civilians. As I have also resided in some parts of the study area for a 
considerable number of years, I have experienced military operations in Plateau State and I reflect on 
this in the study.  
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.3.1 Research Strategy 
This research was designed as an exploratory study due to its focus on understanding the experiences 
of civilians with respect to military operations in Plateau State. In line with the above-mentioned 
philosophical assumptions, the qualitative research strategy was used to guide this research. For 
conceptual clarity, a research strategy is the fundamental framework which guides the overall conduct 
and process of social research (Bryman, 2012: 35). The qualitative research strategy places emphasis 
on understanding rather than measuring, quantifying, and generalising from the data derived or used 
for the study. It focuses on giving thick and detailed descriptions of human experiences through 
observation and interaction with those involved in order to understand the meaning they attach to 
their experiences. Several reasons informed the choice of the qualitative research strategy for this 
study. One was the need to produce a thick textual description of citizens’ experiences, perceptions, 
and attitudes regarding the military operations in their communities. This is important because few 
studies have examined this in Plateau State, Nigeria.  
In addition, while several studies have examined the conflict in Plateau State, a thorough literature 
search across databases and local publications reveals that few have examined it from the perspective 
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of the interaction and experiences of civilians with the military (Abdullahi et al., 2016). A quantitative 
study would have required knowing what indicators to use to measure the effect the military has on 
the security situation in the State, which was not known. However, with qualitative research, themes, 
ideas and theories are derived from findings made from the data collected in the field (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008: ix; Bryman, 2012: 399–404). Furthermore, using qualitative strategies generates the 
primary data to fill the gap in existing theories of CMR to fully explain the phenomenon in Plateau 
State. Several scholars indicate that this is the most appropriate and suitable research method to elicit 
the perceptions, experiences and attitudes of people (Berg, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2008). 
5.3.2 Site of the Study 
The study site for this research was Plateau State, North Central Nigeria. As indicated in the previous 
Chapter, several other States face recurrent and intermittent violence in Nigeria. These include the 
Niger-Delta oil producing region, and several States in the North East such as Borno, Adamawa, and 
Gombe affected by severe threat and violence from the Boko Haram and military coercion. While 
these States could have been used, Plateau State has been adopted for several reasons. One is that I 
am more knowledgeable about the terrain, geographical landscape and the conflict situation in Plateau 
State as I have been resident here for over 20 years. This insider knowledge was important because it 
enabled me to navigate the conflict zones with great care and cautiousness to ensure my own safety 
and security, and that of my participants. Another key factor was my understanding and ability to 
speak, read and write the Hausa language, which is spoken as a second language in some localities in 
Plateau State. This meant language and communication pitfalls were minimised, and participants could 
speak about their experiences and express their opinions comfortably without having to use an 
interpreter. 
The last, and possibly the most important reason for using Plateau State, is the ongoing violence and 
continuous use of the military to curb the conflict. Despite the military’s presence and excessive use 
of force, they have been unable to stabilise this once-peaceful State in Nigeria. On the contrary, the 
military has been engaged in extrajudicial killings and genocide, with one of the most recent attacks on 
civilians on 2 May, 2015 in Tarok communities (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001: 116; Human Rights Watch, 
2005, 2013; Best & Rakodi, 2011: 72). The actions of the military have affected its relationship with 
civilians, who are no longer willing to interact or cooperate with them. The citizenry feel that that the 
military has brought little relief, and rather have become part of the security problem (Crisis Group, 
2012: 21). This made Plateau State relevant in terms of the aims and goals of this study. 
Plateau State has 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs). Of these, six LGAs were used as sites from 
which participants were selected for this study. These LGAs included: 
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i. Jos North LGA 
ii. Jos South LGA 
iii. Riyom LGA 
iv. Barkin Ladi LGA 
v. Mangu LGA and 
vi. Bokkos LGA 
After a preliminary investigation, several reasons informed the decision to use these LGAs as the sites 
of the study. These include the fact that military operations in these LGAs were still very active, and 
that the presence of military personnel in several parts of each of the LGAs was visible and pervasive. 
Along with this, these LGAs have continued to face violence that involved the military and the local 
population, and the recentness of the violence meant participants could more readily recollect, 
narrate, and discuss the issues, as it was topical and fresh in their minds. 
5.3.3 Selection of Participants 
Given that the study aimed to investigate the experiences of civilians of military operations in Plateau 
State, only civilians were recruited as participants for this study. A criterion was that they must have 
been resident in any of the LGAs for at least the past five years. They should also not have travelled 
or stayed away from the State for more than two months within the past five years. These measures 
were put in place to ensure that every person selected to participate in the study had some level of 
experience with the conflict and the use of the military. The assumption was that when individuals 
reside in an environment for a long period, they can observe the changes in the environment, develop 
coping strategies and adapt to the changing environment. Thus, only participants with the required 
lived experiences were included in the study. Another criterion was that they were to be over 20 
years of age in order to avoid the challenges associated with researching minors, as they may not 
possess adequate first-hand experience and a good grasp of the origin of the violence. 
To elicit a broad spectrum of views and perspectives, participants were sampled from different social 
categories across the six LGAs. These categories included students of tertiary institutions; traders and 
artisans; public/private sector employees; employers of labour; unemployed persons; elected 
representatives; and community leaders, as detailed below. 
1. Students of tertiary institutions:  In each of the mapped LGAs, there is at least one tertiary learning 
institution, and these institutions were the point of locating and recruiting participants. These 
educational institutions were the University of Jos, the Jos Campus of Plateau State Polytechnic, 
the Barkin Ladi Campus of Plateau State Polytechnic, College of Nursing and Midwifery Vom, 
College of Education Gindiri, and Plateau State University Bokkos. 
2. Traders and artisans: Sampling for this category took place at their respective places of work or 
trade. For traders, markets and shops in each of the sites were used as the venue for recruitment. 
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Artisans, such as vehicle mechanics, blacksmiths, tailors, and barbers were reached by visiting their 
workshops, garages, stores, or shops. 
3. Public/private sector employees: Recruitment for this category was from the respective 
secretariats, private sector offices and government offices in each of the LGAs. 
4. Employers of labour: A visit to private sector organisations was made to seek consent of 
entrepreneurs who employ labour in each of the six LGAs. 
5. Unemployed persons: Community and youth leaders in each of the LGAs served as leads for 
recruiting this category of participants, given the vast knowledge they have of members of their 
communities. 
6. Elected representatives: Snowball sampling was used here to contact and arrange meetings with 
individuals in this category, due to the difficulties faced in accessing them. 
7. Community leaders: Most community members easily know their community leaders, and oral 
inquiry was used to contact and locate them. 
Criterion purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques were used, because they offered 
flexibility in selecting participants who met the objectives of the research (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995; 
Patton, 2002). Using criterion-purposive sampling ensured that participants met the stated 
requirements, and I assumed that civilians who fulfilled the criteria must have had some form of 
interaction with the military. The benefit was that it presented the opportunity to elicit both good and 
unpleasant experiences with the military, providing a more balanced view. In addition to the broad 
social categories of participants, I also considered ethnic and religious affiliation when sampling 
participants to ensure that I included all spectrums in the sampled population. This was important as 
it included individuals from diverse backgrounds, affiliations, and orientations who had interacted with 
the military, which enabled me to capture diverse views. 
5.3.4 Data Collection 
As this study aimed to investigate the views, perception, experiences, and attitudes of people in 
relation to the military, participant observation and one-on-one qualitative interviews were used for 
data collection. Participant observation was helpful because it provided the opportunity to observe 
and encounter the role of the military, in terms of how they act and behave when interacting with 
civilians. This was important because it aligned my experience of the military as a researcher (within 
the period of data collection) with those of participants. It also facilitated a deeper understanding of 
the experiences of civilians without presenting the challenge of behaviour alteration and inaccurate 
description during interviews. The qualitative interviewing was selected because it supports the use of 
open unstructured conversations with participants and it counters the limitations of using a structured 
interview guide, or a standardised questionnaire for all participants. Rather, it requires the use of an 
aide memoire or broad questions to elicit in-depth responses from participants and to gain ‘first-hand 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 104 
 
experience’ with the phenomenon of study45 (Kvale, 1996). This approach provided the conversational 
space to comprehensively explore the experiences of participants, the meaning they attached to it, 
and the opportunity to investigate ‘unanticipated’ areas of inquiry. 
A total of 55 interviews were conducted for the study. This number was decided upon due to the 
recommendation of conducting not less than 15 interviews for a research using qualitative strategies 
(Bertaux, 1981; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). The view is corroborated by many scholars because 
it is expected that saturation of categories would be achieved from this number of interviews (Morse, 
1994; Creswell, 1998; Warren, 2001; Green & Thorogood, 2009; Mason, 2010). However, as I wanted 
to capture diverse views, interviews were continued until a point of saturation was reached. Table 5.1 
below presents a breakdown of participants and the sites in which they were sampled. 
Table 5. 1 Breakdown of Interviews by LGAs and Social Categories of Participants 
S. 
No 
Students Traders/ 
Artisans 
Public/Private 
Employees 
Employers 
of Labour 
Unemployed 
Persons 
Elected 
Reps. 
Community 
Leaders 
LGAs 
1. 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 Jos 
North 
2. 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 Jos South 
3. 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 Riyom 
4. 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 B/Ladi 
5. 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 Mangu 
6. 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 Bokkos 
Sum 12 6 12 7 6 6 6 55 
Source: Fieldwork Notes 
Although the table does not present other characteristics, such as religious affiliation and ethnicity, 
careful consideration of these characteristics was made in the sampling process. Another characteristic 
not covered in the table, but which needs emphases is the gender of my participants. Of the 55 
participants interviewed, 36 were men and 19 women. Some participants had less interaction with the 
military than others, irrespective of gender. Interaction with the military was not a criterion used in 
selecting participants, and the reasons for this are discussed upon later on in this chapter (Section 5.6). 
5.3.5 Data Analysis 
Although there are several qualitative data analysis techniques, thematic analysis was used for this 
study. This choice arose from the exploratory nature of this study, and its desire to investigate 
complex human experiences. It was considered adequate given that it focuses on identifying and 
describing both obvious and hidden truths within the data. As an analytical tool, thematic analysis is 
considered the most adequate and useful tool for investigating “complexities of meaning within a 
textual data set” (Guest, Macqueen & Namey, 2012: 11). Braun & Clarke (2006: 81) indicate that it is 
                                               
45 See Appendix B for the aide memoire used for this study.  
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a vital analytical tool for describing and examining the meanings and experiences individuals have about 
a given phenomenon. This shows the approach was suitable for this study which sought to understand 
the lived experiences of people. The analysis was conducted with the aid of Atlas.ti 8 computer-aided 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). It followed a six phase approach which involved getting 
familiarised with the data; coding the data; generating themes; reviewing the themes; defining and 
naming the themes; and producing the report by way of analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 87). As this 
was an inductive study, themes were derived from the fieldwork and not from extant literatures or 
my prior knowledge. 
5.4 ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
Prior to the fieldwork for the study, ethical clearance and approval from Stellenbosch University 
Humanities Research Ethics Committee was obtained. This process followed scrutiny from the 
Admissions Committee to the Department Ethics Screening Committee and the Humanities Research 
Ethics Committee, as the study was considered of medium risk. The key considerations outlined in 
the ethical application process were all strictly adhered to during the fieldwork and in writing this 
research report. Some of the major considerations included voluntary expression of consent to take 
part in the study. Consent was obtained orally from all participants after they read, or the content of 
the consent form was read and explained to them, and clarifications were made. Due to the sensitive 
nature of the research and the need to protect participants from unforeseen risks, their names were 
not required or recorded. They were also informed of their right to withdraw from the study. 
Pseudonyms were used for each participant. 
All the interviews were conducted in a safe and noise-free space and were participants felt 
comfortable. I prioritised my safety and security, by navigating unsafe zones with the assistance of field 
officers working in local communities in the conflict zones. Some participants were linked with social 
workers for professional counselling upon the conclusion of the interviews. One participant was 
referred to social workers because his remarks indicated his desire to use actual violence to kill any 
military personnel he encounters. However, participants were assured of their privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality as the interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis. They were assured that all 
audio recordings of the interviews would not be given to anyone but would be saved on an encrypted 
and password-protected device. These were consequently deleted after the interviews were 
transcribed into text. All information capable of identifying participants, such as the names of their 
streets and the address where some incidents directly affecting them happened, were not reported in 
this study. 
5.5 LIMITATIONS 
The study has certain limitations, one being that the scope was limited to civilians’ experiences of the 
military. The design of the study deliberately excluded active military personnel and the officer corps. 
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While this decision was intentional, it meant that the study does not benefit from juxtaposing the 
opinions of military personnel vis-à-vis those of civilians. However, doing this presented the study with 
the opportunity to explore in-depth, the views of the citizens who interact and experience the heavy-
handedness of the military in their daily lives. This rationale helped make the research focus on the 
practical details of the study while not comparing the data with opposing views, which could have been 
at polar extremes. Moreover, it was more practical and feasible to interview civilians than military 
personnel, given that access to active-duty personnel is near-impossible in terms of obtaining official 
approval. However, this is a potential recommendation for future studies to interrogate both views. 
In practical terms, the use of Hausa language for data collection posed certain limitations regarding 
translation and transcribing the data. However, I addressed these issues and ensured that they had 
little or no effect to the outcome of the study. I did this by translating the broad interview questions 
for the aide memoire to Hausa language prior to the interview, and a native speaker of the language 
confirmed its accuracy before I conducted the interviews. This assurance mechanism was important 
despite me being proficient in Hausa, as it was possible that some information could have been lost in 
the process of translation (see Hoffman, 1998). I also did a similar accuracy control with the interview 
transcripts before I began the analysis. However, I anonymised all the data and all information that 
could identify participants before asking for assistance from a native speaker of the language. 
5.6 REFLECTION ON THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
I started the fieldwork on 22nd August 2016 and concluded it in January 2017. Before beginning the 
fieldwork, I carried out a preliminary visit to the various sites of the study in January 2016 to familiarise 
myself with the localities. I did this with the support and help of members of civil society organisations 
who were working in the communities. The support staff from the civil society organisations guided 
me and helped me gain access to potentially unsafe communities that I could not visit alone. This was 
necessary as the residential settlements in various parts of the State are polarised and 
compartmentalised by religion. Non-adherents are unable to visit areas occupied by the different faiths 
for safety concerns. However, the support staff helped me navigate through these communities and 
linked me to key community members, who assisted me in recruiting some participants for the study. 
This assisted in addressing possible trust relations and gaining acceptance. 
I used both snowball and criterion purposive sampling techniques to recruit participants. The 
combination of these became necessary due to the complex sensitive nature of the research, and my 
interest in uncovering and examining specific experiences. Along with this, concerns about my safety 
and gaining the trust of participants played a role: snowballing reinforces trust because it works on 
referral. The sampling strategies further ensured that those interviewed were persons consistently 
resident in the study area, and above 20 years of age. I assumed that these categories of persons would 
have had some form of interaction with the military, given that temporary military bases and make-
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shift roadblocks are common in several locations in the State. However, I did not ask any participant 
about their interaction with military personnel before recruiting them for interviewing. I assumed that 
because they had lived in the State for a prolonged period with pervasive military presence, they are 
likely to have interacted with the military, and this turned out to be the case for all participants. 
Although the combination of snowballing and criterion purposive sampling proved suitable for this 
study, other strategies could have been effective as well. One such strategy is stratified random 
sampling, which also helps to recruit participants across different social categories representing the 
focus of the research (Fox, Hunn & Mathers, 2009: 8). However, because of the sensitive nature of 
the research, security concerns, and the challenges involved in gaining the trust of participants, this 
approach would have been inappropriate. Without the aid of the support staff of various community 
organisations, and the referral snowballing brings, I would not have been able to visit some localities 
or recruit many of my participants. Through snowballing, some participants suggested persons they 
thought would be beneficial to the study and this helped to minimise the challenges associated with 
trust and speaking out. Although one weakness of snowballing is the likelihood that referral could lead 
to recruiting a network of friends, inputs from support staff from civil society organisations helped to 
mitigate this. Also, my use of several sites (six LGAs) for participant recruitment addressed this 
potential shortcoming. 
One point to note is how my positionality as a Christian and a native of Plateau State could have 
affected the research. Typically, being an insider has both benefits and potential challenges in terms of 
the data collection process. The benefits, as I noted in Section 5.3.4, include insider knowledge of 
some local languages, which facilitated effective interactions during the interviews, and knowledge of 
the conflict and conflict zones. Nevertheless, despite being an insider, I encountered several challenges 
in recruiting participants for the study, as some saw me as a ‘suspicious insider.’ I presumed that being 
a native and a Christian would make it easy to contact Christian natives and recruit them for the study, 
without the help of support staff from civil society organisations. However, many Christian natives 
declined to participate in the study, once I introduced myself to them as a research student and 
explained the nature of my topic. 
In one instance in Heipang, Barkin Ladi LGA, a native Christian told me that identity documents can 
be forged, and he was therefore suspicious and would not participate in the research. However, as I 
reached most Muslims through the assistance of support staff, I did not encounter this challenge with 
them. Incidentally, Kusow (2003: 594) also experienced a similar challenge of being a suspicious insider 
while attempting to interview Somali migrants in Canada. Another challenge was that being a Christian 
native, which made me an ‘insider’ to Christians, also made me an ‘outsider’ to Muslims, as such 
statuses are fluid, situational, and contextual (Merton, 1972: 21). This had certain implications for the 
study as Muslims may not have been opened to share and discuss their experiences with me. However, 
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as I used referral and the help of support staff working in the local communities, Muslims generally 
provided consent to participate and opened up on their interactions and experiences with the military. 
Another point to note is that security and safety concerns affected the selection of tools for data 
collection. Dyadic one-on-one interviews were used instead of focus group discussions, which would 
have been beneficial in showing agreement, arguments and disagreement on several issues raised. 
However, concerns about the safety and security of participants convinced me to adopt one-on-one 
interviews to reduce the risk of harm which may arise when participants’ express critical opinions 
before strangers. This decision proved helpful as participants openly narrated their experiences and 
detailed how they felt about the presence and activities of the military. In one interview, the 
interviewee not only expressed bitterness with the military, but the desire to shoot to kill should a 
gun be available. This also showed that the guarantee and assurance on confidentiality, privacy and 
anonymity were essential in order for participants to freely express their positions and disposition 
towards the military. This enabled me to elicit rich data for this study. 
As a native of the State, and of the Christian religious affiliation, my identity needed careful 
consideration before visiting some localities. This was important because the conflict in the State is 
experienced along ethnic and religious lines, between the majority ethnic Christian natives and 
minority Muslim ‘settlers.’ Thus, given that I was not a neutral ‘outsider’, this consideration was 
important because it could have affected the data collection process in two ways. First, my security 
and safety as the researcher was at stake when I visited areas polarised by religious differences and 
intolerance. However, as I sought and obtained support and help from members of civil society 
organisations who were working in the area, this enabled me to overcome the safety and security 
concerns. Together with these staff, I navigated areas which I would not have been able to visit due to 
my being a Christian and a native of the area. However, the second challenge, of trust and openness, 
could have emerged during the interviews even after overcoming the first challenge. Despite gaining 
access and consent to interview those whose religious affiliation was different from mine, gaining their 
trust to open-up and freely discuss their experiences needed further consideration. Thus, through the 
support and help of the support staff, I convinced participants of the relevance, purpose, and benefit 
of the study. Along with this, the assurances of anonymity and confidentiality helped to bridge the 
openness challenge. 
During the interviews, some participants alerted me to incidences of mass extra-judicial killings carried 
out by the military in the border communities of Plateau State with Taraba State. Although these areas 
were not in the proposed site of the study, the facts and wealth of data coming from this incident 
contributed to this study as it corroborated the heavy handedness and extrajudicial use of force by 
the military. One participant made available a six-page communique from the Nwang Ishi Otarok 
community of Wase Local Government Area of Plateau State on 6th May 2015, tagged “planned 
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genocide against the Tarok Race by the Nigerian Army and the Plateau State Government.” The 
communique described incidences of military excesses and parts of the report are referred to in this 
study, given that the incident was officially reported and is currently being prosecuted as a human 
rights violation crime in the court of law in Nigeria (Ahovi, 2015). However, as I did not obtain ethical 
clearance to conduct studies in these areas, I did not visit the localities to conduct interviews with the 
community affected. 
I conducted the interviews in either English or Hausa. Most of the interviews were in Hausa and given 
that I am a fluent speaker of the language, I was able to conduct the interviews without communication 
problems. Using this language proved highly important because some of my participants could not 
speak English. I also noticed that despite the ability of some participants to speak the English, 
conversing in Hausa endeared me to some participants who were native speakers of Hausa. This 
became beneficial to the study because it helped them express their opinions clearly and openly. 
As this study only examined and reported on the experiences of civilians in their interaction with the 
military, one could argue that the study is ‘one-sided’ or biased because it did not include the 
perspectives of the military. The study would have benefitted from obtaining the opinions of military 
personnel, but several factors led to the resolve to only interview civilians. One reason was that the 
study aimed to examine the experiences and interaction of civilians with the military. The shortcoming 
of several theories of CMR is that they fail to consider the citizenry as an active partner whose actions 
affect civil-military relations. Had the study included military participants, attention may have been 
shifted from achieving this. Given the hostility towards the military, obtaining approval from the 
military to interview personnel would also have been difficult. Along with this, it is possible that due 
to the sensitive nature of my study, I could have become a target of the military. They could have 
placed restrictions on my movements or placed me under surveillance, which would have put my 
research participants at risk. This could have further undermined the objective of this study, 
jeopardised it, or lead to the abrupt end of the study. 
One axiomatic issue needs to be reflected upon. I had the misconception that chastity and sexual 
purity is higher in Muslim communities, in part because Muslims in the research area do not openly 
express intimacy, and do not allow non-relative males to visit their residences. With this presumption, 
I did not expect to hear about problems of sexual interaction between Muslim ladies and male military 
personnel. However, this appeared to be one of the major problems in the Muslims communities I 
visited. At first, this came as a shock to me when my first Muslim participant revealed this, but I was 
careful to not express my surprise as this could have jeopardised the interview. Later, I found out that 
the problem was endemic and that both married and unmarried ladies had relationships with male 
military personnel. As I conducted more interviews, I found out that there is a gendered experience 
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of the military in the different study areas which was clearly shaped by religion. Although I discuss this 
further in the next chapter, it is worth noting some of the reasons for this.  
Most females reported having little problems with the military, except for the several desperate 
attempts soldiers make to get their attention. With most of the male participants, however, the 
experience appears to be hugely different. Several male participants reported that the military is 
confrontational, predatory and indulges in excesses including threatening and torturing young men for 
refusing to let go of their relationships with ladies that male military personnel have desires on. Thus, 
while males reported heavy-handedness, intolerance, dehumanising treatment, and a tendency for the 
military to label them as criminals, females do not often have such experiences. On the contrary, a 
number reported experiencing sexual harassment, and a few instances of abuse and exploitation from 
the military. 
5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the research methods, tools used for data collection, the participants whom 
data was collected from, why they were sampled, and how they were recruited into the study. 
Reference was made to how ethical clearance was obtained and the considerations that were made. 
The chapter concludes with a reflection and details of the fieldwork as background to the findings that 
were made from the fieldwork, which are discussed and analysed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINDINGS 
 
Studies show that the military often uses disproportionate violence when it is used internally for law 
and order functions (Zaverucha, 2000; Ojo, 2006; Nwolise, 2007). In Nigeria, where the military is 
frequently used in constabulary roles, there is evidence that it abuses its power (Ojo-Ade, 2004: 293; 
Ojo, 2006). This study looked at the military operations in Plateau State and the effect these have on 
the security of the citizenry, and this chapter presents the findings. These are presented according to 
the themes that emerged from the data: (1) types of military abuse experienced in Plateau State; (2) 
military professionalism and conduct of soldiers; (3) civilians reacting to and retaliating against military 
abuses; and (4) the various interventions by the State to control the military. 
 
This section describes the experiences of civilians with the military in Plateau State, Nigeria. The 
findings support reports and other empirical studies that soldiers often violate the human rights of 
civilians and abuse their power (Odoemene, 2012; Amnesty International, 2015). In Plateau State, the 
findings show that four different forms of military violence and abuse occur in all the six local 
government areas: coercion, predatory acts of corruption and extortion, gender-based violence (GBV) 
against women, and psychological and emotional abuse. The aim of this section is to describe, explain, 
and provide a deeper understanding of the different types of military violence experienced by the 
citizenry in Plateau State Nigeria. 
 Intimidation and Coercion 
The findings show that it is the norm for soldiers to use coercion and violence against the citizenry, in 
periods of both hostilities and relative peace. The most common incidence of military abuse 
experienced by the citizenry is at checkpoints and in communities where soldiers are stationed. All 
participants interviewed reported that they have experienced one or more forms of intimidation and 
coercion by the military, or that they know of a close friend, family member or a relative who has 
suffered from military abuse. A typical example is corporal punishment of civilians who offend a soldier, 
are alleged to be involved in a criminal or violent act, or for simply sounding rude or impolite to a 
soldier. Such punishment varies in gravity, depending on the soldier administering it, but can involve 
bodily pain, injury, harm, or discomfort. Common forms of corporal punishment included beating, 
kicking, and hitting civilians with the soldier’s boot, or flogging using a whip or a military belt. I bore 
witness to several such incidences during my research. A female participant in Jos South LGA recalls: 
I was standing here one day when a Keke (tricycle) mistakenly hit the back of their 
(soldiers) Hilux Van, the way they beat that man was just so unimaginable. A lot of 
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people were passing and laying curses on them saying dem no go make am, God go punish 
dem.46 Yes, the man did wrong, and traffic offence is normal, it happens in every society, 
besides, it was even a busy road with heavy traffic. But, aside from being wrong, he is a 
citizen like you, but, because you are in uniform, you think people cannot do anything 
to you, so you beat him like you have all the authority to do all things. The man bled so 
much because they dealt with him mercilessly, so, for me sometimes I think they are 
heartless in their actions.47 
This incident indicates that soldiers are quick to administer ‘instant justice’ by punishing civilians when 
they commit an offence. They undermine the laws of the State and act as a law upon themselves by 
instantly beating their victims, rather than following the sanctioned and appropriate process of justice. 
The data from this study is replete with such incidences, which makes many see the military as cold, 
heartless, and deriving pleasure from inflicting pain and discomfort on civilians, as one male participant 
described: “the manner they beat people and punish people is more than the offence that was 
committed, even if it is a very little offence that doesn’t even require punishment, you still see them 
punishing and beating people anyhow they want to.”48 Another explained that “on my way from Barkin 
Ladi to Jos, I saw military personnel beating somebody by the roadside mercilessly… but that is how 
the soldiers behave. Most times you meet them, if you offend them just a little, they will bring out all 
their anger on you.”49 Active duty soldiers inflict disproportionate violence on civilians when they are 
seen to transgress or violate any rule or law, with the punishment being disproportionate to the 
perceived crime. 
Other forms of physical punishment involved forcing civilians to do frog jumps, to squat while holding 
their ears for a very long time, and other forms of humiliating punishments. Several participants 
revealed this type of punishment and how this is continued until the soldier felt satisfied. A female 
participant narrated the experience of her neighbour: 
During the recent crisis that happened in Bokkos LGA … my neighbour was just sitting 
by his door, because they said there was curfew and it was for 24 hours for two days. 
They said everybody should not go out, but he went outside his room and sat down 
outside the door. He was just sitting by his door when the military man came, … dragged 
him out and punished him severely by making him to frog-jump while he was hitting him 
with the boot. He was sick for quite some time even though the illness was quite severe, 
but after the punishment by the military, it worsened and that quickened his death. After 
the incidence, he was not able to do most things he used to do, he could not even walk 
again before he died.50 
                                               
46 Words in italic are in Nigerian Pidgin English translated as: the soldiers are cursed, they would never be successful, and 
God would punish them. 
47 Interview with a female participant in Jos South LGA on 9 November 2016. 
48 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 11 October 2016. 
49 Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 5 December 2016.  
50 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 6 September 2016. 
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The government often imposed curfews as a measure to help curb the outbreak or worsening of 
violence when it is tense, or after a community has been attacked. Since the outbreak of violence in 
Jos on 7 September 2001, several curfews have been imposed to restrict the movement of civilians 
for specified periods. Added to this, the Federal Government has declared states of emergency in 
Plateau State on numerous occasions, and in one instance even substituted the civilian elected 
government with a military administrator. During curfews, the movement of civilians is restricted and 
only soldiers and critical service personnel, such as those in the health and media profession, enjoy 
freedom of movement. Soldiers then abuse the enforcement of curfew hours by punishing and beating 
civilians, even when they do not violate the timing or restriction of movement. Soldiers use the 
imposition of curfews as an avenue to express their power in discretionary ways. Incidences of military 
violence are more frequent when curfews are in place, or even before they come into effect. A male 
participant in Jos North LGA voiced this concern: 
Most of the problems we had was with the curfew period. The soldiers were just so 
power-drunk, and they never wait for the time before they start punishing the people. 
In our community, it was by 4 o’clock for example, but, while it was still quarter to four 
and you are rushing to get home, the moment you approach their checkpoint, they 
would detain and accuse you for being late when it is not time yet. And even if you show 
them the time, they would not look at it, they would tell you their own watch says it is 
time and they would beat the hell out of you no matter what you do. They would say 
that according to their watch, it is 4 o’clock already. I have seen this happened to some 
right in front of my house and I heard everything that happened from inside.51 
While soldiers tend to be more abusive during curfew periods, there are several other reasons that 
explain this conduct. It is possible that the soldiers are stricter in compelling civilians to obey security 
measures because the security situation is more fragile during such periods, due to heightened 
insecurity and increasing tension. However, in rural communities and various parts of the city and 
surrounding townships, it may be necessary for civilians to step outside of their homes even during 
curfew hours, as kitchens and bathrooms/toilets are often detached from the living/bedrooms. This is 
then construed as violating the movement restriction. The narrative below by a participant presents 
one such account: 
There was a time I came back home from school and there was curfew in town and 
because of that, the soldiers go out to patrol every street at random. It happened that 
our house was not fenced, some rooms are facing the road and it was an open 
compound. Some bathroom and toilets are detached from the main house and whenever 
we want to use it, we have to go out before going to the bathroom or toilet. One of my 
cousins went out to urinate outside at a culvert, which was closer than the toilet, but 
while he was doing that, he saw some soldiers, but the soldiers also saw him, and they 
decided to chase after him into the house. They came into the compound and stirred 
trouble because they wanted us and our parents to produce him, so, they were yelling, 
where is he? Where is he? They were not willing to listen to our pleas and apologies. 
                                               
51 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016. 
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Nobody knew who they were asking for because we were all in the room and didn’t 
know who they were talking about because when he ran into the compound, he went 
straight to the backyard toilet and hid there. We only knew it was him they were looking 
for after they had left because that was when he came out of the toilet. When they 
came, we argued with them and told them nobody entered our house, but they insisted 
they saw someone coming in. So, they asked all the women and our wives to move to 
one side and asked we the men and our male parents to lie down on the ground, that 
they were going to flog us since we refused to point at the person they were looking 
for. Because they were serious about it, I laid straight on the ground before any other 
person because I was very scared. Luckily for us, one of their senior officers’ who was 
coming from where he went to relax heard the noise and all the shouting and yelling, so 
he came and asked them to leave us before they did.52 
Although this individual was only a few meters from his living room, it was difficult for the soldiers to 
not consider him as violating the movement restriction because he was outside his room. One would 
have imagined that the soldiers would consider his actions harmless and constituting no threat, but, 
this was not the case. Thus, either the terms restricting movement are not well-defined to exclude 
civilians within their compound, even when it has no fence or gate, or the soldiers acted irrationally 
and in an abusive manner. What is certain from the quote is that the soldiers overreacted by stirring 
panic and threatening to punish all the occupants of the house. Thus, as in many other instances, their 
actions were not only unprofessional and coercive but constituted an abuse of their legitimate power. 
They also constituted an immediate threat to innocent law-abiding citizens when they threatened to 
punish everyone for an offence, they knew nothing about.  
Another way that soldiers abuse their power is by delaying civilians at checkpoints as a form of 
punishment for an offence they commit when they travel by road. The military Special Task Force 
(STF) command, codenamed ‘Operation Safe Haven’ (OSH)53 in Plateau State, has written and placed 
notices about some of the proscribed activities at checkpoints. These include warnings not to give 
money to soldiers and not to receive/make phone calls while at the checkpoint. Other common though 
unwritten offences include playing loud music, failing to reduce or turn off one’s car radio while at the 
checkpoint, driving through the barricade before one was asked to, driving at a speed personnel 
consider too high, and throwing dirt/food waste at the checkpoints constitute offences. These offences 
often result in soldiers punishing or delaying motorists for prolonged periods before allowing them to 
continue their journey. 
In some instances, the drivers were not told what offence they committed. While asking a driver to 
pull over for a routine check/search constitutes part of the legitimate task of soldiers at checkpoints, 
                                               
52 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 24 November 2016. 
53 The STF is a joint task force comprising the Nigerian military, the police, and other civil security agencies. The STF was 
established in 2010 by the Federal Government in a bid to strategize and restructure the military operation that has been 
ongoing in the state since the outbreak of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001. The STF is further discussed later in the 
chapter. 
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participants mentioned that soldiers used this to threaten or victimise road users. At some 
checkpoints, the soldiers required motorcycle users to turn off the engine, get down and push the 
motorcycle pass the checkpoint. However, as a participant explains, “if you do not know that order 
and you ride down there, they will keep you there for five hours or more, it happened to my 
brother.”54 When soldiers are having a bad day, it is common for them to delay or subject road users 
to punishment for small infractions. Consider the following accounts and experiences of some 
participants: 
Because of a very minor mistake; a soldier would make everyone in a vehicle to alight 
(drop) and he would punish all of them. There was a time I was travelling in a car, when 
we approached their checkpoint, the brakes of the car began to fail, and the driver was 
not able to stop immediately, and the soldiers were trying to stop us. When the car 
finally came to a halt, they ordered everyone in the car to alight and they gave us severe 
punishment. We were lucky they did not beat us, but they made us fill the empty sacks 
they use for barricades with sand, then we also sewed it and when we finished, they let 
us continue our journey.55 
If they ask a driver to stop, but the driver fails to stop immediately, the journey might 
just end there. They may choose to hold back the car and of course that could come 
with punishments for both the driver and sometimes, even the passengers if we are not 
lucky.56  
We were going to church on bike when we passed them, but they stopped us that we 
did not greet them. They asked us to come down and to pack some stones, they also 
made us to do frog jump and serve other punishments.57 
They make all the passengers frog jump or do some manual labour for them. I have seen 
people forced to ‘weed’ grasses at the checkpoint, some asked to fill all their sacks that 
they use as barricade with sand, and others were even made to sweep the area and pack 
all the dirt with their bare hands just because one passenger threw groundnut peel or 
sugar cane peel there.58 
Delaying road users could come with one or more forms of corporal punishment. Civilians dare not 
question or argue with soldiers, as this is seen as challenging or questioning their authority. A male 
participant remarked that “they do victimise some people especially those who try to speak up and 
stand for their rights. They always use their office or position to suppress anyone who does this.”59  It 
appears as if soldiers focus more on punishing civilians at checkpoints than doing their job, which 
entails searching of and monitoring vehicular movements. 
Another common tactic is to degrade and humiliate civilians by forcing them to sit, lie, or swim in a 
gutter, drain, or muddy water. A male participant witnessed how some civilians suffered this and he 
                                               
54 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016. 
55 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 26 October 2016. 
56 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 5 September 2016. 
57 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA (also called Gwol) on 31 August 2016. 
58 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 14 September 2016. 
59 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 31 August 2016. 
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explained that “they (soldiers) asked them to lie inside the gutter first, but the guys refused to do that, 
so they started beating them and after beating them, they still asked them to lie down inside the 
gutter.”60 Another participant, who was a victim, described the following: 
They (soldiers) made me sit inside a gutter. After that incident, I met with one of them 
at a football viewing centre, he waved at me and I told him I cannot exchange pleasantries 
with him because he does not know the value and dignity of humans.61 
Soldiers delight in coercing civilians and this strains their relationship with the citizenry. Several videos 
of such abuses recorded by civilians are available on YouTube and the internet62 and these videos 
confirm that soldiers abuse their power, while civilians watch without being able to hold them to 
account for these infringements, as doing so could result in further problems with the soldiers. 
 Corruption and Extortion  
Corruption and extortion is another category of military abuse that civilians experience, mostly at 
checkpoints as they commute on roads and in their communities as they interact with soldiers. This 
occurs in two separate ways. One is by extorting money from mostly commercial taxi drivers and 
drivers of vans, trucks, lorries, petroleum tankers, motorcycles and commercial tricycles at military 
checkpoints. Soldiers extort money from drivers to not check the goods/items the driver has in the 
vehicle. Failure to comply and offer money to soldiers often results in drivers having to offload the 
contents of their vehicle, having the content searched, or being purposefully delayed. One participant 
mentioned that “some people refuse to give them. But when they do not, they keep you there for 
long and delay you.”63 Clearly, this is illegal, and participants see it not only as a violation of their rights, 
but as a criminal action. A commercial driver described this extortion as “a daylight robbery. I feel bad 
because I know that they are not supposed to do this but… I am powerless and cannot do anything 
about it.”64 Soldiers are aware that certain categories of goods/products are very expensive, heavy and 
fragile, which means that drivers would rather pay than risk these goods being broken by the heavy-
handedness of soldiers. A participant who does tiling of buildings narrates: 
If they see you with loaded goods, they would always tell you to give them something, 
so if you give them something little, they will ask you to go and park your vehicle there. 
They would say you have a lot of very expensive goods, so, why give them change? Even 
yesterday, when I gave them one hundred naira at the checkpoint at Federal Lowcost 
                                               
60 Interview with a male participant in Bokkos on 5 September 2016. 
61 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 30 November 2016. 
62 See Appendix A for a list of some selected incidents. A typical instance involved a female Cadet and other male officers 
beating a male civilian for complementing her as beautiful. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEFgfDOwbqE 
63 Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 14 December 2016 
64 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 27 October 2016. 
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Junction, they looked down on it, and complained that it was not enough, then, I added 
eighty naira to it and that was when he nodded and said good, carry your load dey go.65 
In the interviews, I asked participants what came to mind when they hear the word ‘military 
checkpoint’, and it surprised me that only a few mentioned ‘soldiers checking commuters.’ The first 
thing they mentioned was that this was a place where money is extorted. Some even mentioned the 
most popular checkpoints where such extortion happens frequently: 
When you get to a checkpoint, all you will see is soldiers collecting twenty to fifty naira 
and I can give you examples. Before Barkin Ladi, the checkpoint around Barkin Ladi 
Junction, they do it openly. If you go to Dorowa, they are doing it. When you go to 
Panyam, the checkpoint around there do it. These are roads I always pass like seven 
times in a month.66 
As with the intimidation and coercion of civilians, I witnessed and experienced this extortion when I 
boarded commercial vehicles as a passenger. What I noticed is that this extortion targets commercial 
taxi drivers, motorcyclists, tricyclists, and drivers of heavy-duty trucks and petroleum tankers. Those 
who are not targeted include elites, many whom drive ‘expensive’ and ‘flashy’ vehicles, as the soldiers 
do not know if this is an influential person or not. Notwithstanding, some drivers of such ‘expensive’ 
and ‘flashy’ vehicles give money to personnel at checkpoints out of freewill, or to prevent being delayed 
or searched. Failure to carry out security checks, which is one of the main tasks of soldiers, has the 
potential to perpetuate insecurity and undermine peace. A participant explained one such key effect 
thus: 
They don’t do what they are supposed to do. The only thing they are after is to collect 
money to put in their pockets for their selfish use. So, they are not even doing the 
checking they are supposed to. If you pass the checkpoint with arms and ammunitions, 
you can pass through to the destination you are taking it to unnoticed. Once you can 
just put your hands in your pocket and give them money, you are good to go, just like 
that… Sometimes they just bring some allegations, or they would delay you indirectly. 
They may not like to say give me something, but they always look for some flimsy 
excuses to frustrate you so that you will be frustrated to put your hands in your 
pocket.67 
What this means is that weapons and ammunition can flow freely through these checkpoints if the 
bribe is high enough. A second way soldiers extort civilians is by forcefully collecting edible food 
products at checkpoints. It is important to point out that although numerous studies indicate that in 
conflict situations, it is common for extortion and seizing of food items to occur in local communities, 
this is not reported in Plateau State. On the contrary, in both Christian and Muslim communities, 
                                               
65 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 27 October 2016. The statement ‘carry your load dey go’ translates 
as ‘take your properties with you and leave’. 
66 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 22 August 2016. 
67 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 23 August 2016. 
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some community members freely and voluntarily give food to the soldiers. However, when this food 
is forcibly taken through extortion, it is seen as problematic, as one interviewee explained bitterly: 
In 2014, I was delivering water, and every time we get to their checkpoints, they forced 
me that it is their right to receive water sachets from me without paying me. This was 
not right, and I know it is a thing of choice for me to give it, not them collecting it from 
me forcefully, it was like robbery in the daylight.68 
Civilians are bitter about this behaviour, labelling soldiers ‘daylight robbers,’ but this has become 
‘normal’ predatory conduct by the soldiers of the Nigerian military. Even though signposts at military 
checkpoints, written in both English and Hausa languages, state that money should not be given to 
soldiers, extortion by soldiers in Plateau State is an everyday practice. This brings about two immediate 
consequences. One is that soldiers do not perform their assigned official tasks diligently and effectively, 
and the other is that it encourages crime and other illegal acts by unscrupulous individuals and armed 
groups who benefit from the recurring violence. Ideally, soldiers should check every vehicle and its 
content on the grounds of intuitive suspicion. For road users, particularly commercial drivers on a 
long-distance journey, this could mean a long delay and being unable to arrive at their destination in 
time. Therefore, an uncomplicated way around this is to offer money and to proceed unchecked, 
which means that weapons and illicit substances can flow freely through checkpoints. There is suspicion 
that some soldiers receive bribes to help armed groups traffic weapons that are then used to attack 
some communities, and that the soldiers may even be directly involved. Suspicion of this was raised 
after a military identity card was found at the scene of an attack where military personnel were not 
present at the time. 
Soldiers’ failure to do their work effectively facilitates and encourages the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons into the State and, to an extent, across the country. The discovery and interception 
by the Nigerian Custom Service of large caches of illegal arms shipped into the country supports this 
claim. Arms proliferation has a ripple effect of worsening insecurity as belligerents can easily obtain 
access to such arms and weapons. However, even when civilians know about such activities, they fear 
reporting or cooperating with the military, given the strained relations and lack of trust that has 
evolved. Besides the physical abuse and extortion, for many civilians it is the fear that they may suffer 
psychological and emotional abuse from the military. 
 Psychological and Emotional Harm 
Psychological and emotional abuse is usually a subtler and less visible form of abuse but can have 
significant psychological effects on the victim. One way it occurs is by calling civilians names using 
                                               
68 Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 8 November 2016. 
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derogatory words meant to humiliate them. Examples include calling a civilian a ‘fool,’ ‘bastard,’ ‘goat,’ 
‘monkey’ and ‘bloody civilian.’ A participant recalls: 
We were installing the product for the military officer when he came out and imagine 
what they ordered us to do, they said, ‘all civilians should face the wall’ so that we do 
not see who was coming out. This is someone who bought this product from me, I am 
now in his residence installing it and you order me to stand up, face the wall and raise 
my hand up like a common criminal?69  
Acts such as these reinforce military superiority, as through name-calling, military work and the 
profession is glorified. By ‘othering’ civilians, the military can enforce their domination and civilian 
subordination. What gives them the power is that they can inflict punishment by othering civilians 
without fear or consequence as they enjoy a level of ‘unquestioned’ impunity and are able to hold 
civilians in a state of fear. One common example is to threaten civilians’ lives. The findings show that 
it is common for some personnel to utter threats to ‘waste’ (kill) anyone who disobeys or challenges 
their authority. A male participant explained that “one of them threatened me that if I talk, they would 
‘shoot me and waste me’.”70 In another incident, a male participant reported: 
It was the first time I was passing through that checkpoint, so, I did not know they also 
have the order for motorcyclist to use the bush path. So, unknowingly, I rode to the 
barriers and that was it. The soldier started screaming at me, who ‘the hell’ are you, and 
of course, I knew he was simply looking for another excuse to be provoked.71 
Asking the motorcyclist who he is shows the soldier’s desire to know if he is personnel, as personnel 
wearing mufti freely ride through the checkpoints, while civilians who do so get punished. This shows 
the soldier’s desire to reinforce the privilege and power the military has over civilians. It also points 
to the othering and depersonalising of civilians by soldiers, an action that projects military superiority 
and authority, and this extends to the conduct of soldiers in other spheres. One sees how the military 
blatantly violates traffic rules and regulations but punishes civilians for the same offences. While traffic 
violations could be justifiable, especially when soldiers need to respond to calls for distress, the 
frequency of the practice shows that they abuse their power when in a military vehicle. Added to this, 
soldiers appear to have taken disregarding traffic regulations a step further. The findings revealed that 
soldiers have replaced traffic laws with ‘sets of unwritten rules’ which not only permit them to disobey 
all traffic rules and regulations but prohibit civilians from overtaking a military convoy. A male 
participant voiced this concern: 
They have made it a law in their head that, if they are driving as a convoy of two or 
more cars, all other road users cannot overtake and pass them, and when they are on a 
convoy, they drive very slowly. It is very frustrating and annoying. There was a day I was 
                                               
69 Interview with a male participant on 24 October 2016. ‘Product’ is italicised because it is used as a generic word to keep 
with the assurance of anonymous presentation of data that could mark or reveal the identity of participants. 
70 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 30 November 2016. 
71 Interview with a female participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016. 
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coming back to Jos when I met such a convoy, some drivers tried to overtake them, and 
they blocked the road and warned them. The journey that should have taken me 2 hours 
ended up taking about 5 hours that day. In fact, at another point, one man tried 
overtaking and they stopped him and dealt with him.72 
Such acts of intimidation and oppression strain CMR and evoke anger and resentment towards the 
military. Instead of being seen as the protectors of society, the military is seen as a source of 
humiliation, pain, and maltreatment that traumatises the citizenry. This is even more so for women 
who suffer persistent and recurring GBV. 
 Gender-Based Violence 
GBV by soldiers in Plateau State is a widespread problem faced by women as the military is on ISOPs 
in many communities in Plateau State. This often takes the form of sexual abuse and sexual harassment 
and occurs mainly at military checkpoints and outposts in towns and residential areas. This adds to 
the strain that families and communities face when the military is present. A female participant 
explained that “every time I am leaving the house or returning, I am always worried about their 
disturbance ... I have to get out from the Taxi or Keke73 in the next junction and then walk a longer 
distance back home just to avoid passing through where they are.”74 Another participant in a different 
part of the State expressed a similar concern that this is a typical problem facing “females especially 
the young girls and sometimes even married women. Soldiers behave wildly as if they cannot live 
without the ladies and they are always harassing them when they begin to have sexual urges.”75 
Civilians seem to shy away from discussing sexual violations publicly due to the shame and stigma it 
brings, although some were more prepared to explain how sexual abuse of female civilians by soldiers 
occurs. This has been a topic of extensive debate among those that study sexual entitlement by soldiers 
(Enloe, 2004; Kelly, 2010; Odoemene, 2012). One of the issues is that many of the ladies have been 
impregnated by soldiers, which raises further difficulties, such as how to establish whether the 
pregnancy was the result of consensual intercourse or abuse, and to what extent soldiers take 
responsibility for their actions. In several instances, soldiers become ‘invisible’ when they are 
redeployed to other areas. Others shirk their responsibility and change their contact number so that 
the woman concerned cannot reach them.76 The laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria prohibit 
abortion, meaning that unless the lady miscarries or illegally aborts, chances are high that she will give 
                                               
72 Interview with a male participant in Bokkos on 20 September 2016. 
73 Keke is the Hausa word for ‘tricycle’ in the study area. 
74 Interview with a female participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 24 August 2016. 
75 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 22 November 2016. 
76 This is more so when the soldier is relieved from such internal operations or moved to another area or for a different 
mission. Some of the reasons for this rotation are later in this chapter. 
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birth to the baby.77 This is worse when soldiers use coercion, threats and intimidation to prevent the 
pregnant woman from taking actions, such as reporting this to the military authority. One female 
participant mentioned that “most of them often leave you with the pregnancy or with a baby. They 
disappear into thin air when this happens. Two of my friends in Jos have had such an encounter.”78 
This is not an isolated case, as several other interviewees reported similar incidences. A male 
participant in Jos South LGA narrates: 
I know that in places like Barkin Ladi, there have been two instances of sexual abuse, 
involving military personnel. I also know that in one community in Riyom, about two 
years ago, a young man was gunned down by a soldier because he shared the same 
girlfriend with a soldier. I also know of a young girl in Zawan who took in for a soldier 
under forceful circumstances. I don’t know the situation of things right now, but as at 
the last time I spoke with her … she could actually reach him but, all she could ever get 
from him is threats. He keeps threatening that if she ever talks to him about any 
pregnancy or any child he was going to deal with her.79 
Such incidences show that women not only face sexual harassment and intimidation from soldiers, 
they are also the victims of soldiers’ threats of violence when they stand up to them. This causes the 
citizenry a great deal of discomfort when the military is present, not only because they evoke fear, but 
because they lack the basic social skills to interact with the civilian population due to the authoritarian 
way they behave. A female participant shared her experience:  
I was so uncomfortable and shaking. Imagine someone holding a gun and asking you for 
a date. That was exactly how I felt. He did not even have the courtesy of leaving his gun 
behind. Even when I told him I am a married, he said it does not matter, that he is also 
married.80 
Sexual harassment is an abusive and criminal act that tarnishes the professional image of the military. 
In both conflict and peace times, it constitutes criminal actions liable to prosecution in a court of law. 
Sexual harassment undermines the professionalism and legitimacy of the military and is a violation of 
the fundamental human rights of the citizenry, and such acts can have lasting or lifelong effects on the 
victim, especially where the victim does not receive professional help or support. Added to this, it can 
also create numerous health, psychological, and social consequences. In Plateau State, sexual 
harassment typically includes using coercion to obtain the contact numbers of females, requesting 
sexual favours, and unsolicited sexual advances on both married and unmarried women. A female 
participant commented: 
                                               
77 This is explicitly stated in both the Criminal Code and Penal Code used in Southern and Northern Nigeria respectively. 
Punishment for abortion runs from seven to fourteen years for the offender and anyone who helps or contribute to it in 
any way. See Odunsi (2015) for a detailed discussion of abortion and the applicable law in Nigeria. 
78 Interview with a female participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 24 August 2016. 
79 Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 15 November 2016. 
80 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 17 September 2016. 
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One soldier just stopped me on the road, asked me for my name and I told him, then 
he asked me if I live around here, close to the checkpoint, I told him no. That was how 
he started insisting that I must give him my phone number or make him a Facebook 
friend. I refused and to be honest, he held me captive there and insisted that he would 
not let me go or he would follow me to wherever I am going because I told him I was 
visiting my friend and I do not reside in the street. Luckily for me, their boss, maybe the 
commandant or something like that came and he had to run back to his duty post, and 
that was just how I managed to escape. Since that day, I told myself I would not even 
turn to look at any soldier, even if they call me, I would not answer, at least I know they 
would not shoot me just like that.81 
Sexual abuse by soldiers in Plateau State is rife. Several participants, both males and females, indicated 
that this as a common occurrence. A female participant in Jos North LGA mentioned that “they use 
threat to intimidate ladies into giving them their contact number or accepting them.”82 A female 
participant who had such an encounter narrated: 
There was a day I was going to see a friend at Anguldi, and when I got out from the car 
and was walking towards the house, I came across one checkpoint. This funny looking 
soldier stopped me and was asking for my phone number, but I refused to give it to him. 
Can you believe he grabbed my phone from me to call his number from my phone? ... 
He took it forcefully because I was holding it in my hand, but, it was locked with a 
password. He asked me for the password, but I refused to tell him, so, he said he is 
seizing the phone until I give him the number or open the phone. When I realised how 
desperate and serious he was, I left the phone with him that evening and I went away.83 
Another participant described a recent experience of some young females with a soldier in Jos North 
LGA: 
Just yesterday, a friend of mine told me she was going to Terminus. There is also a 
checkpoint there, so when they were driving, even though the Keke man was at fault, 
though they said it was just few minutes to the time, because there is a time restriction 
for Keke to drive in, and maybe the man was not aware it was not yet time to drive in. 
So, when he got in, one soldier stopped them, and threatened to seize his Keke if he did 
not settle him, so, she and her friends now pleaded with the soldier, but, even at that, 
he still punished the Keke driver and collected the phone number of the ladies as a 
condition to free the man from the punishment. Why did he collect their numbers? 
Their number was like a sacrificial lamb, because even after they collected money from 
the Keke driver, he still gave him punishment. So, since the soldiers are promiscuous as 
they always are, and they asked for their number as the way out, they must have felt 
that it was a worthwhile sacrifice. Bedsides, giving you my number does not mean I am 
going to stand a chance with you, I would only answer your call if I feel like.84 
Once soldiers obtain the phone numbers of women, they harass them. This opinion was also expressed 
by another female participant when she stated that “the truth is the soldiers disturb us ladies so much. 
                                               
81 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 17 September 2016. 
82 Interview with a female participant in Jos North LGA on 11 October 2016. 
83 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 5 September 2016. 
84 Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 20 September 2016. 
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It is either they are forcing us to give them our number or to sleep with them.”85 In turn, this explains 
why women who do not cooperate and give out their contact number then receive obscene remarks 
from soldiers. Soldiers call them names to denigrate and disparage them because they are 
uncooperative or unwilling to accept the soldiers’ unsolicited sexual advances. As a female participant 
puts it, such name-calling occurs frequently. She explains that, “you will hear them calling us ‘hey bitch 
or ‘hey’ or even say ‘babe come here.’ If you did not come, they will try to force you to come and 
could even embarrass you.”86 Often, name-calling is aimed at shaming and ridiculing the victim, and 
this could cause the victim psychological and emotional trauma when it is persistent, and the victim 
does not receive professional support. As the victims do not often report the abuses, soldiers who 
do this tend to escape any form of punitive actions from the State/military authority. 
In all the six local government areas where I interviewed individuals for this study, GBV was reported 
as a cause of concern, and was identified as a recurring problem in most communities. However, one 
salient observation from the data is that while women experienced several forms of GBV, they also 
experienced less intimidation and coercive violence than men. What was interesting is that although 
more females reported this than males, fewer Christian males raised this as a major concern. In 
comparison, Muslim males reported this as a major problem in their community and this became an 
important finding for this study given that opinions differed by religion and gender of participants. 
Several factors can explain this difference of opinion on GBV. One is that Christians are more liberal 
and are more influenced by Western lifestyles, even though the faith considers sexual promiscuity as 
sinful and prohibited. Another is that GBV is seen as less severe when compared to the frequent 
violent attacks which often result in death and the destruction of their properties and means of 
livelihood. Christian communities continuously encounter cycles of violent attacks and consider the 
military complicit in them. In contrast, Muslims consider GBV as a major cause of concern. As with 
the incidence of recurring attacks and community invasion, few or no such incidences have occurred 
in a Muslim community in the past five years. Also, Muslims in this State and across the Northern 
States of Nigeria are conservative to the point that many ‘protect’ their women by not allowing male 
visitors into their houses. For example, an average Muslim in Jos has the inscription, ‘Ba Shiga/No Enter’ 
written on the doorpost of his house, indicating that visitors are not welcome or allowed into the 
house/premises. Therefore, many Muslims find GBV more troubling than Christians, especially because 
they consider any sexual affair outside marriage as ‘spoiling’ and ‘corrupting’ women, particularly young 
unmarried ladies. As they do not have to deal with incidences of targeted attacks in their communities, 
                                               
85 Interview with a female participant in Riyom LGA on 9 December 2016. 
86 Interview with a female participant in Jos South LGA on 8 November 2016. 
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it is understandable that GBV becomes the more pressing issue to them. Notwithstanding, this 
problem highlights the need to examine the conduct of soldiers. 
 
A professional military is one that does not prey on society, become involved in politics, or seize 
political power. Based on the preceding discussion, one cannot say that the conduct of the Nigerian 
military projects a professional image. This section explains other forms of misconduct which affect 
the professional stature of the military. 
 Substance Abuse 
Substance abuse by active duty personnel during working hours occurs often and it affects soldiers’ 
conduct. The abuse of illicit substances, such as marijuana, Indian hemp and drugs, by military personnel 
deployed for internal security enforcement duties is common. Participants reported encountering 
personnel in uniforms patronising dealers or abusing such substances, while others also mention that 
they know those who supply the substances to the soldiers. A participant in Jos North LGA explained 
in detail how this occurs: 
Here in Adebayo, there is a place where the dealing has been going on for more than 
20 years now, even before the Jos crisis began, the place is called Long Street. If you go 
there, you will see soldiers going there in their Hilux Vans and some on motorcycles to 
buy these illicit substances, everyone knows what is sold there, it is not something 
hidden. They joke, play, and relate very well with those selling these stuffs. If you are 
passing through that place and you happen to look at them twice, they may disgrace and 
mistreat you if they notice you are looking at them.87 
While some directly approach the dealers, others use youths to obtain their regular supply. Soldiers 
often have a good relationship with those who are involved in substance abuse, and several participants 
remarked that soldiers tend to interact mostly with ‘deviant’ persons who deal in, or abuse drugs. 
One participant said that “they only tend to relate well with people who smoke ‘weed’ and abuse 
drugs because these people help them get the supply or accompany them there.”88 Some participants 
stated that law-abiding civilians find it difficult to interact with the military because several soldiers, 
especially those who abuse drugs, only tend to interact with and relate to deviants. Consider this 
remark from a middle-aged employer interviewed in Jos North LGA: 
If you are an honest and an upright person, you are unlikely to have any dealing with 
them, this is because in most instances, their friends are either drunkards, or those who 
abuse drugs and ‘weed.’89 
                                               
87 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016. 
88 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 30 November 2016. 
89 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016. 
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Given the close connection with the soldiers, criminals and dealers enjoy military protection from 
their competitors and threats from other law enforcement agencies. This indicates that a mutual 
relationship exists, one involving trade facilitation and protection from threats, and an uninterrupted 
supply of the substances to both soldiers and civilian buyers. However, several problems do arise 
when soldiers abuse substances when on duty or before they commence work at checkpoints. A 
participant expressed the opinion that, “when they take these stuffs, it makes them to be non-
sympathetic on civilians, but if they are in their right senses, some of them behave calmly.”90 
When active duty personnel abuse drugs and other illicit substances, this may alter their reasoning, 
behaviour and conduct, as some of these substances are stimulants which distort reality. Such addiction 
could also contribute to the economic predatory actions by personnel to raise money to finance this. 
Furthermore, the abuse of drugs and other illicit substances contribute to military excesses, such as 
extrajudicial killings, community raids, and acts of ethnic cleansing. In Kadarko community, where 
soldiers massacred about 400 unarmed civilians,91 there is speculation that soldiers who committed 
this atrocity were under the influence of drugs. Another effect of soldiers being under the influence 
of drugs is that it affects their performance and effectiveness. One typical example of how this plays 
out in Plateau State is described in the following section. 
 Dereliction of Duty 
As explained above, in Plateau State the Nigerian military oversees the collaborative security 
enforcement effort involving personnel from the armed forces, the police, and other civil security 
agencies. This makes the military directly responsible for security enforcement across the 17 local 
government areas of the State. To do this effectively, the military established several operational sector 
commands and bases in various parts of the State. This arrangement makes it easy for the military to 
respond swiftly by sending troops to areas where there is an outbreak of violence, or a call for distress. 
The military has published several emergency numbers of the military operational sector commands 
for civilians to call whenever violence erupts, or when there is an emergency. However, several 
civilians interviewed in this study indicated that, despite circulating these numbers, the dereliction of 
duty by soldiers is a frequent problem in their communities. The military response to distress calls is 
often late, with soldiers arriving long after the assailants have fled the scene. Consider the quotation 
below from an interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA: 
I have worked in areas facing serious insecurity and threats and that was when I 
understood how soldiers behave. Let me give you instances, in one of those areas, there 
were several times when farms were invaded, in some instance, plants were destroyed 
in the farmland, in others, crops that are nearing harvest were destroyed or completely 
                                               
90 Interview with a female participant in Jos South LGA on 8 November 2016. 
91 Data reported in the 6th May 2015 press communique of the Ngwang Ishi Otarok community association of Wase LGA of 
Plateau state, one of the communities which fell victim to the attack. 
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damaged, fertilizers were stolen, and farmlands were also encroached. The victims then 
sort reprieve from soldiers, but, the soldiers keep failing to do anything to stop the 
incidence from reoccurring and they also are not able to apprehend any suspect. Even 
when the community members provide leads, they refuse to act on it. Not only this, I 
have other reasons for saying most of them are corrupt. We have had several instances 
were reports were sent to them about ongoing attacks, but they did nothing about it. 
Most times, they would not come over until when the damage has been done and the 
attackers have long gone.92 
This quote highlights several issues, such as the military failing to deliver on the mandate of protecting 
the people or responding to calls for distress promptly, which would have helped to control the 
situation. This supports the concern of the former Governor of Plateau State, Da Jonah David Jang, 
that the military is often slow in responding or generally unresponsive, even when he alerts them 
about an ongoing attack (see for example Haruna, Bekuma & Elias, 2017: 34). In turn, he established 
‘Operation Rainbow,’ a State security outfit comprising of retired military and police personnel and 
civilians to help forestall the increasing level of attacks. This became necessary because both the 
Nigerian military and the police force are federal agencies, and do not receive instructions from or 
report to the State Governor. They receive commands from the office of the President through their 
respective heads, thereby leaving all the 36 State Governors of the country with little control of the 
security of their State. Thus, decisions on the use of the military, when and how to respond, and with 
what amount of force occur outside the State and are enforced by the officer commanding, operating 
in the State.93 
From the findings, it is clear that the military lacks legitimacy and that citizens cannot rely on the 
military for their protection. This leaves them vulnerable to attack and has meant that some civilians 
resort to joining or supporting vigilante groups or other armed groups for their protection. There is 
also evidence that the military collaborates with armed groups in some communities. Consider the 
following remarks by some participants: 
There was a time when people protested because a military ID card was found in the 
clothes of one of the attackers that was killed. And the military were not there when 
the attack happened, so, how do people know if the man is a genuine soldier or not. 
People say the military can be bribed to kill for the enemy, and this I can say is true 
because even with the way the soldiers now collect money and extort money from 
drivers on the road is too much.94  
We in the villages that have witnessed the violence, we know for sure that it is always 
the Fulani and the Hausa that are attacking us. If you check how the crisis started, you 
would know that they have always been the ones starting all the attacks. Sometimes, the 
soldiers are assisting them and that is even what led to the recent protest in Bokkos.95 
                                               
92 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016. 
93 The position of the commander of the STF is an appointable position. This is further discussed later in this chapter. 
94 Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 11 November 2016. 
95 Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 15 December 2016. 
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Some participants contended that soldiers are paid to collaborate with armed groups. Many civilians 
believe that the military is complicit in some attacks, which may explain why they fail to arrest 
perpetrators. Recently, concerns intensified over this with some accusing the military of aiding an 
attack that led to the massacre of about 27 people on 16th October 2017 in Nkiedonwhro community 
of Bassa LGA (Olokor, 2017; Usman, 2017). Many felt that the military did not act in an impartial 
manner. Consider the opinion of a male participant who narrated an experience they encountered in 
Jos North in one of the armed violent clashes that ensued: 
A tanker, this military armour tank, the person driving the armour tank was a Christian. 
He is in the military but a Christian while the person holding the gun was a Muslim. At 
the junction, the opposite side was a Muslim dominated area and this side is a Christian 
dominated area. The driver kept driving up and down because he doesn’t want anyone 
to come close because the military had come between both sides. So, when the driver 
goes down to where the Muslims were, if the one with the gun wants to shoot, he raises 
the gun up so that the bullets would go up. But we noticed that when he faces the 
Christian side, he takes down the bullet and fires directly at us. So, taking it down, he 
was hoping to hit us with the bullets which he did. At that point, about four of our 
people were killed. But, it was like the driver saw what was happening, then he now 
turned. Those people were now shouting “Ba isa ba, Ba isa ba. Karya ne!”96 When the 
driver turned towards them, he drove to them and crushed some of them because he 
saw that the one operating the gun was bias. I later heard that both where relocated. 
This account shows that military personnel are inclined to save those of their respective religious 
group and are sympathetic to those who share their faith. It further indicates that personnel could be 
partial in the handling of the security situation in the State, which raises concerns on the legitimacy 
and impartiality of the military. 
 Legitimacy and Impartiality of the Military 
Plateau State is a diverse multi-ethnic society with sharp divisions along religious lines. Findings from 
this study show that many civilians feel that the military does not act in an impartial manner. Most 
participants who were Christians expressed concern that the military favours Muslims in its handling 
of the security situation in the State. They contended that when a Christian-dominated community 
comes under attack, the military response is often late and inadequate. Some Christian participants 
felt that the military is advancing an expansionist agenda of Hausa/Fulani Muslim ‘settlers’ who want to 
take over political and economic control of Plateau State. Concerns included the military leading Fulani 
assailants to raid local communities, and the discovery of a military identity card at the scene of an 
attack. A case in point is the disclosure by a native Christian interviewed on an attack in a community: 
There was this day when they came to attack one neighbouring village, Chaha after Kuru, 
when you are going to Vom-Vet. But somehow, we learnt they would be coming over, 
so we went to the farms to hide and await their coming. To our surprise, we saw the 
Fulani men in the bush having a long discussion with some soldiers for about thirty 
                                               
96 In Hausa, implying the opponents cannot do anything to them because the military is now in between them. 
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minutes. After that, they (Fulani) now moved to that village to attack it, but we called 
the people and told them to prepare that the Fulani were coming, that was how they 
were able to defend themselves and the Fulani were not successful that day. My problem 
is the military men, they are supposed to oversee our security and our protection, but, 
from what we are seeing, we have every reason to believe that they are conniving with 
the Fulani to kill our people.97 
In the attack described in this quote, the military only arrived at the scene when the attack was over, 
and the assailants had fled. Thus, Christians felt that soldiers are complicit in aiding assailants attacking 
their communities. Christian participants reported that the military acts in favour of Muslims when 
their community comes under attack and considered the military effort to suppress violence when 
their community is under attack as biased and unfair. They also did not distinguish between assailants 
and the victim population when using coercion. This happened particularly where the victim population 
arm themselves against assailants. Typically, civilians arm themselves with machetes and weapons as a 
means of self-defence, but when the military arrives, they shoot sporadically and arrest everyone they 
can. The problem with this, and why they participants saw it as bias favouring the Hausa/Fulani, is that 
those apprehended by the military are mostly armed members of the victim population, not the 
assailants who often flee and evade arrest. This experience of the Christians interviewed fuels 
emotions and dissatisfaction with the military, as they felt victimised. Added to this, they feel oppressed 
because they are unable to retaliate, adding to their vulnerability. 
The opinions of Muslim participants differed from those of Christians. Muslims neither expressed the 
opinion that the military is biased, nor shared the view that its response to calls for distress are late 
or unsatisfactory. On the contrary, their opinion was that the military is very responsive and efficient 
in its response to calls of distress, an opinion which differed from those of the Christians interviewed. 
Similarly, while Muslim participants agreed that the military is susceptible to corruption and that some 
personnel could take sides when bribed, they felt it was less likely to occur. They did not mention any 
incidence of the military colluding with Christians to attack them. While some felt that the military 
may be biased, they felt that this could be rumours to tarnish the professional image of the military. A 
participant stated that “this issue cannot be completely ruled out. Like the issue of ID card, it might 
be true that the military could be bias, or some people are trying to tarnish the image of the military.”98 
A more compelling opinion held by most Muslims is that civilians impersonate the military, rather than 
that the military collaborates with others to attack or invade communities. Thus, it may not be military 
personnel who are responsible for the lack of service delivery or atrocities, but impostors. However, 
the general feeling is a lack of confidence in the military, especially from Christians. 
                                               
97 Interview with a Christian youth leader in Jos South LGA on 3 November 2016. 
98 Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 24 November 2016. 
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In a situation where civilians are not confident that the persons they come across in military uniforms 
are genuine, it can contribute to insecurity. Although the government and military leadership have 
attempted to address this by introducing a different set of military uniforms, this has not dispelled the 
distrust of the citizenry.99 Moreover, as civilians experience more incidences of military complicity and 
bias towards some groups, it clearly erodes the confidence the citizenry has in the military to protect 
them, as reflected in the following statement:  
Normally, when you see a soldier you are supposed to run to him for security, but the 
soldiers as we have seen will end up killing you. Before now, we did not know why this 
was happening, but we later discovered that it was because of some of them were 
Muslims and our area is a Christian dominated area.100 
This shows that civilians are likely to feel that military personnel favour their respective religious 
persuasion by taking sides. Participants reported several accounts of the military acting in a partial 
manner, which affects their legitimacy and neutrality, and this included high level coercion, intimidation, 
and brutality associated with their conduct. In such cases, clamping down on anyone standing up against 
the military was common and frequent, reflected in several instances of military personnel threatening 
to kill or ‘waste’ civilians, while boasting that they can get away with it. Along with this, soldiers claim 
that they will not risk their lives to protect civilians, as their salary cannot compensate for such loss. 
This statement and behaviour contradicts the principle of professional military service ethic of selfless 
service. 
Muslim communities seemingly do not feel that soldiers act in a biased manner, although they did 
express concerns about corruption and the manner in which soldiers dealt with issues of land 
ownership and community disputes. They blamed this not on the soldiers themselves, but the lack of 
training that they receive. However, when religious affiliation is taken into consideration, two 
contrasting opinions on the legitimacy and impartiality of the military emerge. One holds that the 
military is complicit, aiding assailants, and biased towards Muslims, while the other opinion holds that 
assailants impersonate the military when they attack communities. Although the opinions differ, they 
both spoke to the integrity and professional image of the military. This situation not only affects the 
interaction and relationship of civilians with the military, but it evokes further consequences such as 
civilians forming or allying with armed groups for protection and retaliation against military abuse. The 
next section explains how it plays out in Plateau State. 
 
This section discusses the use of disproportionate violence by the military on the citizenry, the effects 
on the security situation in the State, and what civilians make of it, including the willingness of civilians 
                                               
99 The introduction of a new set of uniform is discussed later in this chapter.  
100 Interview with a male participant in Bokkos on 9 September 2016. 
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to cooperate with the military, and how they react to military abuse. This includes legitimate reactions 
to military violence, and the illegitimate retaliation against military violence and abuse in Plateau State. 
 Cooperation and Sharing Information with Military 
The findings indicate that it is common for civilians to refuse to cooperate and share information with 
the military as a way of reacting to military abuse and violence. Under the conditions presented earlier, 
it is understandable that civilians, and particularly Christians, are less likely to cooperate with the 
military because they feel more aggrieved. Several participants said that they deliberately distanced 
themselves from the military, or completely avoided any form of interaction with them because they 
saw the actions and conduct of the military as unprofessional and lacking legitimacy. Along with this, 
as the citizenry suffer from various forms of violence and heavy-handedness from the military, they 
are less likely to cooperate with them, and many participants preferred not to share information or 
report any sensitive information about an impending attack to the military as they feared they might 
be victimised, as this male participant in Jos North LGA mentioned: “if you give them such a report 
without evidence, they can harass you if they doubt you.”101 A Christian male living in Jos South LGA 
expressed a similar opinion: 
In Nigeria, what I notice is when you have something to share with the security 
personnel, if you are not careful, at the end of the day, you might turn out to be the 
victim, and if I am not sure about it, I cannot say anything to them about it. It is better 
to keep myself safe than to say had I known tomorrow.102 
Only a few participants reported that they would inform the military about an impending or a planned 
attack. However, even though these participants offered to report or share such information, they 
would only do so with great care and caution due to the fear of being victimised, interrogated or 
detained by the military. However, most opted not to report or share information with the military 
due to the injustices they may suffer and preferred to report incidents to their community vigilante 
groups, community leaders or the police. Thus, although the military is the key agency responsible for 
internal security enforcement in the State, it lacks the legitimacy to do so effectively. Added to this, 
civilians distrust them and are unwilling to share information as they are inclined to seek protection 
from other sources, which may be legitimate or illegitimate.  
 Legitimate and Quasi-Legitimate Approaches 
In most instances, the reaction or coping strategy involved the use of collective action to make the 
demand for military accountability known. The first is the formation and use of civil-society groups, 
such as local community groups, faith-based organisations, and non-governmental organisations. 
Community group leadership forms an important channel through which the citizenry can express 
                                               
101 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 27 October 2016. 
102 Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 11 November 2016. 
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their grievances to the military command, particularly those stationed in their community. This 
happens through elders or appointed representatives, on the advice of community members. 
However, this medium does not always yield satisfactory outcomes, especially when the community 
leaders are required to provide evidence to substantiate their claims of abuse. Such evidence is difficult 
to provide because, unless pre-empted and pre-planned, one may not think to make a secret video or 
audio recording of the military in the act. Also, in several instances, those caught recording or 
photographing acts of military brutality were maltreated and the device was confiscated or destroyed, 
making this option less desirable. Other legitimate options for reacting to military abuse include NGOs 
involved in human rights advocacy, peace dialogues, seminars, mediation and advocating for the human 
rights of the citizenry. However, few participants in this study had any contact with NGOs working in 
the State, showing that such groups play a limited role, or do not appeal to the citizenry. 
Another strategy used by some civilian groups is the criminal court. However, based on my findings, 
this mechanism is the least-used, although it is legitimate and a State sanctioned process. Whether 
these were individual cases, such as a person whose hair was forcefully barbed because a person in 
the military felt it was bushy and unkempt, or more serious cases such as the ethnic cleansing suit 
against the military by the Tarok community, participants stated that the court process is long, delayed, 
unpromising and costly. Cases tend to linger on and victims become frustrated, tired, or unable to 
continue the trial, which explains why the court option is the least used. Even where cases are taken 
to court and won, the military often blatantly disobeys the court ruling and other court injunctions. 
As civil society organisations/activism and the courts are unpromising, marches, rallies, protest actions 
and demonstrations have become more popular with the citizenry. This alternative is common, as 
most participants had seen or taken part in one or more of such protests. Although most protests 
and demonstrations start peacefully, many end up becoming violent as protesters pick up sticks and 
weapons. In other instances, it is the military attempt to dispel protesters that leads to violence due 
to their heavy-handedness and high level of brutality. A male participant described one such incident 
which occurred in Barkin Ladi: 
There was a time when women went out on mass and protested to show their 
dissatisfaction with the military. But, do you know that some of those women were 
beaten while others were even shot at? This happened right here in the heart of this 
Barkin Ladi.103 
This shows that military mishandling of protesters contributes to such protests turning violent, 
especially when it involves extra-judicial killing. However, protest marches and rallies organised by civil 
society organisations working in the State were usually successful with no reports of violence. The 
                                               
103 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016. 
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problem with non-violent protests, as some participants mentioned, is that it is often less likely to get 
the attention of authorities or yield any satisfactory outcome.  
Another factor that contributes to the culture of impunity of the military is people simply obeying 
illegitimate orders to avoid stricter punishments. For those in underprivileged positions with no access 
to senior leaders, the mechanism of avoiding the military or obeying and getting victimised was the 
only option, although it was a deviation from legitimate procedures. As active citizens, they should be 
able to challenge unfair practices and be comfortable meeting with the military, but for many this was 
immensely difficult, or not an option. It makes this approach quasi-legitimate because it means that 
citizens conform to illegitimate and informal procedures, thereby blurring the boundaries between 
what they know is legally right, and what they will do to avoid harm. This leads to a breakdown of law 
and order, especially when this is pervasive and has become the normal way soldiers deal with civilians. 
Another form of quasi-legitimate approach is where courageous, educated, ‘connected’ members of 
the public and political figures who experience military abuse try to address or raise awareness of 
military abuses. Some are prepared to take up issues of military abuses because they know a more 
senior ranking officer whom they can call to address a problem with lower-ranking personnel. 
However, because only a few civilians have these connections and courage, it is rare and only a few 
employs this as an option. In its place, some elect to partake in violent protests and other illegitimate 
approaches to show their dissatisfaction with the heavy-handedness and use of violence. 
 Illegitimate Approaches 
Given that legitimate approaches appear to be yielding little or no success, some resort to illegitimate 
actions to retaliate against military abuses. One is the use of disruptive and violent protest actions 
against the military. In such instances, the citizenry target military personnel as a way of expressing 
outrage and calling for their complete withdrawal from the community. Several such incidents have 
occurred in parts of Plateau State, particularly the study areas of this research. Some of the recent 
incidences occurred in Bokkos, Mangu, and Barkin Ladi LGAs, where a male participant made this 
remark: “all the military checkpoints were dismantled by civilians, their tents were destroyed, and the 
military had to quickly escape being lynched because the civilians were ready to die that day.”104 When 
civilians violently confront the military by chasing them away from their communities, it shows that 
the military no longer has the capacity to maintain security in the State, unless it becomes predatory 
on the citizenry. This situation is then likely to enable the rise and proliferation of numerous armed 
militias and vigilante groups for protection. 
                                               
104 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016. 
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Faced with the dual dilemma of violence from armed groups and heavy-handedness from the military, 
some have resolved to self-protection and vigilantism. Self-protection and vigilantism are popular in 
local communities, particularly those without military presence, and in communities that have 
previously forced the military to vacate from their town/streets. Because people have resorted to self-
protection, locally-fabricated guns and other small arms and light weapons are in wide circulation in 
the State. Local communities have set up militias as vigilante groups who assume the responsibility of 
securing and defending their communities against marauders and invaders. A male participant who is 
a community leader explained it as follows: 
In my community, we had to organise and form a vigilante, and we are now paying them 
and encouraging people to cooperate with them. If the vigilante does anything wrong, 
we bring them to order, we have collected money from the people and we are using it 
to sustain the vigilante, and we have bought working implements for them.105 
The vigilante groups are mostly made up of uneducated and unemployed youths who are not only 
easily mobilised, but also loyal to their communities. The funding for the group comes from the 
contributions of community members, and community leaders or chiefs’ delegates control or regulate 
the activities of the group and ensure loyalty to their community. Community members trust these 
groups due to their dedication and loyalty to the community. A female participant in Jos North LGA 
noted that “every evening, they are around securing the area very well.”106 A male participant in Riyom 
LGA stressed he “trusts the vigilante groups we have in the community because they can easily warn 
or sound the alarm if there is a problem.”107 However, a problem with the group is that its informality 
means flexibility to act in other roles, such as being assailants. Thus, it is not certain if such vigilante 
groups do not transform or are not used as local militias to fight other communities. Also, given the 
magnitude of security work required of them, one wonders how ‘heavily’ armed they are. In towns 
and urban areas, there are more formal vigilante groups organised and working, but these groups seek 
State approval through registration with the government and are under the direct supervision of the 
police. 
As we have seen from the previous sections, the abuse of power by the military has led to the erosion 
of their legitimacy and has in turn strained CMR. The State faces a quandary because withdrawing the 
military will not guarantee peace or security, as the activities of armed groups are likely to continue 
because the root causes of the conflict remain unaddressed. Although the military can enforce peaceful 
tolerance and coexistence, the conduct of its own personnel continues to worsen the security 
situation. This study shows that Plateau State is in a state of fragility, where peace and security is 
precarious, and violence is likely to escalate. A male participant described Plateau State as being at a 
                                               
105 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016. 
106 Interview with a female participant in Jos North LGA on 13 October 2016. 
107 Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 6 December 2016. 
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“freezing stage, it is only a relative and forced peace, there is no peace yet at the present state ... and 
we would go back to where we are coming from.”108 In urban areas and Jos, accessing or visiting 
several streets is problematic because the violence has led to the compartmentalisation of streets and 
residences along religious lines. Christians are unable to visit several Muslim-occupied streets fearing 
victimisation, and vice versa. As it stands, while violence appears to have receded in some urban areas, 
rural communities still face the threat of violent attacks and invasion. A distressed participant explained 
the situation: “for us in the remote parts of the State, we often return home by 5-6:00pm, yet, despite 
being too early, we still suffer attacks from unknown gunmen.”109 
Given the fragile state of security in Plateau State, the government continues to use the military, feeling 
that it is a ‘necessary evil’ to enforce ceasefires and prevent violence from erupting. However, in 
certain quarters the data shows that participants feel that the use of the military is not important. 
Despite the shared experience of disproportionate force from the military, different opinions exist on 
the effectiveness of the military. The fact that differences of opinion exist between Muslims and 
Christians is something to examine more closely in relation to security in Plateau State. Given this, it 
is necessary to examine how the State has intervened to control the excesses of the military, and if 
participants are aware of such interventions. 
 
This section examines the attempts by government to address the concerns related to the conduct 
and heavy-handedness of the military. The ability of the government to control the coercive might of 
the military is important, as it affects citizens’ trust in government, and the citizenry needs to see that 
the government is aware of and attempting to address the problems raised. From the findings, three 
different State interventions by the Plateau State Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria 
were identified and discussed below. 
6.5.1 Desert Military Camouflage 
The first strategy the Federal Government of Nigeria adopted when it saw that the deteriorating 
security situation in Plateau State was to deploy the military. However, the reliance on the military to 
force the return of peace in the State brought about several consequences, one of which was armed 
groups impersonating the military. In response to these military impostors, the government changed 
the uniforms of military personnel, and all soldiers doing military ISOPs in the State were given and 
required to use desert camouflage in place of the green camouflage uniforms. This was intended to 
help identify ‘genuine’ personnel and differentiate them from armed groups impersonating the military. 
                                               
108 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 22 August 2016. 
109 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 23 August 2016. 
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The participants in this study had a significant level of awareness about the abuse of military uniforms 
by armed groups, and some tried to explain the difference the intervention has brought. An example 
of this can be seen from the opinion of a male participant interviewed in Jos North LGA: 
There were some soldiers who came to Jos, but their uniform was fake, they were not 
genuine. They were always shooting at civilians haphazardly because they were on a 
mission. They also shot at one of my friends in his house, the house had no fence, so, 
when he was opening the entrance door to get some air while eating, that was how the 
bullet met him. But, they ran out of luck when the government discovered their activity 
and decided to change the uniforms of the soldiers to another colour. Unknowing to 
them that the uniform was changed, when they returned to continue their atrocity, they 
were caught one after the other.110 
Accordingly, the intervention by the government to change the military uniform proved effective in 
helping personnel to apprehend some impostors. It also brought some respite to civilians as the 
military could apprehend some impostors and prevent further attacks on civilian communities. In turn, 
this raised the confidence of civilians in the military because it brought about some level of relief and 
trust. However, participants indicated that this relief was only temporary. While it reduced the abuse 
of military uniforms, it did not stop soldiers from acting unprofessionally. In fact, as the discussion in 
this chapter indicates, military complicity and bias towards Muslims persists and participants narrated 
several accounts of soldiers collaborating with or aiding armed groups to attack local Christian 
communities. 
6.5.2 The STF and the Frequent Rotation and Change of Personnel 
As the change in military uniform did not stop the accusations of military bias and complicity, the 
government was compelled to take further actions, realising the need to restructure and re-strategize 
military operations. About a decade after violence erupted in Plateau State, the Federal Government 
established an STF, Operation Safe Haven (OSH), in 2010 to take full control of the security situation 
in the State. The STF was made up of soldiers of the Nigerian military who were deployed to various 
parts of the State where violence had become common. However, this did not allay the fears or 
problems the citizenry faced with the military. Thus, in September 2011, the Federal Government 
upgraded the STF to a Joint Task Force (JTF). 
The decision to upgrade the STF to a JTF was part of the intervention to gradually reduce the number 
of active military personnel in the State. In its place, personnel from the PMF, a constabulary arm of 
the Nigeria police and other civil security agencies, were brought in to replace some of the recalled 
military personnel, and to work with soldiers as a JTF. The hope was that this arrangement would be 
more effective in handling the security situation in Plateau State and help to rebuild a better 
                                               
110 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 26 October 2016. 
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relationship between the soldiers and civilians. However, this did not improve CMR or peaceful 
coexistence. 
The Federal Government then made the military leadership the subject of ‘close scrutiny.’ A military 
commander, usually a senior military officer not below the rank of a Brigadier, is made the JTF 
commander. The position of the JTF commander has been very ‘flexible’ to allow for rapid changes if 
a new or different commander is needed. In fact, due to the flexibility of the position, eleven 
commanders held this position between 2010 and 12 July 2018. Among these officers, some held the 
position for a period less than a month (see Table 6.1 below). 
Table 6. 1 Plateau State, ‘Operation Safe Haven’ Commanders Since 2010 
S. No Name of Commanders Chronology Year 
1 Major General Saleh Maina 1st Commander 2010  
2 Brigadier General Hassan Umaru 2nd Commander 2010 – 9 September 2011 
3 Brigadier General Pat Akem 3rd Commander 10 September 2011 - 18 Sept. 2011 
4 Major Gen. Oluwaseun Olayinka Oshinowo 4th Commander 19 September 2011 – 23 February 
2012 
5 Major General Mohammed Ibrahim 5th Commander 24 February 2012 – 11 May 2012 
6 Major General Henry Ayoola 6th Commander 11 May 2012 - 8 September 2013 
7 Major General David Enetie 7th Commander 9 September 2013 - 4 August 2015 
8 Major General Tagbo Ude 8th Commander 5 August 2015 – 13 June 2016 
9 Brigadier Gen. Abdulsalam Bagudu Ibrahim Acting 
Commander 
14 June 2016 – 26 July 2016 
10 Major General Rogers Ibe Nicholas 9th Commander 27 July 2016 -11 February 2017 
11 Major General Anthony Atolagbe 10th Commander 12 August 2017 – 23 July 2018 
12 Major Gen. Augustine Chris Chukwudi 
Agundu 
11th Commander 24 July 2018 
Source: Compiled from different local online media reports. 
The government hoped that this frequent changing of commanders would improve military 
professionalism and address the conduct and unprofessional behaviour of soldiers. However, this does 
not appear to have been the case. While the reasons for the frequent change of the commanders are 
confidential and not made available to the public, the recall of some was associated with periods of 
escalating insecurity. For others, it was their religious affiliation, intense public outcry over complicity 
and unprofessional conduct of personnel, and compulsory retirement of officers for being political, 
among other reasons111  (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 31–34). Another State intervention is 
                                               
111 For specificity, there is no record suggesting that any STF commander in Plateau State was compulsory retired from 
service for an offence. Rather, the compulsory retirement referred to is a nationwide exercise. 
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rotation of soldiers and, in some instances, the complete recall and change of all the soldiers. This too 
did not address the problem of military heavy-handedness, and abuse. 
Several factors explain why neutrality and professionalism of the military in Plateau State remains 
elusive. One key explanation is that the STF remains under the leadership of the military, who are not 
trained for such internal roles. With the military in charge, it becomes difficult for even newly-deployed 
soldiers not to engage in excesses, especially because their training and the nature of military culture 
are not well suited for internal security duties. Other problems include the susceptibility of soldiers 
to corruption and extortion, and their substance abuse. Equally important, interagency feuds play a 
vital role. Although there have been few reports on this, there tends to be a degree of interagency 
rivalry between soldiers, the police, and other civil security agencies, especially the Plateau State 
Operation Rainbow security outfit. Consider the following account from a male participant in Bokkos 
LGA: 
I remember vividly there was this time in Barkin Ladi, on your way coming here you 
must have seen the Sector Headquarters in Barkin Ladi, Sector 7, there had been a 
problem between Operation Rainbow that the former Governor, Baba Jang was using 
to quell the crisis, because they were meant to be like the police of the indigenous 
people or the community helping the soldiers with sourcing of information and 
preventing outbreak of violence where the military are not present. The issue started 
when a team of Operation Rainbow parked their van on the road close to the gate of 
the sector headquarters. So, when they parked, altercation began on why they parked 
their van close to the military sector command headquarters. You know in Nigeria, 
wherever the military are, they do not allow any car to stop there, or even park or drop 
someone, even if it is just a house of a military officer. So, the Operation Rainbow guy 
answered the soldier that we are the same uniform people, at least when I am talking to 
you, you need to hear and respect my view. But, the soldier now removed his knife and 
stabbed the Operation Rainbow guy and the guy died. So, that caused a lot of problems. 
This suggests interagency rivalry, but as this study did not include interviewing members of the security 
forces, this was difficult to verify. What is clear is that the security effort of the military has not 
changed, despite its reorganisation to an STF. There appear to be no changes in terms of its mandates, 
command and structures, and importantly, the operational rules of engagement are highly confidential 
and have not been made publicly available. This makes it difficult for security analysts to establish the 
limits and boundaries of the use of military force, and what could be considered ‘excessive’. Given that 
the rules of engagement are not known, one can only draw inferences from global standard practices 
of military ISOPs. In their study of the security agencies in the Jos conflict, Para-Mallam & Hoomlong 
(2013) provide a good summary of some of the issues raised in this section: 
The precise operational rules of engagement of military formations are normally 
classified and not released for public consumption... The military troops deployed to 
Plateau State in the immediate aftermath of violent outbreak consisted of soldiers. 
However, possibly due to public outcry over ethno-religious polarisation within the 
military, the Federal Government soon set up a Special Joint Military Task Force (2013: 
24). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 138 
 
The discussion in this section shows that the special joint military task force has not only failed to 
change, but has defied several interventions by the Federal Government to professionalise it. Based 
on the evidence from this study, we can see that the conduct of soldiers continues to erode public 
trust and confidence in the military, along with its the ethno-religious polarisation. This has 
exacerbated the conflict, such that civilians react against military abuses by joining vigilante or armed 
groups, which pressures the government to seek other alternatives. 
6.5.3 ‘Operation Rainbow’ Constabulary Force 
Given these problems and the inability of the Federal Government to control the military, the Plateau 
State Government provided an alternative security strategy: the formation of ‘Operation Rainbow,’ a 
Plateau State-owned and controlled constabulary force. ‘Operation Rainbow’ is made up of civilians, 
retired police and military personnel, and other civil security agents. As an agent of the Plateau State 
Government, it is maintained by Plateau State and is answerable to the office of the State Governor. 
The benefit is that its personnel are more civilian than military and are from Plateau State, so they are 
more familiar with the dynamics of the region.  
The establishment of the Operation Rainbow constabulary force has improved peace and security in 
Plateau State. There has been a decline in the rate of military abuse and excesses, and some participants 
remarked that it has led to an improved security situation and peaceful tolerance in several parts of 
the State previously seen as hostile and conflict-prone. A male participant in Jos North LGA mentioned 
that “it appears that corruption has reduced, and the rate of molestation of people by the military has 
reduced.”112 Another supported this opinion, saying “presently, the problems have reduced unlike 
before, because it was out of hand in times past,”113 now “we are beginning to see improvement in 
the security situation.”114 
It is important to note that this study did not seek to investigate the effectiveness of the Operation 
Rainbow constabulary force, as this was outside the scope of the research. Nonetheless, the opinions 
of participants interviewed indicate that it has been more effective, and the eruption and escalation of 
violence has reduced. However, there is still ongoing military abuse and excessive use of force, as the 
military remains the major security provider in the State, and the Operation Rainbow security outfit 
has only limited powers. The citizenry still feels that government is doing too little or nothing to 
reduce the abuse of power by the military and until this is addressed, the people will continue to 
support vigilante and other armed groups as an alternative means of security. 
 
                                               
112 Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016. 
113 Interview with a female participant in Jos North LGA on 13 October 2016. 
114 Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 30 August 2016. 
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The interview data presented in this chapter provided an in-depth insight into the interaction of the 
citizenry with the military in Plateau State, Nigeria, including the state of CMR from the ground up, 
and the dynamics of State control in a diverse society facing endemic violence. Some prominent issues 
raised in the chapter include that the military uses disproportionate violence, that their conduct is 
unprofessional, that it perpetuates conflict, and that there is a low level of trust in the military. This 
compromises the legitimacy of the military at various levels, and citizens loath to interact with and 
support the military. Therefore, civilians’ distance themselves by refusing to offer useful security tips 
or information to the military because of the fear of victimisation, intimidation and abuse.  
The findings show that the reactions of the citizenry to the disproportionate violence of the military 
contribute to the insecurity in the State. Due to the desire for security, there is a proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons in the State, which has compelled the State to adopt other less coercive 
measures, even though it is yet to fully reconsider the military alternative. This data therefore helps 
to study: (1) CMR when the military acts internally in society, (2) how military heavy-handedness 
affects the relationship, and (3) the reaction, response, or coping strategies of the citizenry. In the 
following chapter, the implications are discussed and analysed in more depth by bringing together the 
conceptual and contextual frameworks and the findings. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having presented the findings of this study in the previous chapter, this chapter aims to interpret the 
empirical data in relation with the theories of CMR. The goal is to discuss and analyse the issues in-
depth by applying the conceptual and contextual framework appraised in the earlier chapters. 
Accordingly, the chapter discusses the findings in the context of the broader literature of CMR, 
internal conflict, and the internal deployment of the military. The discussion followed the 
quadrumvirate interaction theory of CMR, while also reflecting on extant theories of CMR. The 
understanding is that this will help to indicate and explain the sources and causes of the strained CMR 
highlighted in the findings. 
7.2 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA 
In Chapter 4 (section 4.6), the nature of Nigeria’s CMR was discussed and it was highlighted that 
Section 218 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provided the legal basis for 
this. The law institutionalises and legitimises civilian supremacy over the military, and provides both 
“constitutional and legal basis for democratic civilian control of the armed forces” in Nigeria 
(Magbadelo, 2012: 257; Alaga & Akum, 2013: 231). Accordingly, it empowers the President as the 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and whose power and that of the military shall be regulated 
by the parliament (National Assembly) (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). At the level of theory, 
Nigeria appears to be complying with the legal provision in terms of the nature of CMR. The President 
acts as the commander in chief, and there appears to be both civil supremacy and parliamentary 
oversight since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999. In practice however, there is a weak 
implementation or rather a subjective civil control, as the military continues to act extra-legally 
without sanctions. 
To put this in the context of extant theories of CMR, the Nigerian military is detached from the 
political decision-making process as separation theory suggests, but it has an active constabulary role 
in society (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Given this overlap, and the findings of this study, which 
reveals the existence of a dysfunctional civil-military gap (Feaver, 1999), the ideas of both Huntington 
and Janowitz are unable to fully explain CMR in Nigeria. For example, the findings shows the existence 
of a cultural gap, its influence on military habitus, and how it leads to abuses and violations of civilian 
norms. Also, in terms of the day-to-day control of the military, agency theory (Feaver, 1997, 2003a) 
highlights that there are attempts to control the military that the separation and integration theories 
do not explain. This includes the decisions to frequently change the STF Commanders in Plateau State, 
and the complete withdrawal and replacing of troops with new contingents. However, as with 
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Huntington and Janowitz, agency theory does not consider the role of the citizenry in CMR. Therefore, 
a more useful lens is concordance theory, which explains why despite detaching the military from 
society and the political decision-making processes, Nigeria actively and frequently uses the military 
internally (Omede, 2012; Dambazau, 2014). 
Concordance theory argues that what is necessary is neither separation nor integration of the military, 
but agreement on certain indicators in line with the cultural and historical traditions of a state (Schiff, 
1995, 2009: 37). These indicators are the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-
making process, the method of recruitment into the military, and the military style (Schiff, 2009: 44–
47). The assumption is that when the partners agree on this, concordance or a healthy CMR will result. 
However, concordance theory failed to explain how the citizenry can exert agency and the influence 
this has on CMR, a variable which forms a key finding of this study. The findings indicates that there is 
a strained CMR in Nigeria, and the source(s) of this can be identified by examining the levels of 
interaction of the quadrumvirate interaction theory. 
7.3 SOURCES OF STRAINED CMR IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA 
One key contribution of the quadrumvirate interaction theory of CMR is that it introduces the four 
levels of interaction in CMR, which it also identifies as the possible sources of a strained CMR. The 
aim of this section is to identify and discuss the sources of the resulting strained CMR in Plateau State, 
Nigeria. This is achieved by appraising CMR in Nigeria along the five indicators of 
concordance/agreement at the levels of the three sub-units of interaction between the partners. 
7.3.1 The major intersecting level 
Based on the existing cultural and historical tradition of Nigeria, the understanding and agreement is 
that the military shall enlist personnel to the rank and file of the military using the all-volunteer force 
model of recruitment. The recruits across all the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) 
are enlisted based on the quota system of the Federal Character Commission (FCC), which apportions 
how many and where to recruit civilians (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). The aim is to ensure 
that the rank and file of the military reflects the ethnic diversity of Nigeria, and that no region of the 
country is excluded from employment into the military. Similarly, the agreement and understanding is 
that the officer corps shall be recruited from all the geopolitical zones of the country, and that this 
must be in line with the principle of the FCC to ensure that the composition of the officer corps 
reflects the ethnic diversity of the country. 
There appears to be compliance to representativeness when the military enlists commissioned officers, 
but data on the nation’s officer corps is not publicly available to verify the degree of compliance. 
However, there is evidence of a lack of cohesion as ethnic and religious identity affects the functioning 
of the military. Major General Chris Alli, a retired high-ranking officer of the Nigerian military, noted 
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that in the army, “religious and ethnic diversities regulate inter-personal relationships and values… 
you have to be a Muslim to serve as aide-de-camp or military assistant to a Muslim officer. This is the 
pattern among most Christian officers” (Alli, 2001: 23). The findings of this study reinforce Alli’s claims 
that ethnic and religious identity have a major impact on the sense of corporateness of the military. 
Evidence presented in the study shows that personnel are prompt in assisting groups/communities 
who belong to their religious identity. This implies that they do not act in an impartial manner in the 
conduct of their duties to protect the citizenry. 
The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides the legal framework for the use of the military for internal 
security operations and MOOTW in society, in times of serious security threat. However, this shall 
be under strict parliamentary oversight with clearly worded operational rules of engagement to guide 
the conduct of the mission. Another key part of the agreement and understanding is that the Nigerian 
military shall not be involved in the political decision-making process of the country. Given this, the 
military is not involved in the Federal Executive Council, the apex executive body, which is responsible 
for the functions of government in Nigeria. However, given the security challenges Nigeria faces, the 
military is represented in the National Security Council, a body responsible for advising the President 
on security matters (section 25 and 26 of the third schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria). In theory, Nigeria has a clear legal framework which was drafted towards the 
end of 29 years of military rule, to guide the state of CMR for the democratic state. However, on 
practical matters of implementation of the agreement on the indicators of concordance/agreement, 
problems exist which undermine the state of CMR in the country. To understand the sources of the 
problems and how they occur, I turn to the three subunits of interaction between the partners. 
7.3.2 Interactions at the subunits 
The findings of this study revealed that an unhealthy relationship exists between the military and 
civilians in Plateau State. In the subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, the 
relationship has reached a stage where civilians feel compelled to pick up arms or ally with armed 
groups in self-defence and for protection. Typically, this involves retaliating against military abuse or 
the willingness to do so, using violent and disruptive protests and through directing violence against 
military personnel. Thus, problems which undermine the legitimacy of the mission exist in this subunit 
of interaction. As this affects the interaction between two partners, it has negative effects on the 
agreement and understanding reached at the major intersecting level, and this affects the state of CMR 
in Nigeria. 
While the findings from this study did not provide adequate data on the interaction in the subunit of 
interaction between the political elites and the citizenry, it is not to say that this subunit has little or 
no influence on CMR. Recently, civilians have begun revolting against the Plateau State Government 
for its failure to intervene and end the attacks by the military, and the inability of the military to provide 
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them security. One incident involved a forceful occupation of the State House, where government 
properties were destroyed and vandalised by protesting civilians. Another incident involved an attack 
on the State Governor on 16 July 2018, after visiting internally displaced persons in one of the 
communities hosting them (Alechenu, Ameh, Fabiyi, Adetayo, Olokor, et al., 2018; Sadiq & Adama, 
2018; Usman, 2018b). These incidents occurred within a space of two weeks, after two separate 
attacks on 23rd and 24th June 2018 leading to the death of over 200 people (Stefanos Foundation, 2018; 
Usman, 2018a,c). In this study, civilians expressed dissatisfaction with the inability of the government 
to ameliorate their security situation, although they applauded the Operation Rainbow constabulary 
force established to complement the security work of the military. Thus, civilians are getting impatient 
with the government, and this dissatisfaction has the potential to undermine CMR if the concerns are 
not addressed. 
While there is a growing tension and dissatisfaction in the two subunits discussed above, in the subunit 
of interaction between the political elites and the military, there appears to be no major concerns. 
Here, what is evident is weak implementation of civil control of the military. Although there is a clear 
system which empowers civilian political elites to oversee the military and ensure it complies with 
applicable rules and professional standards, little is done to implement or ensure this. Chiefly, this is 
because political elites exert subjective civilian control which undermines military professionalism, and 
ultimately leads to their unprofessional conduct. Again, this points to the inadequacy of subjective 
civilian control, given that it does not allow for the maximising of military professionalism (Huntington, 
1957: 80–83).  
As military professionalism is not enhanced, the military continues to serve the interests of the ruling 
group and, in the process, pose significant threats to society. Added to this is the fact that the military 
holds significant prerogatives over civilian leaders, and civilians are unable to implement adequate civil 
control because this would raise tensions in this subunit of interaction. This explains why long-lasting 
solutions to military abuse or ongoing conflict are hardly explored or prioritised, as they do not serve 
the interests of the ruling political elites and retired military officers (Dantani, Wika & Abdullahi, 2017). 
In Plateau State, while the decisions of the civilian political elites brought some respite, however, this 
was only temporary. For example, the decision to restructure the military operations into an STF 
ensured heavy militarisation of society, but the militias have also changed their pattern of warfare to 
surprise attacks late at night, a tactic that has remained highly effective and surgical. The decision to 
frequently rotate personnel, change unpopular commanders, and change the military uniform of 
personnel has also not led to the end of violence. On the contrary, while the threats and abuse of the 
military continue daily, there is a lack of political will to call them to order (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 
2013), and the problems are often overlooked. Given this, it is important to understand the causes of 
the strained CMR and why the military has become a source of threat and insecurity to the citizenry. 
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7.4 CAUSES OF STRAINED CMR IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA 
The findings of this study indicate that the military operations in Plateau State are rife with abuses and 
violations of the human rights of civilians, including instances of extra-judicial killings. Along with these 
are concerns of military bias, complicity, and soldiers conspiring with armed groups to attack certain 
communities. Christians particularly believed that soldiers only support and protect Muslim 
communities, while their own communities rarely benefit from the military when they are under attack. 
Several incidents were referred to in favour of this claim, thereby supporting earlier studies that in the 
resolution of conflicts, the military is rarely a neutral actor, and professionalising it would not guarantee 
neutrality either (Enloe, 1977: 137). Given this, it is necessary to examine the dimensions of military 
professionalism of the Nigerian military and how this is affected by military ISOPs in society. 
 Loss of Professionalism 
A key starting point for this discussion is Michael Desch’s submission, which is informed by 
Huntington’s (1957) objective model of civilian control. Desch argues that using the military for 
internal missions would often result in unhealthy CMR. Accordingly, he maintains that: 
[E]xternal missions are the most conducive to healthy patterns of civil-military relations, 
whereas non-military, internal missions often engender pathologies… If a country faces 
significant internal threats, the institutions of civilian authority will most likely be weak 
and deeply divided, making it difficult for civilians to control the military… a non-military 
and internal mission will produce the worst pattern of civil-military relations (1996: 13–
14). 
This claim has been proven to be true especially in states where the military intervened in politics 
following deep political division, corruption and resource mismanagement, and increasing levels of 
internal threats (Luckham, 1971; Collier, 2009: 8). However, Desch seems to have missed an important 
point in that involving the military in such non-military roles can erode military professionalism, 
particularly where civil control is absent or weak. The task of this section is to discuss the findings of 
this study, which show evidence of eroding military professionalism, and dissatisfaction from civilians 
due to the military’s conduct. 
The dissatisfaction of civilians with military abuse can be explained using the service ethic dimension 
of military professionalism. For Huntington (1957: 8), the responsibility of the military to the state is 
to serve and defend, and not to engage in predatory actions, or pose a threat to society. As the military 
institution has the monopoly on knowledge and skills on the management of organised violence, the 
service ethic holds that it must use this for the good of the state and citizenry (Huntington, 1957: 9; 
Downes, 1985: 159). However, the findings of this study indicate that personnel deployed in Plateau 
State engage in acts that undermine the objective of the military mission. One such action is the use 
of intimidation and coercion. 
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In the arena of warfare and armed conflict, it is the norm for the military to use intimidation and 
coercion to suppress hostilities. As previously noted, the military could use coercion to stop 
belligerents from continuing with violence by forcing a ceasefire. When this does not prove effective 
and violence ensues, the military could engage in intimidation by using sanctions or the threats of 
sanctions to force compliance and prevent violence from recurring (Sharp, 2012: 71, 114). Commonly 
used sanctions include “punishments, pressure … to penalize, thwart, and alter the behaviour of other 
persons, groups, or institutions … for failure to behave in the expected or desired manner” (Sharp, 
2012: 173). In this way, it is seen that the use of intimidation and coercion by the military plays a vital 
role in managing conflict situations. The importance of this is that it cripples the ability of one or more 
warring parties to continue with violence. Also, because the military has superior instruments of 
violence, using intimidation and coercion enables it to protect the weaker side from further threats 
or violence from opposition groups (Boulding, 1989: 25). However, although this measure could be 
effective in forcing a ceasefire and suppressing violence, implementing it is often problematic. Where 
there is suspicion of third-party bias or the military is believed to be taking sides, it can erode public 
trust and undermine the peace-enhancing mission of the military. 
Another concern with the use of coercion and intimidation is the way soldiers use force on non-
combatant civilians. Several studies indicate that how state forces use these tools can be questionable 
and problematic (see Collier, 1999), especially where it assumes the form of extrajudicial killings and 
summary execution of civilians or suspects. In his ‘Democracy's blameless leaders’ Mitchell (2012) 
documented five instances of such abuse against the civilian population. For him, such gross violations 
occur because of a systemic weakness, and in this context, this points to the erosion of service ethic 
by the military (Mitchell, 2012: 6). The problems with this are numerous. Civilians face the dangers of 
violence from armed groups and threats from state forces, and this can result in bodily harm, injuries 
or the loss of life. Where victims survive, resources are also strained as more must be earmarked for 
treatment and rehabilitation. 
As the Nigerian military has a long history of involvement in the internal security of the country, 
several accounts of military abuse of civilians exist (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). An example is the instance 
reported by Amnesty International which describes how, “in 2013 and 2014 ... Nigerian military forces, 
sometimes in collaboration with civilian JTF members, executed a large number of victims, at times 
dozens or even hundreds in one day” (2015: 40). Other instances of such violations include the 
extrajudicial and indiscriminate killing of civilians in Zaki Biam in Benue State, and in Odi in Bayelsa 
State (Ojo, 2009b). While these and several other extrajudicial executions constitute gross violations 
of human rights and professional service ethics, both political and military leaders express little or no 
concern over the abuse (Ojo, 2009b: 5–7; Mitchell, 2012: 1–2; Odoemene, 2012: 226). Rather, their 
rhetoric indicates support for such military abuse, and this is partly because a significant number of 
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the political elites are retired military generals (Adekanye, 1999a; Badmus, 2005; Agara, 2006). This 
problem brings to light the concern of Janowitz (1960: 440) of “unanticipated militarism”, especially 
when military values become extolled over civil and societal values. A consequence is that society and 
social institutions become militarised because military values have a hold on the state. 
An important point is that the use of intimidation and coercion by the military to suppress violence 
during periods of heightened hostilities could be legitimate, as this is necessary to prevent violence. 
However, one cannot make the same argument during periods of calm or ceasefire. Incidences of 
extrajudicial killing, such as the massacre in Tarok communities in 2015, as well as the daily abusive 
treatment and manhandling of civilians at various military checkpoints, indicate that this is the norm. 
As a result, civilians are afraid of encountering or approaching military personnel or checkpoints. This 
indicates that an unhealthy relationship exists between the military and the civilian population, and 
several participants prefer not to have any interaction with the military at all. Thus, “an average 
Nigerian encountering soldiers on the road is likely to be subjected to unnecessary and unwarranted 
fear” (Peterside, 2014b: 1306). Clearly, this is in violation of the military service ethic to protect society 
and not become a threat to the state. However, as this study did not interview military personnel, it 
cannot examine if the reasons for joining military service influence the behaviour of soldiers, as this is 
an important aspect of military service ethic. 
The evidence from this study shows that the unregulated use of intimidation and coercion has strained 
the relationship between civilians and personnel. When this becomes a recurring problem and 
government makes little or no effort to stop the violation or to serve justice to victims, it leads to an 
erosion of military service ethic. Although the State can compensate victims of military abuse, this 
does not change the fact that whenever the military does internal security duties, brutality and abuse 
would be likely. Hence, as Collier (1999: 11) claims, “where the boundary between internal policing 
and external defence is not clear…, there is likely to be a serious problem of proportionality in the 
use of state violence”. This could result in soldiers becoming involved in more abusive violence, 
especially where there is no proper regulation or measures to ensure accountability, and where the 
military does not respect the rule of law or democratic values. 
Another problem with eroding service ethic is the incidence of sexual and gender based-violence 
(SGBV). In armed conflict situations, rape, and other forms of SGBV are as ubiquitous as intimidation 
and coercion. Although reports of sexual violence in armed conflicts is widespread and rampant, 
Wood (2006, 2009) argues that it occurs in varying proportions and might not necessarily be used in 
some conflicts. Notwithstanding, several accounts have shown that state forces, including the military, 
often engage in sexual violence against girls and women in the societies where they provide peace 
support activities (Odoemene, 2012; Bartels, Kelly, Scott, Leaning, Mukwege, et al., 2013). In fact, the 
Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset indicates that “state militaries are more likely to be 
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reported as perpetrators of sexual violence than either rebel groups or militias” (Cohen & Nordås, 
2014: 418, 425). While the dataset does not express certainty due to data collection and reporting 
biases and limitations, several individual studies validate the claim that military personnel are often 
involved in the sexual abuse of civilians (Butler, Gluch & Mitchell, 2007; Nwolise, 2007; Leiby, 2009; 
Bartels et al., 2013; Johansson & Sarwari, 2017).  
In Plateau State, SGBV is a common occurrence and as with intimidation and coercion, it strains the 
relationship between the military and the citizenry. According to Wood (2009: 133) and the 
International Criminal Court (2011: 7–10), acts such as “rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and forced pregnancy” are common examples of 
sexual violence. However, this study did not find these to be common in Plateau State, although sexual 
harassment, intimidation, and unsolicited appeals for sexual favours were reported. Given this, one 
wonders why personnel deployed for military ISOPs become sexually predatory on civilians they 
should be protecting. 
For Wood (2009: 132), a contributing factor is selfish desires and opportunism, as armed conflict 
“provides the opportunity for widespread rape, and many if not all male soldiers will take advantage 
of it.” Thus, conflicts make women (who are often the dominant victims of sexual violence) vulnerable 
to predatory males. Butler et al. (2007: 679–670) and Schneider, Banholzer & Albarracin (2015: 1341) 
note that selfish drives and opportunism serve as the central causal factors. However, beyond this 
opportunism perspective, other explanations also shed light on why soldiers are sexually predatory. 
Johansson & Sarwari (2017: 2) explain that one key explanation pertains to the imbalance of power 
relations between the military and civilians. Leiby (2009: 84) also emphasized this point when she 
argues that the aim of sexual violence is to not only humiliate the victim, but to also demonstrate the 
powerlessness of the victim. Studies documenting and analysing some instances of military sexual 
violence in Nigeria not only support the claim, but emphasise that this formed part of the intention of 
personnel who raped and sexually abused women (Nwolise, 2007: 391–393). Odoemene (2012) also 
supported this position in his analysis of the sexual violence by the Nigerian armed forces in Ogoni 
land in the Niger Delta region between 1990–1999. He argues that “an imbalance of power relations 
was identified as the ultimate cause of violent acts, which were used as demonstrations of power and 
weapons of state terrorism” (Odoemene, 2012: 225). 
Accordingly, one sees that due to both selfish motivations and the imbalance of power relations 
between personnel and civilians, conflict situations expose women to predatory SGBV. Considering 
Odoemene’s submission and the findings presented in the previous chapter showing evidence of sexual 
violence by personnel in Plateau State, one can infer that the military misuses its power. The 
widespread occurrence and frequency indicate that the socialization of the military plays a key role in 
influencing personnel’s sexual misconducts. Along with this, as few or no cases of disciplinary measures 
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have been taken against perpetrators, the claims of Moncrief (2017: 715) and Wood & Toppelberg 
(2017: 620) hold true that both officers and recruits are involved or tolerant of such sexual predation 
of civilians. It is therefore likely that such sexual predation would strain the relationship between the 
citizenry and the military. Moreover, in conservative communities where sexual purity and chastity is 
highly valued and held in high regard, this would not only lead to unhealthy CMR, but it could result 
in confrontation over the actions of the military. Ultimately, the sexual predation by soldiers entails 
personnel seeking their selfish desires rather than upholding professional service ethic and protecting 
the civilian population. This evokes even more challenges for the victims, including mental health 
problems which is widely associated with SGBV in conflict situations (Amone-P’Olak, Lekhutlile, 
Ovuga, Abbott, Meiser-Stedman, et al., 2016).  
Psychological and emotional harm are mostly non-violent actions which do not immediately result in 
injuries or bodily harm and may not necessarily lead to the death of the victim. However, it poses 
substantial problems that undermine the mental well-being of the victim and create numerous burdens 
on their families and communities. This harm typically consists of a “myriad and often less obvious 
consequences of violent behaviour, such as… deprivation and maldevelopment that compromise the 
well-being of individuals, families and communities” (World Health Organization, 2002: 4). Common 
forms include verbal aggression such as name-calling, and other dominant behaviours such as othering 
civilians. Others include “controlling behaviours such as isolating a person from family and friends or 
restricting access to movement, information and assistance” (World Health Organization, 2002: 15). 
According to O'Hagan (1995: 458) and Sharp (2012: 161), psychological and emotional harm may not 
be the same, but they are interrelated and are not necessarily “entirely separate experiences.” As 
such, one exposed to psychological distress from experiencing violence could also experience 
emotional distress because of the same exposure. 
When the military conducts ISOPs, and the behaviour of soldiers is unprofessional and poorly 
regulated, resultant psychological distress could be severe and traumatic, and could evoke further 
consequences. In part, this is because an unequal power relation exists when personnel interact with 
society. When the military takes undue advantage of this, it evokes psychological and emotional 
problems for the victim. Intimidation and coercion, such as public humiliation, can cause psychological 
and emotional distress for civilians. Clearly, this is distressing for the victim, and can result in some 
disorders. According to Khan & Majumdar, the effects include “depression, recurrent, intrusive and 
distressing recollection of events, irritability and outbursts of anger, difficulty in concentrating, 
insomnia, persistent sadness, poor mental health and coping, and disinterest in social activities” (2017: 
50). For Nwolise (2007: 393), a possible consequence is that it could “sow the seed of future wars 
and revolt in the conscience of the general public.” Even more problematic is when such abuse is a 
frequent experience for civilians. 
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The findings from this study indicate that it is common for military personnel in Plateau State to use 
condescending and humiliating language when engaging with civilians. For many participants, 
psychological harm has become part of the military style of the Nigerian armed forces, particularly the 
foot soldiers who have the most interaction with the citizenry. Again, this indicates that the actions of 
soldiers fall short of professional conduct and are a clear case of an eroding service ethic and a lack of 
responsibility to society. More problematic in the Plateau instance is that the physical presence of 
abusive soldiers in society makes the problem frequent and repetitive, thereby worsening the situation 
of victims. For example, O’Hagan (1995) observes that the more exposure to emotional and 
psychological abuse, the more consequence it has on the victim, and the higher the tendency to expect 
different forms of reactions to the abuse. In most cases, because individuals react differently to 
psychological abuse, reactions vary depending on social and demographic factors, the temperaments 
and the availability of emotional support for the victim (World Health Organization, 2002: 8). The 
consequences of psychological trauma include “disturbed and antisocial behaviour… conflict, and 
aggression towards others. The situation is often exacerbated by the availability of weapons and by 
people becoming inured to violence after long exposure to conflict” (World Health Organization, 
2002: 22). The implication is that it strains the relationship between civilians and the military, causing 
civilians to retaliate against the military using violence. 
Another problem with an eroding service ethic is the possibility for personnel to become corrupt and 
exploit civilians. Studies shows that corruption is associated with inequality, power imbalance and 
unequal interpersonal relationship (Zimring & Johnson, 2005: 796; Anders & Nuijten, 2007: 15; 
Dawood, 2014: 103). As such, this reinforces the position of Zimring & Johnson that corruption is a 
“crime of the powerful” (2005: 796). While power imbalances and inequality are a social constant in 
every society, its exploitation for undue advantage by privileged power holders makes the act 
illegitimate and corrupt. The literature outlines some of the common forms corruption can assume: 
extortion; fraud; embezzlement or theft; misappropriation of public resources; collusion; trading 
influence; nepotism; bribery; conflict of interest; political meddling; the obstruction of justice; 
facilitation payment; corruption; and money laundering (World Bank, 1997: 9–11; Zhang, Cao & 
Vaughn, 2009: 205; Dawood, 2014: 105). Participants in this study indicated that soldiers in their 
communities engage in some of these acts, especially extortion, collusion, nepotism, bribery, conflict 
of interest, and the obstruction of justice. The literature on military professionalism indicates that the 
erosion of selfless service ethic occurs when recruits join the military for occupational reasons or as 
a pathway to other careers (Moskos, 1986; Battistelli, 1997; Manigart, 2005; Heinecken, 2013a). 
However, soldiers who engage in corrupt acts while on duty take the problem a step further. I outline 
the argument that supports this. 
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The presence of the military in society, especially in periods of both hostilities and relative peace, 
confers a privileged power position to soldiers, albeit as authorised armed servants of the state. 
Although the military is required to perform specific conflict prevention and law and order duties, 
absent or weak civil control means personnel could use their power discretionarily, including involving 
in corrupt practices. Along with this, the presence of military personnel with weapons and 
paraphernalia reinforces the ability of personnel to control and direct civilians to do their bidding. 
While this power imbalance is legitimately sanctioned by the state, corrupt practices become evident 
when personnel do not uphold ethical and professional standards. Collier raised this concern, noting 
that internal deployment paves the way for “predatory rent seeking, extortion, and abuse” (1999: 9). 
In Africa, a similar trend was observed in the military operations in the conflicts in the DR Congo 
(Baaz & Verweijen, 2014). 
Participants in this study also identified self-serving interests as the reason why soldiers deployed in 
their communities are prone to corrupt practices. The findings support the literature that self-serving 
interest and weak civil control are the major factors responsible for military corruption in Africa 
(Howe, 2001: 40–42). In Nigeria, the problem of corruption is not unique to the military, as some 
have argued that it is institutionalized, systemic, and pervasive across all institutions of the state, and 
has seemingly become uncontrollable (Osoba, 1996: 371; Erero & Oladoyin, 2000: 280). In the military 
operations in Plateau State, military corruption is endemic, resulting in the military authority placing 
signposts at each military checkpoint asking civilians not to give money to personnel in an attempt to 
curtail the growing problem. However, this intervention has yielded little or no relief because the 
soldiers extort money, food products, and other valuables from commuters at military checkpoints. 
This undermines the credibility and the legitimacy of the military mission, particularly where civilians 
see the military as a predator preying on their livelihood. Also embedded in this are issues of 
corporateness, especially where corruption among soldiers makes them prone to complicity and bias 
to the extent of aiding/colluding with some armed groups or taking sides with belligerents. 
Corporateness means a shared “sense of organic unity and consciousness… a common bond of work, 
and the sharing of a unique social responsibility” among personnel (Huntington, 1957: 10). When there 
are “ideological, political, or service-oriented differences” within the armed forces, it undermines the 
feeling of unity existing within the military (Pion-Berlin et al., 2014: 235). For many, as corporateness 
is the unifying force of the military, it is the determinant of mission success as the military can only 
succeed when soldiers act in unity and as a team (Frank, 1991; Siebold, 1999, 2007; King, 2007; Käihkö, 
2018). In fact, Wong, Kolditz, Millen & Potter (2003) added that cohesion not only influences the 
success of a mission, but has a positive impact on performance and effectiveness. When cohesion is 
lacking, it paves the way for the emergence of factions or splits, which undermine military values 
including discipline, obedience and subservience to command and hierarchy. 
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However, MacCoun, Kier & Belkin (2006) challenge the notion that cohesion is an important 
determinant of effective performance in combat. They argue that evidence suggesting that cohesion 
affects performance in combat does not hold true and does not support the claim. Rather, they 
maintain, that “the evidence indicates that military performance depends on whether service members 
are committed to the same professional goals, not on whether they like one another” (MacCoun et 
al., 2006: 652). An important point MacCoun et al. made is that although there is no evidence to 
support the claim that cohesion influences performance in combat, it has a strong influence on the 
success of a mission. When personnel do not commit to work towards achieving the mission objective, 
it makes it difficult for the military to emerge victorious in any combat mission. Although my study 
specifically focused on eliciting primary data from civilians and did not interview personnel, my 
participants raised concerns about the corporateness of the military. One of these is a concern that 
soldiers are biased towards certain groups. 
Young (1996: 179) observes that “military factors… have often determined the ultimate outcome of 
modern African insurgencies”, and one of these military factors is the actions of personnel in the 
process of dealing with conflict situations. This was supported by Herbst (2004: 358), who contends 
that when the military does internal security duties, the behaviour of its personnel “is a critical 
determinant of the duration and course of the conflict.” This is especially so where the military is 
deployed internally to police ethnic hostilities, religious conflicts or political violence. These hostilities 
occur along identity lines that can stir the emotions and sentiments of soldiers, especially those who 
have a connection with the local communities. This could influence personnel to be biased and to act 
in an unprofessional manner. Ideally, state militaries form part of the unifying force of a nation (Shaw, 
1979; Simonsen, 2006; Samii, 2013). When the military is representative of society, it embodies strong 
institutional cohesion, strong bond, solidarity, and an unequalled esprit de corps. However, where 
internal conflicts affect the bond and personnel are biased towards their respective ethno-religious 
persuasions, this can have lasting impacts on the state. 
The findings of this study show a sharp difference of opinions among participants of different religions, 
with Christians contending that the military is biased in favour of Muslims while Muslims do not share 
such sentiment. In 2010, after series of attacks by ‘unknown assailants’ on many Christian communities, 
the military was accused of being complicit and heavily biased towards Muslims, as it is seen to be 
collaborating with the assailants who are believed to be militias sponsored by Muslim Hausa/Fulani 
groups, and the military neither repelled the attack nor arrested the assailants. Civilians who were 
largely of the Christian faith protested vehemently against the military’s complicity. The protest forced 
the Federal Government of Nigeria to withdraw and replace the military personnel in Plateau State 
with about 850 other military personnel (Crisis Group, 2012: 21). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 152 
 
One sees that the military is therefore complicit and has failed to perform its duty in Christian 
communities. However, Muslim participants do not feel this way about the military. Rather, they 
expressed satisfaction with the role and duties of the military, and a recent study reported a similar 
finding (Dantani et al., 2017). One must note here that although opinions on military bias differ by 
religion, it does not refute the concern that military complicity occurs. Rather, it is a strong sign of a 
possible collusion. When some soldiers take sides and are biased, it shows a loss of the sense of 
corporateness towards mission objectives. One reason widely believed in the study area is that the 
military is serving as a political tool for the ruling class, to promote a ‘conquest agenda’ associated 
with the serving government. As I shall subsequently explain, this is an indication that civilians exercise 
subjective control over the military (Huntington, 1957: 80), which explains why the military is lacking 
professionalism. Downes (1985) had earlier observed that a loss of the sense of corporateness occurs 
when soldiers no longer share in the organisational goal of achieving success in a mission. Clearly, the 
Plateau case illustrates that soldiers are biased. In essence, this means organisational goals are typically 
replaced with individual’s own ideological interests, one of the three causes of eroding corporateness 
(Pion-Berlin et al., 2014: 235). 
This is not atypical. Enloe (1977: 137) argues that “militaries and police forces are rarely neutral actors 
in ethnic conflicts,” making it difficult for military power alone to resolve such conflicts. Thus, the 
military should be seen “in any country afflicted with ethnic hostilities as being participants with a stake 
in the outcome, not simply as neutral instruments of a supra-ethnic state authority” (Enloe, 1977: 138). 
Accordingly, Ouédraogo (2014: 16) observes that a major contributing factor is that the military is not 
representative of society. As Nigeria is a multi-religious and an ethnically heterogenous nation, it fits 
into this analogy, and two indicators of concordance theory are relevant in explaining the situation. 
One is the composition of the officer corps, which is a critical component because it comprises the 
administrative leadership of the armed forces. They are responsible for decisions on the functioning 
of the armed forces and accomplishing the mission objectives of the military (Schiff, 1995: 14; Young, 
1996: 182). The second pertains to issues of recruitment, size, and the general composition of the 
armed forces (Schiff, 2009: 13). 
Accordingly, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that all public sector 
recruitment and appointment should consider the native origin of candidates and the ethno-religious 
diversity of the country. Through this, the Constitution sets the legal basis for the social composition 
of the officer corps, enlisting recruits across the ranks and file to ensure an even representation of the 
various states of the country. In practice, it is difficult to establish if the military adheres to this 
principle. Data on the social composition of the officer corps and the ethno-religious composition of 
the rank and file of the Nigerian armed forces is not made publicly available. As such, it poses certain 
limitations for this study, but one can make certain inferences from the findings. Most attacks on 
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Christian communities in Plateau State up until the 2010 protest happened when the military 
commanders leading the military operations were Muslims. This intensified the outcry by Christians 
that under the leadership of Muslim officers, the military has a stake in the violence and its outcome. 
While the officers may or may not have such a stake, personnel across the rank and file whom civilians 
interact with daily are behaving in ways that reinforce this reality. This was supported by the numerous 
assertions by participants indicating that personnel are not impartial and are assisting communities or 
persons who belong to their respective ethno-religious groups. A recent study on the deployment of 
security operatives in Plateau State by Dantani et al. (2017) also reported this lack of neutrality by the 
personnel. 
Another possible explanation is that the bias could be a consequence of prolonged contact between 
military personnel and society. As Ginsburgh (1964: 256) indicates, when soldiers ‘intermingle’ with 
civilian society, it could affect their willingness for sacrificial service. The fear is that personnel can 
“become more concerned with the adequacy of military pay than when they were living on military 
stations isolated from the impact of the more attractive wages.” Hence, where there is an attack, it is 
unlikely for such soldiers to respond to calls for distress as they begin to see this as constituting a risk 
to their life. Whereas the oath of a professional soldier is to protect and defend the state (even if it 
means paying the ultimate sacrifice of death in the process), this is not the case here. Rather, 
dereliction of duty becomes more obvious. A consequence of this is demotivation and decreased 
morale of unit members who notice such behaviour among their fellows. However, while soldier’s 
bias explains the perceived or actual impartiality, contributing factors may also include substance 
dependence and excessive alcohol consumption. 
Excessive alcohol consumption and substance abuse are social ills that pose other challenges for both 
the individual user and the state, and evidence from numerous studies indicates that this is common 
within several state militaries (Rona, Jones, Fear, Hull, Hotopf, et al., 2010; Adams, Larson, Corrigan, 
Ritter & Williams, 2013; Bray, Brown & Williams, 2013). Many studies show a connection between 
alcohol and substance abuse with deployment and combat exposure (Bray, Fairbank & Marsden, 1999: 
247; Hooper, Rona, Jones, Fear, Hull, et al., 2008; Spera, Thomas, Barlas, Szoc & Cambridge, 2011). 
Other studies show that binge drinking is more common among active-duty personnel than among 
civilians (Stahre, Brewer, Fonseca & Naimi, 2009: 208). This indicates that personnel deployed for 
combat or violence control/prevention missions are likely to adopt such a lifestyle. 
Given this, one can ask why soldiers indulge in this lifestyle; how those deployed on security 
missions/operations sustain such substance abuse and binge drinking dependence; and what are the 
consequences for both the image of the professional soldier and the security duties they conduct in 
society? To begin with, it must be noted that there are numerous reasons for heavy alcohol use and 
substance abuse. In a worldwide survey on the alcohol and drug use of military personnel, some of the 
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reasons uncovered include getting along with peers who indulge, or to be sociable. For other 
personnel, the reasons include the desire to forget about their worries, for relaxation purposes, to 
cheer and change one’s mood, as a way to alleviate boredom and depression, and for the purpose of 
boosting self-confidence (Bray, Guess, Mason, Hubbard, Smith, et al., 1983: 160).  
In a more specific study, Bray et al. (1999: 246) found a correlation between stress and substance 
abuse for both military men and women. The study identified the major causes of stress for personnel 
as “being away from family, deployment, increases in workload, financial problems, and conflicts 
between military and family responsibilities” (Bray et al., 1999: 247). Other studies identified exposure 
to traumatic incidences, such as life-threatening hostilities while on deployment, and the feeling that 
they could be killed in such deployment or combat operation (Hooper et al., 2008). While this study 
did not interview personnel and has not established the reasons why some personnel in Plateau State 
engage in this lifestyle, civilians reported that substance abuse and alcohol consumption among the 
soldiers is not only common and frequent, but a cause of concern because they also indulge the youths 
in communities they work. 
From another angle, given that active-duty military personnel work around the clock in periods of 
tension and heightened hostilities, it is a concern if soldiers work under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol. The findings indicate that some personnel working at checkpoints get drunk and often smell 
of cannabis and other substances while on duty. This supports extant studies that deployment 
promotes the likelihood that personnel would indulge in binge drinking and become substance abusers 
(Federman, Bray & Kroutil, 2000; Saxon, 2011). Accordingly, Kazeem & Abdulkarim (2014: 29–30) 
reported that of the 22,400 Nigerian military personnel deployed for United Nations (UN) peace 
support missions between June 2010 and July 2013, 18.5%  were active abusers of substances, alcohol, 
cannabis or tobacco. Given the frequent deployment of the military for ISOPs and 
peacekeeping/enforcement duties, this supports a connection between deployment, binge drinking and 
substance abuse (Federman et al., 2000; Saxon, 2011). It further validates the claims by participants 
that at several checkpoints one is likely to encounter personnel who have just finished abusing 
substances or are working while under the influence of substances. 
The findings from this study show that active-duty military personnel sustain these habits through two 
strategies. The first strategy involves collaborating and cooperating with the dealers of these 
substances. Instead of apprehending and handing over the dealers for prosecution, they reach an 
understanding with the dealers for continuous supply in exchange for not arresting them for 
prosecution. The second strategy involves the use of extortion, and this resonates with the earlier 
discussion on corruption by active duty military personnel. Although it is likely that military personnel 
could use their salaries and allowances to maintain their lifestyle, the high levels of corruption, 
particularly extorting money from civilians, suggest otherwise. Abusers could be doing so to sustain 
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this habit, as binge drinking, and substance abuse often leads to dependency, and it is difficult to 
conclude if the salaries of personnel are sufficient to sustain such habits. 
The consequences of substance abuse by active-duty military personnel are numerous, as it can affect 
job performance and effectiveness. A study found that “binge drinkers were more likely to report not 
being promoted, getting into a fight and hitting someone, working below their normal level of 
performance, and drinking and driving” (Stahre et al., 2009: 211). While this study did not investigate 
nor establish these issues because interviewing personnel fell outside its scope, the problem of 
personnel violating traffic regulations shows the possibility for a linkage between drunk-driving or 
driving under the influence by military personnel. This is particularly worrying because the findings 
indicate that personnel violate traffic rules even when they are not responding to an emergency or a 
call for distress. Stahre et al. outline other problems substance abuse and binge drinking pose, including 
“adverse health and social consequences, … interpersonal violence, motor vehicle crashes, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and unintended pregnancy” (2009: 208). The findings of this study indicate that 
some of these issues are prevalent in Plateau State. 
Along with this, when personnel work under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and other illicit 
substances, it affects their performance, and could lead to misjudgement and unsound decisions (Ames, 
Cunradi, Moore & Stern, 2007). Those working at checkpoints are likely to not perform the security 
checks effectively and may be engaged in outright extortion to help sustain their dependency needs. 
Clearly, this erodes military service ethic. Along with this, the claim of personnel collaborating with 
armed groups as several participants indicated, could become highly possible due to the distortion of 
reasoning and mental instability associated with substance abuse. Similarly, the likelihood is high for 
binge drinkers and substance abusers to be biased, complicit, and negligent while on duty. Stahre et al. 
argue that this behaviour “can adversely affect military readiness, workplace productivity, and safety… 
particularly given the equipment and the dangerous environments” (2009: 209). 
While this study does not have sufficient evidence to confirm how binge drinking and substance abuse 
affects cohesion, it is likely that this behaviour affects commitment to achieving the objective of the 
military mission. It is difficult to imagine how personnel who rely on drugs and substances can 
guarantee the safety and security of the civilian population. Also, despite the restructuring of the 
military operations to an STF with several bases across Plateau State, the high militarisation has not 
prevented violence from recurring, nor militias from carrying out attacks on civilian populations. Given 
this, it becomes clear that alcohol/substance dependency has an impact on corporateness because it 
undermines mission success. A possible way this occurs is through the dereliction of duty, which is 
identified in this study as a major factor undermining mission success. 
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Dereliction of duty occurs in several ways, as identified by participants in this study: a failure to respond 
to calls for distress when a community is facing violent attacks; delayed response to such calls and 
arriving at scenes of attacks after the assailants had escaped; collaborating with armed groups who 
attack a community; and failing to stop further attacks from occurring. Several of the issues discussed 
above provide possible explanations for this, including alcohol/substance dependence, ethno-religious 
bias, corruption, or simply a lack of social responsibility by the military to both society and the state. 
Feaver (2003a) considers such actions as ‘shirking’, that is, “part of a broader range of deviant 
behaviour in which a soldier might engage - for instance, looting, going to sleep on duty, showing 
insubordination to an officer”, among many others (Feaver, 2003a: 60). 
This study indicates that personnel of the Nigerian military do shirk their responsibility by extorting 
civilians and neglecting the performance of their duty to protect civilians from the threats of harm and 
coercion from assailants. Certainly, dereliction of duty is a deviant behaviour. It is also a product of 
the rational choice of personnel who decide to behave in this manner. Further, this could dampen the 
morale of other personnel by fraying internal cohesion and the unity of the military institution. 
Typically, this is because when some are seen as biased or supporting groups they have vested interest 
in, it undermines the unity and collective solidarity of the group. Similarly, when the military does not 
respond to calls for distress to prevent violence, it indicates that it bears little or no responsibility to 
protect civilians from the threats of harm and violence they face from armed groups. 
Additionally, where internal cohesion is undermined, this could lead to the emergence of factions and 
hostilities within the rank and file of the military. Pion-Berlin et al. (2014: 235) contend that in the face 
of growing division within the military, personnel could begin armed clashes with their fellows over 
differences in interest. Danfulani (2007: 368–371) also argues that this has been the situation in Nigeria, 
and the major factor that led to the incursion into politics. Although the findings of this study did not 
reveal any incidents of altercations among personnel which led to armed clashes, there was a report 
of personnel having vested interests while on duty. This involved the driver and gun operator of an 
armoured military tank suppressing conflict in a religiously-polarized and demarcated community in 
Jos North LGA. The gun operator, whom participants identified as a Muslim, shot and killed some 
Christian belligerents, yet when facing Muslims, his gunshots were aimed at dispersing them. In 
retaliation, the driver (who was identified as a Christian) ran over the Muslim belligerents. Such actions 
undermine the bond and unity of personnel, especially when they have some form of affiliation to 
communities facing recurring violence. However, as this study did not interview active-duty military 
personnel, I am unable to establish the motives and opinions of personnel on the existence of factions 
and how it affects their work in society. 
One major theme from this discussion is that the behaviour of soldiers, particularly their violence, 
abuse, bias, corruption, GBV, dereliction of duty, coercion, and intimidation of civilians, affects military 
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professionalism. According to Huntington (1957: 11), these issues speak to the management of 
violence, particularly the ‘expertise of officership.’ This is because the officers are the administrative 
head and leadership of the military. As such, planning and organising “the direction, operation, and 
control” of the military organisation “whose primary function is the application of violence is the 
peculiar skill of the officer” (Huntington, 1957: 11). 
The officer acquires the skills and knowledge on how to manage the organisation through education, 
training and prolonged experience of participating in combat missions (Huntington, 1957: 8). The 
knowledge is expected to cover broad areas of human relations, including the motivations, attitudes, 
behaviour, and the cultural values of society  (Huntington, 1957: 14). Lasswell adds that “it is probable 
that the specialists on violence will include in their training a large degree of expertness in many of the 
skills that we have traditionally accepted as part of modern civilian management” (1941: 457). Similar 
observations were made by Sarkesian (1981: x), who noted that this includes “the humanistic and 
political-social character of the military institution as well as the characteristics of the environment in 
which the military must operate.” The expectation is that the knowledge will equip and empower the 
officers to oversee military missions and ensure performance that would lead to success and 
effectiveness. 
In this regard, along with the management of violence, a central feature of the expertise of officership 
is that the unique knowledge creates responsibility for the collective and individual actions of personnel 
(Gabriel, 1982: 86). Sarkesian (1981: x) calls this “the responsibilities of unit commanders to the 
‘people’ problem - what to do with hundreds and thousands of refugees or how to deal with the 
problems encountered in trying to engage an enemy within the territory and population.” In this sense, 
for military leadership, expert knowledge means assuming responsibility to society, a point which 
reflects the need for the preservation of democratic values. Equally important, this responsibility means 
an obligation to advise the government on the capability of the military to successfully execute 
missions, and the limitations and the challenges of the military when it does this (Keithley, 2002: 21). 
The significance of this, notes Sarkesian, is that “the total value system of military professionalism must 
be linked to society - in turn, society provides the context within which the military is assessed 
regarding credibility and legitimacy” (1981: 13). Therefore, in Plateau State where the military abuses 
its authority and the citizens view the soldiers as predatory and abusive, it indicates a failure of officers 
whose duty is the management of the mission, including aspects of military and civilian interactions. 
Another reason why the onus is on the officer is because the military operates with a high degree of 
autonomy which ensures self-governance over internal institutional matters (Van Doorn, 1965; 
Moskos, 1981). Where the military has a high degree of autonomy, as Pion-Berlin (1992: 84) observes, 
the officers make the decisions on the general functioning of the organisation, and also oversee the 
administration of the service. While this entails numerous functions, it is important to emphasise 
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sanctioning insubordination and ensuring that personnel who transgress are disciplined in line with the 
military code, as this applies more to this study. 
Galligan (1979: 92) observed that when officers tolerate or overlook unprofessional conduct of 
personnel, it poses fundamental problems for military professionalism. When soldiers abuse their 
power and violate the human rights of civilians, the officer must take appropriate measures to address, 
caution or sanction the perpetrators. When strict measures are not taken, and justice is not served 
to the victim, the legitimacy of the military can be a subject of contestation and public condemnation, 
and a possible consequence is that this could undermine mission success (Sarkesian, 1981; Howe, 
2001). Feaver (2003b: 77) adds that civilian leaders could also assert more regulatory control and 
choose to monitor the military more intrusively, thereby restricting professional autonomy. Typical 
examples of such intrusive monitoring include “withdrawing esteem or support … withdraw a measure 
of autonomy by placing societal controls upon the profession when it judges that the profession cannot 
maintain its own corporate self-discipline” (Galligan, 1979: 20–21). 
Clearly, self-regulation is central to military autonomy, and the discussion in this chapter supports the 
literature that this is among the most crucial characteristics of military professionalism (see Van 
Doorn, 1965: 267). Commenting on the African context, Howe states that “military rulers themselves 
are often to blame for the lack of professionalism” (2001: 13). In Nigeria, there appears to be a 
recognition of this concern, hence the decision to frequently change the STF Commanders in Plateau 
State due to the numerous problems evoked by the military in this State. However, despite having 
over ten Commanders (none of whom was below the rank of a Brigadier), this has not resulted in a 
change in the behaviour of personnel as the problem of the loss of military professionalism persists. 
This indicates a failing of the officer corps, a loss of service ethic by personnel, and an unwillingness to 
discipline and bring to order, personnel in society. 
 Military Culture and Habitus 
The previous discussion explained the loss of professionalism of the Nigerian military in the ISOPs it 
conducts in Plateau State. Two reasons for the problem were discussed: unprofessional conduct from 
soldiers, and a general weakness by the officer corps in the management of violence. The discussion 
detailed the problems civilians encounter with the military and the reasons why military abuses occur. 
However, the discussion did not cover the influence of military culture and habitus on personnel when 
they perform ISOPs in civilian society, which operates on a different cultural system altogether. I 
therefore now turn to these issues, with an outline of military culture and values, which are often the 
antithesis of those of civilian society. 
As a professional organisation, the military has a distinct occupational culture, which is different to 
those of professional civilian institutions. Along with this distinct military culture, most militaries are 
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relatively isolated from civilian society, in that they generally work and live in bases and barracks with 
their families (Soeters et al., 2006: 237). As such, the cultural elements of the military differ significantly 
from those of civilian society because the culture of the military aims at equipping and preparing 
personnel for battle (Esterhuyse et al., 2013: xvi). The need to equip personnel to be alert and battle-
ready at all times means that the military is characterised by a high degree of communal life, obedience 
to an established hierarchical structure, and a strict emphasis on discipline and control (Soeters et al., 
2006: 240). However, several external forces, including socio-political changes in society, have brought 
about a considerable change in the values of the modern military. This means a shift from traditional 
virtues to the new values of ‘duty, courage, commitment, patriotism, honesty and truthfulness, and 
competence’ (Keithley, 2002: 49–56). However, despite the changes, the military still has many 
features of a traditional military, it is still conservative in its outlook and focus on warfighting, and it 
still emphasises cohesion and formalism (Bacevich, 1997; Burk, 1999; Winslow, Heinecken & Soeters, 
2006). Given that military culture differs from the values of society, how does this influence soldiers’ 
behaviour when they are deployed in society? 
One answer to the question lies in the nature of military training and socialisation. The military trains 
and educates its new recruits to transform them from civilians to soldiers. The training process occurs 
mainly along the notion of the total institution, where recruits are isolated from society and are 
enclosed as a team or unit, and are made to live a regimented life with little or no control over their 
daily routines (Goffman, 1961: 5–7; Woodward, 2000). The training regime is designed to facilitate the 
transfer of military skills to the recruits, to ensure they become accustomed to military culture and 
are skilled in the art of combat warfare (Ricks, 1997; Woodward, 2000). However, although both the 
culture and training regime are important for teaching and instilling the necessary skills for combat 
operations, military training and education is not primarily focused on law enforcement (Salo, 2011: 
139). As such, the training prepares both personnel and officers for combat operations, although this 
does not prevent using them for military operations other than war (MOOTW). The concern here is 
that the training and indoctrination of recruits with the cultural values of the military equips them for 
combat, but it does not train them for ISOPs (Weiss, 2012; Dambazau, 2014). Bourdieu (1990) refers 
to this as habitus, a social disposition which embodies people, and shapes and guides their actions and 
behaviour. 
In the context of this study, it can be argued that the unprofessional conduct of soldiers occurs because 
of their cultural disposition. Personnel struggle with the tension of substituting the military values they 
are accustomed to with the liberal values of society in periods of both relative calm and hostility. Along 
with this, military training and strategies are not suitable for use in an internal capacity. In one recent 
study on ISOPs in some parts of Nigeria, Gulleng & Hunduh argued that “the Nigerian military was 
not ever intended to be substantially deployed in internal security… as a result, their strategies, 
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training and rules of engagement are not always suited” for this purpose (2018: 221). Similarly, Azinge 
(2013: 16–19) pointed to the orientation, training, strategy and tactics of the military as the reason for 
the challenges. In Pakistan, military training and values, including discipline, bureaucracy and ‘cohesion 
without consensus’, were highlighted as the key factors which deepened insecurity and gave rise to 
several fundamentalists (Farooq, 2012: 76). Similar problems were also reported in a study on the 
deployment of troops to suppress the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, and the Northern Ireland troubles 
(José & Rasmussen, 1999). Given this, one sees that the training and socialisation of personnel makes 
their engagement in MOOTW problematic. 
However, associating soldiers’ misconduct with the habitus of the military has two major 
shortcomings. One is that it ignores the fact that personnel can switch identity in different situations, 
particularly across time and locations (Bergman et al., 2014). A second is that it takes away the agency 
of personnel, as though habitus is fixed, unchanging, and cannot be unlearnt (Vest, 2012). Critiques of 
military habitus indicate that it does not take away the agency of personnel, although it can influence 
their behaviour (Reed-Danahay, 2005; Vest, 2012). As such, it is difficult to conclude whether 
personnel always act out of their free will or that military habitus often predisposes them to violate 
civilian norms. However, one can argue that unprofessional conduct such as rights violations, 
intimidation, coercion, and GBV can be influenced by military culture and socialisation and are thus a 
consequence of military habitus. It is difficult to associate other forms of misconduct with military 
culture and socialisation, as they are not influenced by military habitus, but by other factors. For 
example, personnel conspiring with armed groups and incidences of dereliction of duty are largely 
rational and premeditated actions. Along with this, corruption is also a product of rationally-thought 
actions. Warnings against extortion and signposts placed at checkpoints by the military support the 
claim that extortion and corruption are against professional military ethics. However, as the 
misconduct continues, one sees that these rational actions have become a part of the habitus of the 
soldiers. 
Another point is that participants reported that many soldiers abuse alcohol and substances during 
active duty hours. This supports the literature that binge drinking or alcohol dependency is high among 
personnel (Rona et al., 2010; Adams et al., 2013; Bray et al., 2013). However, I believe that this 
dependency problem has a bigger influence on corruption and extortion than habitus, as military 
culture and training does not encourage this rational misconduct. Given this, it seems that military 
habitus tends to influence personnel to commit atrocities that involves excessive use of force, GBV, 
and psychological and emotional abuse. However, it is difficult to substantiate the claim for acts such 
as corruption, dereliction of duty, and bias towards certain groups. As such, rational choice rather 
than habitus explains the abusive actions of the military when it conducts security enforcement duties. 
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In this regard, it is necessary to examine the consequences of the misconduct on the peace and security 
of civilians. 
Although the causes of strained CMR points to a loss of military professionalism, and the culture and 
habitus of the Nigerian military, these issues are deeply embedded in the military approach of 
concordance/agreement. However, while this forms the root of the problem, the level of subjective 
control over the military, which means that politicians fail to hold the military to account, serves to 
encourage the abuse and provide impunity. In turn, civilians feel compelled to exert their agency 
including providing security for themselves. Given this, it is important to understand the various ways 
they do this. 
7.5 AGENCY OF THE CITIZENRY 
The evidence from this study shows that the military abuses their power when they interact with 
civilians in the process of conducting military ISOPs. Some of the problems, such as unprofessional 
conduct and a lack of impartiality, result from the rational choice of soldiers. Other problems, such as 
the abuse of civilians emerge from the tensions between the military habitus of soldiers and civilian 
society. The findings indicate that the Nigerian military are predatory in nature, causing immense 
dissatisfaction among the citizenry, and this situation has caused the citizenry to use their own agency 
to counteract this misconduct. The findings of this study as presented in section 6.4 of the previous 
chapter indicates that the citizenry in Plateau State exert agency in all the ways identified by the 
typology of the quadrumvirate interaction theory. This includes compliance, contestation, 
collaboration, and confrontation.  
Accordingly, this study indicates several instances of compliance to demands from civilian political 
elites (the state) and from the military. One example of compliance is obedience to the imposition of 
curfews that restricted movement. Other forms of compliance included obeying extra-legal demands, 
especially from soldiers at checkpoints who extort money and valuables from citizens or inflict 
corporal punishments on so-called offenders. The problem with this is that it not only fosters a culture 
of impunity, but is a violation of basic human rights, and a clear disregard for the criminal justice 
processes. Although the findings indicate compliance, the study also found numerous instances of 
contestation against both military demands and those of the civilian political elites or the state. A 
typical example here is the use of protests and demonstrations, an action which has since been banned 
by the State government under the guise of ‘security concerns’. Examples of this were presented as 
legitimate and quasi-legitimate approaches in section 6.4.2 earlier. 
The findings of the study indicates instances of collaboration between the citizenry and the other 
partners. Legitimate aims for collaboration such as providing information to soldiers and civilian elites 
and calling to inform soldiers about the occurrence of violence were noted. Similarly, illegitimate aims 
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for collaboration were observed as some civilian groups ally with soldiers, particularly where they 
need them to overlook their criminal activities/attacks. In the same regard, confrontation, the last form 
of exerting agency were also observed in Plateau State. There have been several instances of civilians 
retaliating against military abuse and the failure to protect their community from attacks. As detailed 
in the findings, such instances include the violent protests that led to the damage/destruction of 
properties, such as vehicles in the government house, Little Rayfield and many other instances of 
violent hostilities against the military. This includes several instances of confrontation and burning 
down of military tents and removal of checkpoints in Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, and the 11 March 2012 
incident opposite the PRTV gate Rayfield. The Rayfield incident was because the soldiers failed to 
detect the suicide bombers who drove past the checkpoint before detonating their explosives at the 
St Finbarr’s Church, which was only some few meters away from the church. 
7.6 CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 
This section examines the implications of the strained relationship between the military and the 
citizenry when the military conducts ISOPs. 
7.6.1 Insecurity amidst military presence 
One critical consequence of this strained relationship is the continuous experience of the threat of 
violence and insecurity, in spite of the militarisation of society. Typically, the threats and insecurity 
emerge from two sources - the military institution, and armed groups. In terms of the former, studies 
show that where the state does not regulate its institutions effectively, they can become a source of 
insecurity to the citizenry (Buzan, 1983: 25; Howe, 2001: 13). Such threats include “physical threats 
(pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work 
or resources), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil activities), and threats to position 
or status (demotion, public humiliation)” (Buzan, 1983: 19–20). The findings of this study support these 
claims, as many participants reported experiencing or knowing someone who has been subjected to 
one or more forms of threats from the military. Hence, where the activities of the military are not 
carefully regulated, it results in a security dilemma for the citizenry as civilians have to contend with 
abuse and threats from both state forces and armed groups. 
Given the unpleasant encounters that the citizenry endures when interacting with the military, most 
of the populace feared encountering soldiers. The situation is not specific to Plateau State, but is 
reported across Nigeria in general (Dode, 2012; Omede, 2012; Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Peterside noted 
that “an average Nigerian encountering soldiers on the road is likely to be subjected to unnecessary 
and unwarranted fear” (2014b: 1306). This study shows that the citizenry experience fear because 
military abuse is a continuous threat in their everyday lives, supporting other studies which also 
reported that military abuse of power and human rights violations in communities have become a part 
of life for the citizenry (Okoli & Orinya, 2013; Dantani et al., 2017). 
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One would expect that the presence of the military should force a ceasefire and suppress further 
incidences of hostilities and violence. Yet despite their extensive deployment, violent attacks, hostilities 
and tensions remain a recurring problem in Plateau State (Olokor, 2017; Usman, 2017; Gulleng & 
Hunduh, 2018). In 2018 alone, attacks from suspected Fulani militias and reprisal attacks from other 
ethnic militias has resulted in the loss of over 200 lives (Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018a,c). 
This supports the claim by Ferreyra & Segura (2000: 19) that although the military is capable of forcing 
an immediate ceasefire and bringing about relative peace, the military option is only temporal, and 
often does not have a lasting impact. Other writers have highlighted “the irrelevance of military 
solution”, as the military appears to complicate rather than resolve the security issues (Sisk, 1995: 104; 
Howe, 2001: 13). In Plateau State, there may be other explanations as to why the crisis remains difficult 
to overcome. For this reason, it is important to examine why the threats of violence and hostilities 
from armed groups continue to be experienced in spite of the heavy military presence. 
7.6.2 Unwillingness to cooperate or share information with the military 
While civilians are often the target of violence from armed groups during conflict, writers indicate that 
they play a crucial role in the management of conflict and the peace enforcement processes (Miall et 
al., 1999; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005; Ramsbotham et al., 2011). One way they do this is 
by reporting strange and suspicious activities, persons, or objects in their environment to military 
personnel. This is important as security agencies cannot effectively cover and monitor all communities 
due to several limitations, including inadequate manpower. Added to this, many contemporary 
conflicts and violence occur within society and are mostly fought by masked armed groups that hide 
and seek refuge within civilian society (Kaldor, 1999, 2013; Thompson, 2014). Under such conditions, 
security tips from civilians form an integral part of preventive and proactive mechanisms for preventing 
the outbreak of violence and further insurrections. Accordingly, it is common practice for security 
agencies to make available to the public, dedicated hotlines and phone numbers to call and offer 
security tips or when in distress and in need of emergency response, and this is also the case in Plateau 
State. However, the strained relationship between the citizenry and the military in this State has 
hampered cooperation between the military and civilians in reaching lasting peace. 
Three factors impede effective cooperation between the military and civilians. The first is the fear 
among civilians that they could be victimized if they report information to the military. The findings of 
this study indicate that a significant section of the population do not have a healthy relationship with 
the military and have developed antipathy toward soldiers. As a result, civilians are less inclined to 
report sensitive security tips to the military, preferring to share security information with local 
authorities such as traditional chiefs and local vigilante groups. This makes it more likely that civilians 
will harbour belligerents, especially when they feel that such armed groups can provide the protection 
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that the military cannot. Again, this points to a lack of trust and legitimacy in the military, which adds 
to the unwillingness of civilians to cooperate and share information. 
A second factor that impedes effective cooperation between the military and civilians is military 
legitimacy. Sarkesian (1981: 13) and Pattison (2011: 136) argue that the legitimacy of the military relies 
heavily on effective performance of the tasks that the military is charged with carrying out. This 
includes fulfilling the aim of a mission such as suppressing violence, peace enforcement and protection, 
or ensuring that the citizenry enjoy their basic human rights. The inability of the military to prevent 
attacks, and the widespread nature of military corruption and extortion undermines their public 
legitimacy. 
In Plateau State, the legitimacy of the military is further undermined by suspicion that the military 
fosters and facilitates an Islamic agenda. Christians believe that the attacks are an attempt to continue 
with the aim of the Sokoto Caliphate (of a Fulani, Sheik Usman Dan Fodio) to defeat and subject the 
indigenous people of Plateau State to its imperial rule. The concern is that President Muhammadu 
Buhari, whom the military receives orders and command from, is a Fulani. His ministerial appointments 
disregarded the constitutional provision of reflecting the ethnic diversity of Nigeria, and his security 
council comprises of mostly Muslims, many whom are from the Hausa/Fulani ethnicity. Added to this, 
he has not been vocal against the attacks by his kinsmen (Ostien, 2009: 2–11; Crisis Group, 2012: 6; 
Madueke, 2018: 96–97). The recent actions of the STF Commander, General Anthony Atolagbe, such 
as relocating the operational base of the STF to Barkin Ladi, a locality most affected by attacks from 
Fulani militias, led to unprecedented success in arresting militants and forcing a respite. However, 
many analysts claim the effort may not have been supported, as he was immediately recalled, a decision 
made by the Chief of Defence Staff who is appointed and directly reports  to the President (Ogorry, 
2018; Usman, 2018d; Yakubu, 2018). Therefore, one sees that the military is acting as a political tool 
because it lacks professionalism and is serving the interests of the ruling class (Huntington, 1957: 80). 
The third factor pertains to the rule of law, and how the military complicates the criminal justice 
process (Howe, 2001: 30–31), such as when the Constitution of a state is replaced with martial law, 
especially during periods of emergency rule. When this occurs, military ISOPs are often characterized 
by arbitrary arrests and heavy-handedness. As this study has shown, in conflict situations it can be 
difficult to differentiate between assailants and victims acting in self-defence, and civilians are often 
arrested and detained without trial, for summary punishment and for a myriad of other civil offences. 
Typically, these problems arise when the military becomes involved in handling civilian disputes. Ideally, 
these should be referred to the police for prosecution, but military personnel frequently assume this 
role. 
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The problem with the involvement of the military in civilian disputes centres around what Von Benda-
Beckmann (1981) refers to as ‘forum shopping.’ Forum shopping is the choice disputants make in 
choosing “between different institutions and they base their choice on what they hope the outcome 
of the dispute will be, however vague or ill-founded their expectations may be” (Von Benda-Beckmann, 
1981: 117). The problem with this is that personnel often lack the capacity and the patience for 
investigation to ascertain guilt as the police and the courts do. As such, this justice can be denied 
where the accused is subject to unnecessary coercion, physical and psychological punishments and 
abuse before ascertaining guilt. As civilians choose their arbiters based on expected outcome/benefit, 
it is likely that they elect soldiers that will favour them, even when they are wrong or the guilty party. 
Another concern is that military personnel do not specialise in investigation, hence they could destroy 
and trample on the evidence required for effective prosecution of crimes and violations. Woody (2017) 
for instance observes this as a major challenge in the over ten years Mexico’s military campaign against 
drugs trafficking and cartels. As such, this study supports similar studies which indicate the involvement 
of the military in handling civil disputes and issues (see Baaz & Verweijen, 2014). 
7.6.3 Violence against the military  
Faced by growing threats from the military, civilians exert their agency by adopting various strategies 
to cope with or counteract the abuse. According to Verweijen (2015: 191–192), the first is compliance 
or obedience to military demands and instructions, although this could be either willingly or grudgingly. 
The second strategy involves civilians collaborating with the military to achieve a set aim, be it a 
legitimate or an illegitimate/harmful aim. The third strategy involves contesting military actions or 
behaviours. Elements of each of these were identified in this study. Some comply and obey military 
orders, others collaborate with the military specifically to cause harm to other groups, while at the 
same time there is a general contestation of military violations by others. This supports the claim that 
the expression of the agency of civilians towards the military is fluid and enacted on the basis of 
perceived benefit or harm to the individual actor (Verweijen, 2015: 211). Because individuals associate 
themselves with certain identities, it is understandable that their interests could change over time and 
in different situations. 
One notable rational evaluation of benefit and harm played out in two different but related protests 
in Plateau State by women. Abdullahi et al. (2016: 19) described Christian women staging a protest 
march against the military and calling for their withdrawal from Plateau State, while Muslim women 
staged a counter-protest maintaining that the military should remain in Plateau State. They further 
pledged continuous support and satisfaction over the role and duties of the military in Plateau State. 
In each of these cases, the two groups acted based on actual and perceived rationality having weighed 
between benefit and harm of the presence of the military in their respective communities. The 
Christians demanded withdrawal because they suffered injustice, while the Muslim groups protested 
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because the presence of the military in Plateau State was beneficial to them. Civilian actors are likely 
to comply with legitimate instructions, but when they consider certain actions as harmful, they are 
likely to contest the source of harm, including when it emanates from the military. Contestation in 
this sense entails refusing to comply or obey instructions made by military personnel. It assumes 
“active efforts at resistance, implying that civilians take the initiative to protest against certain of the 
military’s practices or certain units or figures within the military” (Verweijen, 2015: 192). 
Unsurprisingly, this study found that civilian contestation of military violations in Plateau State used 
some of the repertoires identified in the literature.115 
One such example is collective violent protest actions against the military or a military unit considered 
to be acting illegitimately. This falls under what Verweijen (2015: 197–211) calls collective popular 
protest against the military, and is one of the two ways the citizenry enact their agency in Plateau 
State. The often disruptive and violent nature of collective civilian protest actions and demonstrations 
undermines their legitimacy. Nevertheless, it calls attention to the concerns of civilian groups that can 
prove successful in forcing desired changes. The women protests in Plateau State were successful in 
compelling the Federal Government to withdraw and replace the entire military personnel (Crisis 
Group, 2012: 21), while similar civilian protests and demonstrations against the deteriorating security 
situation compelled the replacement of some STF military Commanders. This indicates the strength 
and efficacy of the collective power of the citizenry when they protest to force a change of their social, 
political or security conditions. The civil contestation in what is called the Arab 
renaissance/spring/uprising is an indication of how the exercise of agency can bring about socio-political 
changes (Puddington, 2012; Lutterbeck, 2013; Nepstad, 2013). 
A second way that civilians enact their agency is through direct confrontation, usually involving violence 
aimed at military personnel. Civilians in Plateau State tend to engage in rapid reprisal attacks after an 
attack or a bomb explosion in their community or in a neighbouring community (Krause, 2011: 36–
44; Musa, 2014b: 78, c: 122–123), and this often involves attacking, killing, and burning or destroying 
properties of persons of other religions. In the case of violence against the military, most incidents 
involve mob violence against military personnel either for failing to prevent an attack, or for suspicion 
of complicity. In some instances, military checkpoints are pulled down and the barricades and tents of 
personnel at checkpoints are destroyed or burnt down. I bore witness to violence against the military 
on 11 March 2012 following a bomb attack targeting Christian worshippers at St Finbarr’s Catholic 
Church Rayfield, in Jos South LGA of Plateau State. Worshippers who survived the bomb explosion 
                                               
115 Contestation in the Kivu province takes the form of: everyday contestation (negotiation and bargaining, non-compliance, 
trickery, hiding, avoidance, and rumours), collective popular protest (demonstrations and spontaneous protests, strikes, 
mob justice), and professional practices of contestation (civilian authorities, civil society organizations and local media, and 
formal vs informal forms of contestation) (Verweijen, 2015: 197–211). 
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immediately formed a group, attacked the military personnel at the nearby checkpoint, and destroyed 
and burnt down the checkpoint. 
There are several incidents of confrontation/killing of soldiers in Nigeria. For example, in October 
2001, 19 soldiers were killed in Benue State by Tiv ethnic militia groups who were dissatisfied with 
the actions of the military deployed to contain hostilities in their communities (Agbu, 2004: 25). In 
Plateau State, four soldiers were killed in the first quarter of 2018. One reason for this violence is 
citizens’ dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the military, while also serving as a means of enacting 
their agency and making their grievances known. Confronting soldiers and pulling and burning down 
checkpoints sends a strong message that the citizenry do not want the military in their community. As 
with the case of the military checkpoint next to St Finbarr’s Church in Jos, civilians burnt down the 
checkpoint and to date has not been replaced. Such acts are seen as a way of expressing local autonomy 
by civilian communities suffering marginalization/oppression (Godoy, 2004: 637–639). Accordingly, 
Godoy argues further that this serves as: 
[A]n attempt by embattled communities to reassert their autonomy after decades of 
repeated assault by State armies, local elites, the globalized economy, and other 
adversaries. By enacting these highly ritualized, unequivocally public displays of “justice,” 
marginalized communities seek not only to punish and to deter criminal activity, but 
perhaps more importantly, to reassert themselves collectively as agents rather than 
victims (Godoy, 2004: 621). 
This shows the strength of collective action by the citizenry, and highlights that the citizenry is not just 
a passive actor, but that they have and exercise their agency when they are not satisfied with their 
social, material, and general conditions of living. This reinforces the position of Schiff on the importance 
of introducing the citizenry as a partner with agency in CMR: “the current civil-military relations 
literature does not consider the citizenry, … it reflects only a partial story of civil-military relations” 
(Schiff, 1995: 13). These issues have consequences for both peace and stability, especially as the military 
is not only seen as lacking legitimacy but is also coming under attacks from civilians who see them as 
being complicit in violence. As in the case of the Tivs murder of 19 soldiers, civilians recognize their 
individual weaknesses, and decide to form alliances or join militias to exert their agency. The next 
section discusses this point further. 
7.6.4 Armed groups proliferation, deteriorating insecurity 
Numerous studies have reported the increase in non-state armed groups in North Central Nigeria, 
particularly in Plateau State (Crisis Group, 2012: 15; Ploch, 2012: 10). This is attributed to growing 
levels of hostilities and insecurity, and the inability of the government to adequately curb the violence 
and protect the citizenry. Since the outburst of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001, several 
communities across the 17 LGAs have experienced many incidents of violence. This is largely due to 
the proliferation of armed groups, which means civilians and civilian groups feel the need to protect 
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themselves against these threats. Hence, both individually and collectively, some feel compelled to ally, 
join, or seek needed protection from armed groups and state oppression. 
Studies show that threats and insecurity from both state and non-state sources compel the citizenry 
to seek protection. Buzan (1983: 31) contends that “individuals can do many things to enhance their 
security both against threats from the state and against threats which the state has failed to alleviate.” 
He stressed further that such security-enhancing measures include formation or alliance with armed 
groups. Collier (1999: 10) argues that individuals “who join opposition movements often seek the 
security that the state has failed to provide: participation represents an attempt at individual or 
community self-help in a setting of social anarchy.” Clearly, the Plateau State example reflects the 
position of these studies. Two types of armed groups operate in this State - ethno-religious militias, 
and criminal armed groups specialising in looting and cattle rustling. 
The proliferation of ethno-religious militias in Nigeria predates the country’s current democratic 
dispensation. Agbu (2004: 14–33) examined the historical antecedents of some of the renowned 
groups, noting that many emerged as a result of frustration and dissatisfaction with the government, 
the socio-political reality, and the economic hardship citizens face. This supports the generally-held 
view that militias are the result of an unpopular and failing state, and its inability to provide basic and 
essential public goods evenly across the state (Shultz et al., 2004: 33; Carey et al., 2012: 250; Thompson, 
2014: 89). In terms of organization, ethno-religious militias in Plateau State are usually loosely-
organized and operating as community vigilante groups. They are often led by a leader who directly 
reports to either a community leader (a Chief or a community leader called Mai Angwa), a religious 
leader or both, depending on the ownership of the group. Some of these groups are for self-help and 
defence against threats, aggression and attacks from known or suspected rival groups (Gulleng & 
Hunduh, 2018). Muggah & Sang (2013: 427) refer to such groups as “spontaneous community groups 
arising as part of their self-defence strategies and in response to repressive police and military tactics.” 
Membership of ethno-religious militias in Plateau State is often exclusive to members of the 
community, church or mosque that the militia represents or defends, and these larger communities 
fund the group through voluntary or enforced contributions. The size of each group is often 
determined by factors such as the perceived level of threat facing the group, the size of the community, 
and the availability of able-bodied youths. Irrespective of the size of these groups, they will often attack 
unsuspecting communities to inflict the maximum harm possible, and minimize their own casualties 
(Sayne, 2012: 6). This mode of attack makes them highly effective in inflicting violence against enemies, 
as evidenced by the recent overnight attacks on 23rd and 24th June 2018, which resulted in the death 
of at least 233 people (Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018a,c). These attacks are more serious 
when the groups acquire small arms and light weapons. Muggah & Sang (2013: 427) argue that “such 
weapons are frequently used by vigilante, neighbourhood-based and spontaneous community groups 
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as part of their self-defence strategies and in response to repressive police and military tactics.” In 
turn, this makes them a serious security challenge to both the citizenry and the state (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010: 223). 
In North-Central Nigeria, criminal armed groups that specialise in cattle rustling are a major security 
challenge. The groups are highly clandestine in their operations, membership and finances. For 
example, the Fulani herdsmen accuse local native community groups of cattle rustling, implying that 
such communities assist the criminal groups (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 11).116 In January 2011, 
over 7,000 cattle were said to have been stolen by criminal groups (Krause, 2011: 44). However, 
recent reports in the media indicate that while native militia groups might play a role, members of the 
Fulani ethnic group are also culpable of cattle rustling (Olokor, 2018; Usman, 2018e,f). While little is 
known about the organization of cattle rustling groups, their activities pose a significant security threat 
as they cause retaliatory attacks by Fulani militias. 
The security problem arises when heavily armed Fulani militias react by attacking communities, they 
suspect of rustling their cattle. This has caused “the escalation of conflict, and is responsible for… a 
similar pattern of violence in the Southern Zone of Plateau State, with pockets of the situation in the 
Northern and Central Zones” (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 13). While Para-Mallam & Hoomlong 
(2013) observed this warning sign at an early stage, the failure by government to address this problem 
has led to it becoming a national emergency. In 2017, the Global Terrorism Index reported that Fulani 
militias carried out more attacks than the Boko Haram terrorist group, killing over 2,500 Nigerians 
between 2012 and 2016 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017: 24). Total deaths from its attacks 
in Nigeria since 2001 is estimated at over 60000 people (Obaji, 2016). 
From another angle, while both ethno-religious militias and criminal groups appear to be effective in 
their use of violence against civilians and their opposition, the level of effectiveness suggests that 
military personnel collaborate with these armed groups in various ways (also see Para-Mallam & 
Hoomlong, 2013: 11). A typical example is military inaction or refusing to promptly respond to calls 
for distress when a community is under attack, as was the case in the 2004 intercommunal violence in 
Yelwa-Shendam of Plateau State. Human Rights Watch (2005: 47) observed that the military only 
responded to the violence after about 700 people were killed. The result of this inaction is the loss of 
trust and legitimacy of the military, and the failure of the military and the State to successfully restore 
peace and stability.  
                                               
116 In Nigeria, as in several parts of West Africa, the Fulani are known for nomadic cattle farming, which involves open grazing 
of their animals and constantly migrating from one part of the country to another in accordance with the seasons.  
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From this, it is obvious that the role of the Nigerian military in Plateau State has become a matter of 
concern due to the challenges it evokes for the citizenry and the state of peace and security. While 
Abdullahi et al. (2016: 9) observed that “only a heavy presence of military and police forces ensures a 
fragile calm in the city,” this has not resulted in the restoration of peaceful coexistence in Plateau State. 
On the contrary, the military presence has evoked hostility, worsened the insecurity and violence 
experienced. Along with this study, other studies point to evidence that the military has indeed 
entrenched the conflict situation and added to the number of civilian casualties (Sayne, 2012: 8). In 
fact, Dantani et al. (2017: 99) argue strongly that “state security agencies constitute veritable threat to 
the security of the citizens… and rather than restore peace and order, they exacerbate crises, thus 
ramping up social and political tensions.” 
Since the outburst of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001, the conflict situation has assumed different 
dimensions while spreading through most parts of the State. Typically, the conflict took the form of 
open confrontation, attacks, and burning of properties and valuables of minority groups. In Christian-
dominated neighbourhoods, Muslims and other non-Christians became the target of violence and were 
killed if they could not escape. The same victimization happened in streets and neighbourhoods with 
majority Muslim dwellers. Places of religious worship of both groups were burnt and destroyed. This 
paved way for the compartmentalization of residents, forcing those who were unable to return to 
their properties to sell or abandon them and move to neighbourhoods occupied by those sharing 
similar religious affiliations. However, following the heavy presence of military personnel, the conflict 
assumed the pattern of “silent killing”.117 
Added to this, militias started using the cover of night or darkness to attack unsuspecting communities. 
Improvised explosive devices were acquired or made by some groups to launch quick attacks to inflict 
maximum harm (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 11; Musa, 2014b: 79–81). In turn, these incidences 
led to a surge in civilian deaths. In the 2001 crises, between 3,000 - 4,000 people were killed in the 
conflict. Since then, several episodes of violence and reprisal attacks have led to more deaths, while 
displacing over 220,000 people (Krause, 2011: 36; Abdullahi et al., 2016: 9). However, the deterioration 
of the conflict occurred while military presence was firmly established and widespread across this 
State, thereby, pointing to the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the military option. 
  
                                               
117 Silent killing refers to isolated killing of othered persons (for example, Christians in Muslim neighbourhoods and vice 
versa) and mostly burying their remains so that the assailants or their community would not be implicated for the murder. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the experiences of civilians with the military ISOPs in Plateau State, Nigeria. 
The aim was to understand whether the State exercises adequate civil control of the armed forces to 
ensure that it does not become a threat to the citizenry and exacerbate insecurity. To understand the 
issues, the study argues that there is a relationship between authority and conflict, hence, a conflict 
theory explanation was used to explain why conflicts occur in society (see Dahrendorf, 1958, 1959). 
It notes that dissatisfaction from marginalisation or the deprivation of certain section of society tends 
to compel the desire for social change, including using violence where non-violent alternatives fail. 
Typically, where the problems are not addressed promptly, it results in insecurity that threatens both 
the political and social stability of the state. 
The study established that contemporary violence and conflicts manifests in numerous ways, which 
are often determined by the actors and their motives for resorting to the use of violence. This means 
both state and non-state actors perpetrate contemporary violence, and these non-state actors could 
assume the form of a militia, an insurgent, terrorist groups, or organised criminal and transnational 
criminal organisations. Two of these groups were found to be operating in Plateau State. One is 
criminal armed groups who specialise in rustling cattle for the economic motive of profit. The second 
are numerous militia groups that are motivated by a combination of religious, political, and ethnic 
ideologies. These groups typically operate in the guise of community vigilante groups, or the armed 
faction of ethnic or religious organisations. The activities of these groups has turned Plateau State to 
a scene of recurrent violence since the 7 September 2001 violence between Christians and Muslims. 
The problem with the activities of armed groups as evidenced in Plateau State is that they are difficult 
to suppress, and the police do not have the capacity to contain the emergence of armed violence. 
Armed groups who use sustained violence of irregular nature against state forces and civilian groups, 
overwhelm many African police forces who are under-manned and equipped to counter their threats. 
Because of this, it has become the norm for many African governments to deploy the military to curb 
the violence and conflict situations these groups create. This is the situation in Nigeria where several 
parts of the country continues to face incidences of recurring and protracted violence and armed 
conflicts. However, while the military has come to be accepted as the most potent organ of the state 
with the superior coercive force to suppress the threats and violence posed by armed groups, this is 
problematic, especially where the military is generally abusive and engaged in numerous predatory 
activities that violate the human rights of the citizenry and exacerbates their insecurity. 
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One key finding of this study is that the abuse of power by the Nigerian military in Plateau State has 
made the military unapproachable to the public. This has strained the state of CMR and has made 
civilians loathe to associate with the military. Some have also felt compelled to seek alternative 
protection against violence from armed groups and from the coercion of the military. The study traces 
military abuse and human rights violations during military ISOPs to two sources. The first points to 
this as the product of the rational choice of soldiers that are either supported, or tolerated by military 
commanders, which undermines military professionalism and the legitimacy of the military. The study 
establishes that there is an association between abusive military conduct (such as dereliction of duty, 
conspiring with armed groups, and corruption and extortion) and the loss of professionalism. It further 
indicates that this has the negative effect of eroding the service ethic of selfless service, as well as the 
corporateness of the military. The lack of political neutrality, a key element of military professionalism 
is also undermined where political elites are retired military officers. These political elites, given their 
close relationship with the military, undermines effective civil control especially where they fail to hold 
the military accountable for human rights violations and the abuse of power 
The second source of military abuse and human rights violations is the tension between military culture 
and habitus, and the values of society. As military culture differs from civilian values, the habitus of 
soldiers makes them act in ways which are unacceptable to society. However, as critics of habitus 
indicate, habitus does not necessarily take away the agency of the actor. While it can influence action, 
soldiers are capable of exercising agency to decide to be abusive, or to act professionally. Typically, a 
weak implementation of civil control of the military has contributed to foster the unprofessional 
military conduct. Using the quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation, the problem is understood 
to have emerged from the subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, despite 
agreement on the pattern of CMR at the major level of intersection. This means that agreement on 
the pattern of CMR must be closely followed with an effective implementation strategy at the subunits 
of the political and military sphere to ensure conformity and compliance with the agreement in place. 
The evidence from Plateau State shows why this is important, particularly because where it becomes 
the norm for the military to be abusive, it has negative implications for CMR. 
Accordingly, my assessment of the CMR literature indicates a disconnect between theory and the 
findings of this study, as existing theories do not explain the agency of the citizenry. Most of the 
literature focuses on institutional explanations of CMR and civil control, while not explaining crucial 
micro issues, and particularly the agency of the citizenry. As numerous studies have been conducted 
on CMR and the civil control of the military, this study focussed on an under-researched aspect of the 
discipline. The study shows the complex interaction between the partners in CMR, and the various 
ways the citizenry can influence CMR, despite being the partner with less influence when compared 
to political elites and the military. It presents evidence that the citizenry can exert agency which can 
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undermine the agreement and understanding reached at the institutional level of policy where all the 
partners interact and agree on the pattern of CMR. When the citizenry is dissatisfied with the military 
and consider their actions illegitimate, this can result in tension and crisis that can sever CMR. 
This study indicates that civilians in Plateau State are dissatisfied with the unprofessional conduct of 
soldiers, and that they consider the military a source of threat and insecurity. This has led some to 
retaliate against military abuse, a situation which emphasises the agency of the citizenry. This supports 
the position of concordance theory, which introduced the citizenry as a third autonomous partner in 
CMR. However, while Schiff’s contribution introduced the citizenry as an autonomous partner, it does 
not address their interaction with the military in terms of how they exert their agency. This is 
undertheorized but has a critical effect on CMR, as the findings from Plateau State indicate. To explain 
this, the study proposed the quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation of CMR which takes these 
micro level issues into account and also reflects on how it affects agreement at the intersecting level. 
Using the quadrumvirate interaction theory, the sources of the strained CMR were identified as the 
subunits of interaction between the military and the citizenry, and the subunits of interaction between 
political elites and the citizenry. Along with this, a weak implementation of civil control in Nigeria has 
meant that the military has come to act as a law upon themselves, which abuses their power and 
authority with impunity. As such, civil control only occurs subjectively because civilian political elites 
also appear to benefit from the lack of professionalism of the military because it is predatory, but as, 
long as it does not take over political power. Thus, although personnel continue to act 
unprofessionally, state actions to address this are minimal and have little or no impact. 
The implication is that the insecurity in Plateau State is likely to remain unchanged and may further 
worsen, despite the continuous presence of the military and the security enforcement duties it 
conducts. As such, it becomes clear that although existing literature supports the internal use of the 
military as a necessary evil, the effectiveness of military ISOPs is questionable and of little help. Where 
there is a weak civil control of the military, and consequent failure to uphold professional standards 
the military can act with impunity. The challenge with this is that compromised soldiers can collaborate 
with armed groups to aid their attacks or abet it by overlooking the attacks while it occurs, thus, 
worsening insecurity and eroding public trust and the legitimacy of the military. Under this 
circumstance, military ISOPs is counter-productive because it exacerbates insecurity. As is the case in 
Plateau State, this can compel the citizenry into exerting agency in numerous ways to protect 
themselves or to retaliate military abuse, thereby, further worsening insecurity. 
In conclusion, although Nigeria faces serious internal security challenges, social instability, political 
uncertainties, and has a history of military intervention in politics, the Nigerian military has yet to 
intervene in politics since 1999. One explanation from this study suggests that the Nigerian military 
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holds significant prerogatives in political and economic structures of the State, therefore, it has no 
need for intervention in politics yet. Evidently, the security problems discussed in this study, and the 
growing unhealthy relationship between the military and the citizenry are some of the key predisposing 
factors influencing military intervention in politics. Added to these are monumental corruption in the 
civil service, deep-seated political grievances, and increasing ethno-religious intolerance. Although no 
such intervention has occurred since the return to civilian rule in 1999, when the problems extend to 
other States in Nigeria, it would not be surprising if the military intervenes to ‘salvage the situation’, 
as it has done in the past. Hence, the need for the State to adopt certain measures that could prevent 
a possible return to a predatory praetorian military era is necessary in Nigeria. The signs are ripe, and 
Nigeria is currently on a ticking time bomb. 
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the conclusion of this study, in the previous section, the key problems uncovered by this study were 
highlighted as: (1) Nigeria has a weak implementation of civil control of the military, especially to curtail 
military excesses and the violations of the human rights of the citizenry; (2) there is a general failure 
of the State to fulfil its part of the social contract to address the conflict situation in Plateau State and 
guarantee security to the citizenry; (3) the citizenry have felt compelled to exert agency by allying or 
joining armed groups to provide the needed security and protection from military abuse and coercion; 
(4) the combination of all these problems has resulted to a the worsening of insecurity in Plateau State. 
In the light of these problems, this study presents some recommendations to help address the 
problems. 
Given the general weakness in implementing adequate civil control of the military, there is a need for 
an improved civil control of the military, across the various arms of government. As the 
representatives of the people for instance, an improved parliamentary oversight by the National 
Assembly which is empowered to ensure the military complies with the regulations guiding its missions 
would improve compliance. This can also include making publicly available, the military rules of 
engagement for every internal security operation in the country. The benefit of this is that it will 
improve accountability, ensure compliance, and also serve as the standard which to assess the 
performance and activities of personnel deployed for every ISOPs in society. Without this, it becomes 
difficult to determine which actions of personnel are appropriate, when to use force on civilians, and 
the extent at which force can be used against a protesting or riotous civilian group. 
Similarly, another important area of consideration relates to the role of an independent military 
ombudsman that can effectively intervene in the areas of military abuse. While at present, the National 
Human Rights Commission of Nigeria performs similar activities an ombudsman can perform, an 
independent military ombudsman dedicated to addressing issues of military abuses is more beneficial. 
The everyday presence of the military in society and the high frequency of military abuse requires a 
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priority attention in order to adequately address the challenge. Also, as the military is in active 
deployment in many parts of the country, this measure can help to build public trust in this institution 
of the state and improve its status and legitimacy. 
This study highlights that the Nigerian military is largely unapproachable to the public, and civilians 
prefer to distance personnel as far as they can. The source of this problem was identified as the military 
approach indicator of concordance/agreement – that is, the reflective and interactive aspect of military 
style which considers, both human and relational variables when the military interacts with society. As 
this is influenced by military training, socialisation, and habitus, an obvious solution to this is to 
prioritise redressing the socialisation and habitus of the military in a way that aligns with the values 
and tradition of society. This point emphasises the position of Janowitz that the values of the military, 
especially when it assumes constabulary roles should be closely aligned with those of its society in 
order to overcome the challenges with its new role in society. The expectation is that this will help 
transform the acquired military habitus which makes it difficult for personnel to maintain healthy 
relationship with civilians. 
This study found a general loss or a lack of professionalism by personnel of the Nigerian military 
conducting military ISOPs in Plateau State, across all the dimensions of military professionalism. While 
some pointed to the socialisation and habitus of the military, some were out of the rational choice of 
soldiers, thereby highlighting a general lack of discipline in the military. This is a leadership and 
command issue and the necessary military sanctions should be in place to discipline, charge and dismiss 
soldiers who are found guilty of misconduct and human rights violations. Clearly, there is the need for 
the military to develop an effective way of tracking erring personnel, and ensure they are subject to 
an effective disciplinary procedure. 
Unprofessional actions such as corruptly extorting money and valuables from civilians at checkpoints, 
which is rampant and pervasive can be easily identified when commanding officers engage in ‘disguise 
monitoring operations.’ This can be in the form of boarding a commercial taxi which plies the roads 
with checkpoints, using trucks and vans of commercial drivers, and also boarding the popularly used 
tricycle (Keke Napep). The benefit of this is that it will raise consciousness among personnel that their 
activities are subject to effective monitoring by their superiors, and hence, discourage unprofessional 
conducts. Added to this also, there is the need for an effective disciplinary procedure to ensure justice 
is served to victims of military abuse and excesses. Where the accomplishment of the agencies of the 
military on redress offered to victims of military abuse is made public, this will increase civilian 
confidence to approach the bodies rather than retaliating such. Agencies such as the human rights 
desk of the Nigerian Army and its department of civil military affairs are among those that require 
such priority attention. 
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 FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
As this study focused on how civilians experience their interaction with military, an area for future 
research is to establish how military personnel experience their deployment in ISOPs, and why the 
act in the way they do. As the study only relies on the account of civilians and political elites, it did not 
benefit from understanding the opinions of personnel on the problems and concerns civilians raised 
about the military, and particularly the excessive use of force. Thus, the study has not presented a 
complete account of CMR in Plateau State in Nigeria, giving that it only provided the opinions of only 
two of the three partners. A comparative study that cross-examines the opinions of both civilians and 
military personnel directed at understanding the knowledge, attitude and practices is necessary to 
develop effective policies for intervention to address the issues raised in this study.  
A study which uses multiple case studies, or one conducted across two or more countries with 
civilians, active-duty military personnel, and political elites as participants would be highly beneficial. It 
would serve to validate the claims of this study and could be important in strengthening the 
quadrumvirate interaction theory this study propounds, especially the claim that civilians are capable 
of exerting agency which can affect the state of CMR. 
Future studies should also attempt to verify the representativeness of both enlisted soldiers and the 
officer corps of the Nigerian military, especially, their ethnicity, religion, and gender. This can provide 
understanding on the social dynamics of those serving in a conflict situation and can verify the degree 
of compliance with personnel’s representativeness. It would also present a variable for understanding 
why soldiers are keen to support communities who belong to their religious or ethnic background 
while neglecting others. In the same way, the gender balance of the military can also be an important 
variable to explore. This could provide more insight on the frequency of military abuse of civilians, 
giving that most of the abuses were perpetrated by male personnel. 
Another possible area of further study is the Operation Rainbow constabulary forces which this study 
did not investigate. Future studies should examine the effectiveness of the constabulary force, and the 
effect of having multiple state security agencies in conflict situations. There is a possibility that because 
multiple security agencies operate in Plateau State, security coordination could be an issue, and that 
this could have an impact on the conduct of the military ISOPs in Plateau State. 
 POSTSCRIPT 
After the data of this study were generated, certain events and developments occurred that are crucial 
to mention as an afterthought. One development was the creation of the Plateau Peace Building 
Agency by the current government of Plateau State. The expectation is that the body will bridge the 
gap between the reactive security measure of deploying personnel with proactive conflict prevention 
intervention strategies. One of the key outputs of the agency has been the development and launch of 
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a five-year strategic action plan (2018-2022) tagged Plateau State Roadmap to Peace on 8 March 2018. 
The action plan has five priority areas which the government wishes to focus attention on as key to 
promoting peace and avoiding a relapse to violence in the State. These priority areas are: 1) research, 
coordination and partnership; 2) natural resources management 3) peace education 4) gender and 
youth development 5) post conflict rehabilitation (Plateau Peace Building Agency, 2018). However, the 
document provided little to no attention to issues of CMR and the security role of the military, which 
this study has argued is exacerbating the security situation in this State in Nigeria. 
Another incident was the killing of Major General Idris Alkali (who had just retired from active service 
in August 2018) in Dura-Du community in Plateau State. The incident was said to have occurred as a 
retaliation by angry protesters who blocked the road and attacked travellers, in the aftermath of an 
attack in their community. However, while this incident raised concerns across the country, several 
commentators and analyst expressed concern on the genuineness of the recovery of the corpse of 
the late General by the military. The concern was that an autopsy was not conducted to authenticate 
that the corpse was the body of the late General before it was reburied by the military. This was 
because he was reported missing/killed for over a month before the corpse was recovered from the 
grave, and later the well it was hidden, as such, the recovered corpse was beyond recognition. What 
is important for this study is the concern raised by the military authority that knowing the late Major 
General was personnel did not deter the protesters from killing him. This corroborates the position 
of this study that there is a wide feeling of disaffection and dissatisfaction with the military, and that 
civilians feel compelled to take up arms, even against the military. 
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APPENDIX A – SOME INSTANCES OF MILITARY ABUSE 
1. Abuja: “Nigerian female army beats man for calling her beautiful”: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEFgfDOwbqE and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlUYnrvkTsg 
2. Link of interview granted by the victim on Channels Television: 
http://dailypost.ng/2016/02/08/how-i-was-tortured-for-telling-female-cadet-she-is-beautiful-amari-
sunday/   
3. Abule Egba Lagos: “Nigerian Naval Officers Beating Poor Man Because Car Broke Down”: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iY3nAxvyE1E 
4. Onipanu, Lagos: “Army Officer beat up a conductor”: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSTiBwNhAnM 
5. “Nigerian Army Abusing Civilians”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxNcFWI8VHw 
6. “Nigerian Army Doing What They Are Best At”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sInlDiqIZso 
7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDwTtTdGQlw 
8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zE4HHv0dpPY 
9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vy4o1TqbBZI 
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APPENDIX B – AIDE MEMOIR 
Duration of residence in study area 
Are you permanently resident in Plateau state? 
Length of time spent residing in the state 
Any travel away from the study area in the past 5 years for up to 2 months? 
Employment or occupation status of the participant 
Frequency of contact with military personnel 
Military stationed in close street or neighbourhood? 
Daily contact frequency with military 
Reason for coming into contact with the military – checkpoint and activities at checkpoints 
Is there substantial military presence at workplace, market, school or place of worship? 
Experiences 
Experience fear or panic with military presence and why so? 
Remarkable experience with the military (personal or otherwise) 
Bad/sad/sour experience with the military 
Place of occurrence 
Account of the experience. 
Any experience by a friend, colleague, relative, or employer? 
General relationship with military personnel: cordial or negative 
Perception 
How would you feel if the military is withdrawn from the state? 
Importance of military presence in Plateau state 
Are you happy with the service of the military in the state? 
Trust in the ability of the military? 
Military bias  
Excessive use of force 
Friendliness with civilians 
Cooperation with military 
Provision of useful information to military personnel – Facebook, social media? 
Cooperation with military personnel 
Comfort with military presence 
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Armed groups and fake soldiers 
Who is responsible for the attacks in the state? 
Masked armed groups or unknown gunmen 
Fake soldiers 
General or distinct features 
Legitimacy of using the military  
Support for the use of the military? 
Tension 
Exacerbate insecurity? 
Adaptation or how tension and fear is overcome? 
Military use of abusive and derogatory words 
Feeling of military bias – if so perceived, how is it handled?  
Any incidence of civilian protest against the military 
Civil-military interaction 
Problems 
Eroding the liberty of civilians? 
Military presence evoking fear, panic or hope 
Feeling of sense of security or insecurity 
Forceful tolerance and peaceful co-existence 
Military predation or enforcing peace  
Excessive use of force 
Military and police/civil defence relations 
Resentment or sympathy of military towards civilians 
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